CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 



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CHINA IN 
TRANSFORMATION 

BY 

ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN 

GOLD MEDALLIST, ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY 

AUTHOR OF 

"THE OVERLAND TO CHINA," "GREATER AMERICA," " THE MASTERY OF 

THE PACIFIC," "DAN TO BEERSHEBA," ETC. 



REVISED AND ENLARGED 
WITH TWO MAPS 




LONDON AND NEW YORK 

HARPER & BROTHERS 

45, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 

1912 



©CU.lBt.lGl 9 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

INTRODUCTION - - - - - VII 

I. THE CHINESE PEOPLE - - - I 

II. CHINA AND RELIGION - - - - 36 

III. GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION - - 54 

IV. CHINESE DEMOCRACY - - - - 87 
V. THE NATIVE PRESS .... I0 5 

VI, THE NEW LEARNING .... 124 

VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS .... 136 

VIII. DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE - - - - 171 

IX. THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION - - - 198 

X. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM - 2IO. 

XI. COMMUNICATIONS - 236 

XII. CHINA AND THE POWERS - 248 

XIII. WHITHER, CHINA ? - - - - - 275 

APPENDICES : 

(i) RAILWAYS ..... 287 

(2) GLOSSARY OF TERMS - 2gO 

(3) IMPERIAL BUDGET FOR I9II - - - 293 

(4) FOREIGN LOANS OF CHINA - - - 294 

INDEX ------- 295 

MAP. TREATY PORTS AND RAILWAYS - - - 286 

MAP. CHINA, JAPAN, AND KOREA - - - end 

V 



INTRODUCTION 

The first edition of " China in Transformation " 
appeared in 1898, at a time when signs of renascence 
were obvious only to those who had the opportunity to 
look below the surface. The author's first intention 
in bringing out the present edition was merely to pre- 
serve those parts which appear to have a permanent 
value, but in practice it was found difficult to adhere to 
this, and the result is a book, of which many chapters 
are entirely new, while all have been carefully revised 
and brought up to date. 

If it appears that rather undue proportion is given to 
the history of the middle of last century, and especially 
to the diplomatic and commercial relations of that 
period, it must be explained that the material for this 
was obtained by the author in 1897 from original 
sources no longer available either to the student or the 
general reader. For this reason this portion has only 
been slightly curtailed, in order to fit better into the 
general perspective. 

As the original edition, though fourteen years old, 



viii INTRODUCTION 

has never ceased to circulate, notwithstanding the 
great number of books on China which succeeded it, 
it is hoped that the present work, which is really a 
new " China in Transformation," will meet the need for 
a simple, yet not ephemeral, description and estimate of 
a country and people destined, before long, to be counted 
among the great world-powers. It may interest readers 
to know that this work has exercised some little influence 
on the Chinese reform movement. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, 
at present leader of the republican party in China, 
informed the writer that he was seldom without a copy, 
having, in his wanderings, purchased as many as fifteen 
for himself and his friends. 

The author has to acknowledge his indebtedness to 
several old China friends for help in revising the proofs, 
to Mr. H. B. Morse's " Trade and Administration of 
the Chinese Empire " — a valuable study — and to the 
China Year Book, 1912, which is a mine of information 
on a variety of subjects. 



CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 



CHAPTER I 

THE CHINESE PEOPLE 

The manners and customs of the Chinese, and their 
social characteristics, have employed many pens and 
many tongues, and will continue to furnish an inex- 
haustible field for students of sociology, of religion, 
of philosophy, of civilization, for centuries to come. 
Such studies, however, scarcely touch the province 
of the practical, at least as yet, for one principal 
reason — that the subject is so vast, the data are so 
infinite, as to overwhelm the student rather than 
assist him to sound generalizations. Writers on this 
theme may be classified more easily than the subjects 
on which they write. Two groups at least are 
sufficiently distinct to admit of being labelled : the cen- 
sorious and the picturesque. Both approach Chinese 
portraiture with a bias which distorts their pictures. 
The one set go up and down among this great people 
with a Diogenes lantern, and fail to find any good 
thing in them. They are weighed in the balance 
against other nations, notably the Japanese, and are 



2 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

found wanting.* Their virtues are vices, their customs 
odious, their religions abomination, and all their 
practices brand them as a lost race. These catalogues 
of vileness recall a class of advertisements now very 
common, which from a tale of unutterable woe lead up 
to a sovereign remedy. 

The second class of writers seek, legitimately enough 
for their own purpose, to catch the excrescences of 
Chinese life, with a view to caricature, and through 
their exertions the European public is possessed of a 
series of impressions which, though true in themselves, 
are out of setting, and, for want of a natural back- 
ground, constitute distorted pictures. A few philo- 
sophical observers like Sir John Davis and Taylor 
Meadows address serious readers, but are little known, 
though they are most authentic. The Abbe* Hue 
touched with an artist's pen the dry bones and made 
them live. Dr. Williamson has left us many sound 
and practical observations. But the reading public of 
our day are chiefly indebted to the two American 
missionary writers, Justus Doolittle and Arthur H. 
Smith, for the most laudable attempts to cover the 
whole range of Chinese life, the one relating with great 
circumstantiality of detail the social customs of the 
Chinese, and the other their moral and mental 

* " The sickly praises lavished by passing travellers upon Japan 
and her fitful civilizations ; the odious comparisons drawn by super- 
ficial observers to the disparagement of China, of her slowly- 
changing institutions, and of her massive national characteristics ; 
these are gall and wormwood to all who know under whose tuition 
it was that Japan first learned to read, to write, and to think." — 
" Gems of Chinese Literature," by Herbert A. Giles. 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 3 

characteristics.* That these two conscientious writers 
have done their best to repress natural prejudices 
cannot be doubted; and that one of them has suc- 
ceeded, at least in his second edition, may be readily 
admitted, which is the more creditable since it is 
obvious that the very raison d'etre of the Christian 
missionary would be gone if the Chinese were acknow- 
ledged to be a nation of exemplary livers; for they 
that are whole need not the physician. One may 
specially commend Mr. Smith as at once terse and 
fascinating, calm and cultured : his modest volumes t 
bear the impress of accurate original observation in 
every line. Readers whose tastes incline them to 
follow up this interesting subject will thus find 
abundant food for reflection in the recorded observa- 
tions of a host of writers, from the early Jesuits, whose 
works have borne the test of two or three centuries of 
subsequent experience, down to the shoal of ephemeral 
paragraphists and photographers of our own day. 
This is not the place either for abridged discussion or 
for summarizing conclusions on questions which do 
not fall within the scope of the present volume. Only 
one observation need be made which ought to be 
borne in mind, alike in judging of their traditional 
customs and of their potential efficiency in the life of 

* Though hundreds of books have appeared in the last fifteen 
years, some of them containing clever and picturesque studies of 
various phases of Chinese life, the writer has read nothing to 
alter this estimate of the best authorities on Chinese character. 
Of recent descriptive books he would place first Mr. Johnston's 
" Lion and Dragon in Northern China," which contains valuable 
side-lights on characteristics. 

t " Chinese Characteristics " and " Village Life in China." 



4 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

to-day. The two great facts which differentiate the 
Chinese from every other people of whom we have any 
knowledge are their unprecedented mass and their 
unprecedented duration. Without discussing the causes 
of one or the other feature, the bare facts are there, 
staring us in the face, and they surely explain much 
that strikes the foreigner as paradoxical. There has 
never been any such accumulated experience in the 
world's history ; never such accumulation of custom, 
of ceremonial, of superstition. The early contempo- 
raries of China have all fallen to pieces, some of them 
many times, and the continuity of tradition has been 
broken. But if we, instead of gathering their social 
history painfully from potsherds or paintings on tombs, 
or their religion from survivals of poetical mythology, 
found the Assyrians, Babylonians, ancient Egyptians, 
and ancient Greeks alive at the present day, should we 
not expect to find the same maze of folk-lore as in 
China, the same confused and contradictory supersti- 
tions, layer upon layer, survivals from the oldest 
mingling with the newest accretions ? The product 
resulting from duration multiplied by numbers must be 
immense, and if to that we add a third factor — isolation 
— we have no right to be surprised either at the complex 
character of Chinese civilization or at its peculiarly 
conservative form. Indeed, whatever may have been 
the cause of the long life of the nation has probably 
also been the cause of its crystallization. And that is 
what gives so hazardous a character to all innovations 
forced on China from without. 

Leaving aside, for the moment, all these speculative 
questions, it may be profitable and practicable to 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 5 

consider in what relation the Chinese people stand to 
the outward and workaday world of our own time. 
What part are they capable of playing in the drama of 
mechanical progress, in which they are left no option 
but to join? To arrive at a just opinion on this 
subject it will be better to consider the Chinese from 
the point of view of their likeness to ourselves, rather 
than from that of their unlikeness, which is the 
picturesque view. No nation can be fairly judged by 
its books, for there will always be a gulf fixed between 
aspiration and achievement, between the maxims of the 
study and the manners of the forum. For practical 
purposes we must take the Chinaman of real life, of 
active life. We have known him intimately for over 
sixty years— a cycle of Cathay — and can speak of his 
doings, if not of his thinkings. His predominant 
quality, that which marks the Chinese as a race, 
whether at home or abroad, is, beyond doubt, his 
industry. He has almost a passion for labour: in 
search of it he compasses sea and land. He seems 
born to be the hewer of wood and drawer of water 
for humanity, but not as a slave. The Chinaman is 
a merchant and sells his labour for a price. 

In those countries where the race is persecuted it is 
his industry which offends, because it competes with 
the desultory work of white men, who deem them- 
selves entitled to dissipate half their time. Com- 
bined with the appetite for hard work the Chinaman 
has two highly important qualities — docility and 
temperance. The latter enables him to profit by a 
double economy — that of time and that of money ; the 
former enables him to " stoop to conquer." There is, 



6 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

indeed, no end to his patience. He is content to 
exploit worked-out claims for an infinitesimal gain, and 
as ready to be kicked out whenever it pleases his 
superior white brother to come along and "jump" 
them. A valuable agent is the Chinaman, therefore, 
for sweeping up the " tailings " of human industry. 

He demands no comfort, still less luxury ; but, though 
he can do with rough and scanty fare, he never starves 
his body when he can afford nutritious, well-cooked 
food. For sentiment, as we understand the term, the 
Chinaman has no sympathy. His outward life is 
conducted on a " cash basis," so much so that when 
wages are very low he will sometimes strike a balance 
between work and food, calculating that, as a certain 
amount of exertion will necessitate so much food, the 
game may not always be worth the candle. He works 
outrageously long hours with very moderate induce- 
ment ; the clink of the artisan's hammer and the whirr 
of the spindle are heard in the streets at all hours of 
the night, and the dawn finds the labourer already at 
work. The faculty of endurance and of patience is 
well evinced to foreigners in such occupations as 
domestic service and nursing, in both of which 
capacities the Chinaman excels. However late the 
master or mistress may come home the servants are 
in waiting, and are as ready for a call in the early 
morning as if they had had twelve hours' good sleep. 
As nurses Chinamen are quiet, light-handed, and 
indefatigable ; no need, with them, to reckon day and 
night shifts ; such snatches of sleep as can be picked 
up at odd moments satisfy them. 

In addition to robust muscularity the Chinese 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 7 

physique is endowed with great refinement. Their 
hands and feet are well made, and the fingers are 
remarkable for suppleness and delicacy of touch. 
Their skill in the minutest kinds of handicraft, such 
as intricate carving in wood or ivory, miniature paint- 
ing, and fine embroidery, are well known ; and when 
European manufactures are introduced into China, 
they will find no lack of the manual dexterity needed 
for the most delicate productions. Ample experience 
has shown the aptitude of Chinese artisans and 
mechanicians to fabricate in wood and metal, and to 
become experts in the use of labour-saving machinery. 
Not only in workshops and building-yards has the skill 
of their artificers been tested and approved, but in the 
responsible positions of engine-drivers on steamboats 
and locomotives, under proper training, the Chinese are 
found to answer all requirements. 

The intellectual capacity of the Chinese may rank 
with the best in Western countries. Their own literary 
studies, in which memory plays the important part, 
prove the nation to be capable of prodigious achieve- 
ments in that direction. It is stated in Macaulay's 
" Life " that had " Paradise Lost " been destroyed, he 
could have reproduced it from memory. But even 
such a power of memory as he possessed is small com- 
pared with that of many Chinese, who can repeat by 
heart all the thirteen classics ; and it is as nothing to 
that of some Chinese who, in addition to being able to 
repeat the classics, can memorize a large part of the 
general literature of their country. A Chinese acquaint- 
ance of mine was able, at the age of sixty-five, to repro- 
duce verbatim letters received by him in his youth from 



8 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

some of his literary friends famous as stylists. When 
pitted against European students in school or college 
the Chinese is in no respect inferior to his Western 
contemporaries, and, whether in mathematics and 
applied science or in metaphysics and speculative 
thought, he is capable of holding his own against all 
competitors. 

In considering the future of the Chinese race, there- 
fore, we have this enormous double fund of capacity to 
reckon with — capacity of muscle and capacity of brain ; 
and we have only to imagine the quantitative value of 
such an aggregate of nervous force, when brought into 
vital contact with the active spirit and the mechanical 
and mental appliances of the West, to picture to our- 
selves a future for China which will astonish and may 
appal the world. 

But, while there are here the elements of an im- 
mense subordinate success— the success of muscular 
and intellectual force directed by a master — it does 
not follow, and there are many to be found who will 
deny, that the Chinese can ever play the leading role. 
Experience, it must be admitted, so far as it goes, 
gives its verdict against this, though the verdict 
is by no means final ; and it is to be noted that 
Dr. Pearson, in his learned and well-thought-out work 
on " National Character and Development," ignores 
altogether the assumed disability of the Chinese to cope 
with the creative genius of the world. In favour of 
Dr. Pearson's hypothesis of the latent power of the 
Chinese race their mere numbers are a telling fact, 
since, if the percentage of original, initiating and direct- 
ing minds among them were but a tithe of that of the 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 9 

Caucasian races, it would constitute them a real ener- 
gizing force in the future progress of the world ; and, 
though the modern Chinese copy and do not originate, 
may there not be in them, nevertheless, a latent talent 
which is waiting for favourable circumstances to cause 
it to blossom into action ? That they possessed creative 
power in the past cannot be doubted. Before answer- 
ing the question, however, we should have to solve a 
few preliminary ones, as, for instance, the true cause of 
Chinese stagnation and of the sameness of their life 
routine. 

Here, however, it may be appropriate to indicate, 
briefly, some traits of character and effects of hereditary 
training which militate against their success in the 
pursuits which have built up the power of the modern 
Christian States. Only a few of the more obvious need 
be noted. One is universally acknowledged : it is the 
indifference to truth, as such. A lie is no disgrace ; it 
is only disgraceful not to put a good " face " on things. 
Combine these two ideas, and the natural result is 
universal mistrust, which places co-operation, without 
which even a pin cannot be economically made, largely 
out of the question. The entire absence of natural 
science and of any definiteness of conception or 
arrangement in matters not rigidly prescribed by 
traditional etiquette coincides with the unconscious- 
ness of the value of accuracy; but the question is 
whether the general introduction of science as part of 
the educational curriculum, followed by its extensive 
application to the business of life, will not cure this 
radical defect in the moral equipment of the nation. 
That such a result would be, at the least, a protracted 



io CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

affair, the most sanguine can hardly doubt, nor will the 
process be rendered the more easy by the fact that the 
Chinese have discovered certain working substitutes for 
factual truth. Meadows has pointed out that personal 
probity is not relied upon, because the business of life, 
mercantile and domestic, is carried on under a chain of 
guarantees, infidelity to which is of very rare occur- 
rence. In a general reform of the code of honour, this 
time-honoured institution would have to be uprooted, 
rendering the whole operation doubly difficult, except 
as a result of protracted evolution. But, as an offset 
against a chain of reasoning based upon experience in 
other countries, we are bound to confess that China is 
a country where one can never argue from premises. 
Seventy years of dealing with them may convince us 
that co-operative trading is impossible for the Chinese, 
and then comes the astonishing experience of the Com- 
mercial Press, as told in the chapter on " The New 
Learning." 

Closely allied with untruthfulness is the looseness of 
conscience in the handling of money. The process 
known as " robbing Peter to pay Paul," of patching a 
hole by a piece cut out of the garment, forms a part of 
the Chinese practice, from the Throne downwards. 
Even in the returns of the imperial revenue the authori- 
ties seem to prefer that deductions be made from dis- 
bursements before remittances are forwarded, rather 
than that the full revenue be shown on one side of the 
account and the full expenditure on the other. Such a 
system invites peculation, which is carried on whole- 
sale throughout every Government department. The 
shifty tendency pervades every relation of life ; shame- 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE n 

less malversation is tolerated as a mere peccadillo where 
a breach of filial etiquette would be punishable as a 
crime. With such a code of financial morality it would, 
apparently, be impossible to develop joint-stock enter- 
prise, for no confidence would be felt in the integrity of 
the management, and yet in Hong-Kong, Singapore, 
and Tientsin such enterprises are now being success- 
fully conducted. Mines do not pay the proprietors 
because the labourers pilfer the production ; cotton 
factories because the mill-hands carry off the raw 
material, stowed away in their clothes ; railways, under 
native management, eat up the capital provided with- 
out any appreciable advance to completion. The most 
important Chinese companies are machines for whole- 
sale misappropriation of funds, a state of things which 
is always aggravated in cases where an official has a 
hand in the manipulation. While such an all-sufficing 
explanation exists, it seems needless to seek for more 
speculative reasons for the want of enterprise of the 
Chinese, or for the well-known fact that they are willing 
to place their funds at low interest with foreign banks 
rather than trust their own countrymen on more tempt- 
ing terms. This preference for foreign security, based 
on foreign integrity, is the principal lever by which the 
commercial, industrial, and financial resources of China 
may hereafter be developed. It is only by organized 
probity that we can compete with the Chinese. This 
is not advanced as a principle or a theory of Chinese 
morals, but merely as an empirical observation, for it is 
in flat contradiction of other facts equally well known. 
The probity of Chinese merchants and bankers has 
always been proverbial, and is no doubt the basis of 



12 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

their success in these enterprises. It is a melancholy 
fact that this high standard has suffered by contact 
with Europe and America, but it remains unique in the 
business world. As the Chinese have no separate 
castes, it is hard to account for such apparently 
contradictory phenomena as exceptional fidelity in 
certain walks of life and systematic fraud in others, 
the line of demarcation being, moreover, sharply 
drawn. 

That some general cause is in operation to produce 
such disparate results seems evident, and the explana- 
tion may possibly be found in the special training 
which is required by different avocations and the 
selection of the men who are to follow them. Every 
profession has its own code of honour and rule of 
practice, and every society its law of self-preservation. 
The deterioration of Chinese commercial morality is 
said to be due to the influx into business of a different 
class of men to those originally engaged in what was, 
after literature, the most honourable pursuit in China, 
Commerce cannot be carried on without confidence, 
and the continuous experience of many centuries has 
burned this law into the hearts of those who are 
enrolled under its banner. Natural selection will tend 
constantly to the rejection of individuals who do not 
obey the law by which alone a commercial community 
can live, and the hereditary principle lends its potent 
aid towards keeping the body pure. Traditions handed 
down from father to son, not so much in formal maxims 
as in daily practice, enter deeply into the character; 
and children follow unconsciously and automatically 
the ways of their fathers and families, in contact with 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 13 

whom they have grown up. They would find it difficult 
to do otherwise. 

The different code of honour which prevails in official 
circles, on the other hand, may equally be pleaded as a 
necessity of existence. No Government official in China 
can possibly live on his pay ; his necessary expenses 
many times exceed it. What is he to do ? Immemorial 
tradition points out the way. The ox is not muzzled 
that treads out the corn. Of course, official corruption 
is an insidious poison, not only as affecting the efficiency 
of the public service, but also the personal character of 
the individual. Once admit bribery or malversation 
as a justifiable means of living, and it is impossible to 
draw the line. Necessity soon becomes rapacity, and 
rapacity grows by what it feeds upon. It is astonishing 
that any vestige of character is left in men who have 
graduated in the official school. Some, indeed, there 
are who resist the common temptation, and are re- 
garded as a kind of monstrosity of virtue — a sort of 
"white elephant" — who for this reason may claim 
unlimited indulgence. Such officials must either be 
themselves wealthy, have wealthy friends, or be financed 
by some shrewd man of business, who manages every- 
thing behind the back of his principal. 

The danger of new enterprises lies in the circum- 
stance that they fall outside the tradition, and therefore 
outside the protection, of the professional code which 
is so efficacious within its own sphere. If an official 
personage has any concern in the undertaking, his 
dominant idea is to make it a milch-cow for himself; 
his whole habit of mind would militate against his 
paying any regard to the rights of shareholders. 



14 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

Where the commercial morality of the Chinese is at 
its worst is where it comes in contact with Western 
legality. They are shown in an unfavourable light 
when, for example, they are called upon to pay up calls 
on their shares in limited companies registered abroad. 
This is one of those cases where their tradition fails to 
support them in a right course, the whole thing being 
alien from their own customs. Neither family honour 
nor public opinion concerns itself with such strange 
devices as foreign legal forms, which are as unintelligible 
to the Chinese as to the unlettered peasantry of Europe. 
There is no sanctity attaching to them, and if their 
terms can be successfully evaded, and without pre- 
judicing one's interest in other ways, it is considered 
permissible, the mere moral sanction counting for 
little. 

Rectitude of conduct between man and man is secured 
among themselves in an entirely different manner ; 
everything is regulated by custom, which possesses 
greater vitality than judge-made or statute-made law. 
A mercantile contract, for example, drawn up and 
signed, is held of quite secondary validity ; but if 
bargain-money has been paid it is unimpugnable, and 
bargain-money without the paper is of greater efficacy 
than the paper without bargain-money. It is not, 
therefore, to be expected that a people living and 
moving in such an atmosphere of tradition and custom 
should adapt themselves easily to the machinery of 
foreign legislation, which in its subject-matter is neces- 
sarily altogether uncouth to their ideas, varies more or 
less in each nationality with which they have to deal, 
and is subject to change in each new session of some 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 15 

foreign parliament which to them has not even the 
consistency of a myth. 

" Respect for the law," as a virtue of civilized peoples, 
cannot apply to exotic regulations which are alien in 
their nature as well as in their source. The sentiment 
bred in the bone of the Chinese people is not respect 
but reverence for law ; it is more than religion to them. 
But the foreign manufactured article is as a strange 
god introduced into their pantheon ; it takes no hold 
of their moral sense. The whole attitude of the Chinese 
towards this kind of law, therefore, differs fundamentally 
from that of the peoples of the West, and this should 
be taken into account by all who have business with the 
people of China. The Chinese look to quite other safe- 
guards in commercial dealings than do Englishmen, 
who have always a solicitor at their elbow and learned 
counsel to consult on every clause and shade of meaning 
of a contract. In the first place, the Chinese merchant 
or banker places no reliance whatever on litigation, 
but takes his measures as if there were no such thing to 
fall back upon. His first line of defence against fraud 
or misunderstanding is to select his clientele on the 
most rigid principle, and deal only with men of known 
character and untainted connections, in such a manner 
as to be able to follow them into all the transactions they 
may undertake. It is this perfect mutual knowledge 
which cements the confidence between men of business, 
and the customs, which are better known to them than 
any legal enactments can possibly be to the people of 
Europe, rule every transaction that is doubtful. Written 
contracts have scarcely any place in the Chinese system, 
whereas they are the very essence of ours. Our jurists 



16 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

place the verbal construction of an agreement before 
everything, while in China the whole stress is laid on 
the obvious and reasonable intention of the parties ; the 
one regards only the documentary contract, the other 
the thing contracted for. The difference between the 
two points of view is almost irreconcilable, and it is as 
erroneous for us to test Chinese equity by means of our 
standard, as for the Chinese to judge us wanting in 
good faith because we take advantage of a technicality 
to avoid a disadvantageous obligation. The moral to 
be drawn from this state of things would seem to be 
that each party should take the other on its own 
ground — that foreigners should rely on Chinese time- 
consecrated sanctions to bind the Chinese commercial 
conscience, and that the Chinese should trust foreigners 
only so far as they can have written contracts signed, 
sealed, and delivered. 

An element of distrust between Chinese and foreigners 
— which is really a phase of that natural instinct of 
resting on the substance and not on the form — is the 
looseness and disregard of punctuality which charac- 
terize the Chinese. Except in banking transactions, 
time with them has not the same recognized value as 
it has to us, and their habits are easier and more 
slovenly. This leads to irritation, and sometimes need- 
less suspicion, when an important engagement is not 
kept, and when either no excuse is thought necessary 
or the most ridiculous reasons are given. Much should 
be allowed for mere habit in such matters, and a great 
deal more for the complex life Chinamen lead. It is 
alleged against them that they are superstitious, but 
it is scarcely possible for a foreigner to conceive how 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 17 

completely their lives are enveloped in cobwebs of 
necromancy, geomancy, witchcraft, animal worship, 
luck, evil eye, and a thousand influences which seem to 
us grotesque and childish. This is a natural result of 
the long duration of the people, which has permitted 
the accretions of 3,000 years to be preserved in a 
gigantic accumulation, whereas the primitive beliefs 
and folk-lore of Western peoples have been broken up 
by their migrations, wars, and commotions. Almost 
every conceivable action of a Chinaman's life is pre- 
scribed by a minute etiquette which no one dreams of 
disregarding. Being unintelligible to foreigners, this 
necessarily creates friction in their mutual relations. 
But in addition to this the Chinese, even the most 
reasonable and most practical, are under the dominion 
of sorcerers and fortune-tellers and the reign of " luck " 
to such an extent that they are in constant appre- 
hension of doing or saying things at the wrong time, 
the wrong place, in the wrong way, or in company with 
the wrong people. A promising combination may be 
spoiled by some occult warning, and a Chinaman may 
often have bad faith imputed to him when he is really 
under the constraint of some influence which he dare 
not avow, and which causes him to make a shuffling and 
mendacious excuse.* 

What is most mysterious in Chinese ways would 
probably be simple enough if we were in sympathy 

* Foreign trained Chinese students may escape from some of 
this bondage, though they will find it difficult to evade its influ- 
ence when they return home. But, after all, the foreign trained 
man is still a minute fraction of the vast population, whose 
characteristics can alter but slowly. 

2 



18 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

with the explanation. Probably the fundamental prin- 
ciple of their national and private life, the family idea, 
if well understood, would supply the key to many 
seeming peculiarities. To dub them idolaters because 
they worship their ancestors is begging the question. 
It were more to the purpose to examine into the 
relationship which is called " worship " and see what 
an important part these ancestors play in Chinese life. 
Their authority seems to be the power which keeps the 
nation together ; they are one with their posterity, and 
the ancestral tomb is the family altar. 

The ancestors assist at the family council and 
sanction its proceedings. The effect on the practical 
or business life of the people of the ancestral cult is 
various. The family being the unit of the State, there 
is a collective responsibility for the behaviour of each 
member, in consequence of which order is kept in every 
village and city without the supervision of military or 
police. This alone is no slight gain. The family 
responsibility in financial matters, too, gives security 
in business, for a debt is never cancelled except by pay- 
ment, and descends as a burden from father to son. A 
bad side of the system is the moral obligation which 
rests on anyone who is rich to support all the members, 
for obviously such a principle discourages enterprise 
and industry. It stands seriously in the way of material 
progress, for no sooner does a man by his own energy 
establish some promising industry than he is pounced 
upon by all the ne'er-do-wells of his family, who live 
upon him, and whom he is obliged to employ to the 
exclusion of useful men, even to the ruin of his enter- 
prise. It is impossible for a Chinaman to emancipate 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE ig 

himself from this family incubus, and the fact must be 
reckoned with in all schemes for co-operation with 
Chinese. 

In all estimates of the social system a practical dis- 
tinction must be made between the Chinese people in 
their individual and their public capacity ; between 
their utility as material to be moulded and managed by 
others, and their power to organize and lead their own 
forces — industrial, commercial, political, and military. 
In what has gone before, the former forces have been 
glanced at ; we will now refer briefly to the latter. 

The Chinese in public life, as we conceive the idea, 
is as yet an unknown quantity. The nation, as a whole, 
does not concern itself with political affairs any more 
than, on the advice of Confucius, it concerns itself with 
theological affairs. The popular maxim is that, as the 
mandarins are paid (and pay themselves) for attending 
to public administration, it is their business to do it, 
while the public cultivates its garden and pays its taxes. 
As this is not a philosophical treatise, we are not 
tempted to speculate on the development of this state 
of feeling, or on its significance, further than to make 
the obvious remark that a faculty that has never been 
used, or that has fallen out of use, is virtually non- 
existent. We may conclude, accurately enough for 
practical purposes, that public spirit has hitherto been 
an unknown sentiment to the Chinese people. To our 
appreciation the Chinese, as a nation, exhibit no 
patriotism ; but this may be the effect of our own 
prejudice and want of insight into the true relation 
between the subject and object of what we call 
" patriotism." Instances of the loftiest and purest devo- 



20 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

tion are not rare, nor in these cases does the ideal 
appear very different from our own. Speaking, how- 
ever, only of what operates on the masses as we see 
them, and not as they may be intrinsically, we should 
perhaps be justified in saying that what represents the 
feeling of patriotism in China is a survival of clannish- 
ness, which affects small segregated areas — not a pro- 
vincial or even a civic patriotism, but rather a local 
village spirit which on occasion is capable of com- 
bining to resist extortion or resent interference. It is 
elsewhere shown how this great political vacuum in the 
Chinese social organism is partly supplied by secret 
societies, as in the commercial sphere the juridical gap 
is supplied by trade guilds. The officials themselves 
possess their defensive combinations, each province 
having in the capital a society, which we call a "club," 
where gatherings are held daily to discuss public affairs. 
These clubs are managed with considerable strictness, 
and the very highest officials may be expelled when 
accused of conduct derogatory to the character of the 
society. It is interesting to note that the particular 
offence which has led to a sentence of expulsion in con- 
spicuous cases has been " truckling to foreigners." For 
this the most respected and influential official in the 
last two generations, Tseng Kwo Fan, father of the late 
Marquis Tseng, was expelled from the Hunan Club in 
Peking, and many years and many sacrifices were 
required before he could gain readmission. This 
general, perhaps universal, feeling — a most natural and 
proper feeling, we must admit — against foreigners is by 
some maintained to be the only article in the Chinese 
code which may fitly be called patriotic. In i< 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 21 

when this book was first published, although anti- 
foreign feeling was rapidly growing, it did not appear 
to have any central idea or direction or to lead to 
common action ; but, in the years which have passed 
since then, out of the blind agitation which culminated 
in the Boxer agitation has come a clearer vision of 
China's needs. It is less the foreigner who is blamed 
by the intelligent reformer of to-day than the Govern- 
ment, which has made the predatory actions of the 
foreigner possible. " China for the Chinese " became 
an anti-dynastic cry as well as anti-foreign, and the 
conduct of the reformers of 1911-12 in protecting mis- 
sionaries and other foreigners shows the trend of their 
policy. 

The events which followed the Boxer rising dissi- 
pated the remains of the atmosphere of semi-religious 
seclusion with which the Throne had been surrounded, 
and as a political force the Manchu dynasty showed 
itself contemptible. Reverence for the Throne un- 
doubtedly exists as the apex of that great pyramid, the 
family system, but is rather a sublimated religious than 
a political sentiment. There is no vital attachment in 
it, no loyalty which commands sacrifice, and among the 
officials even the genuine feeling of devotion to the 
Imperial service has been absorbed into and dissipated 
by the hyperbolic formulae prescribed for their memorials 
and addresses. 

Associated with the political are the military senti- 
ments of the Chinese people. There we find the same 
general principle prevailing — that of aloofness or in- 
difference. If they ever were warlike, the" Chinese 
ceased for very many centuries to be so. The nation 



22 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

has survived the military age, and till recently the 
treatises on strategy dated from before the Christian era. 
For a long time, even after they had come in contact 
with the West, the Chinese persisted in their contempt 
for militarism. They conceived the superiority of their 
antagonists to be due merely to mechanical devices, and 
therefore supplied themselves with the latest pattern in 
guns and other armaments without any provision for 
training men. Their defeat at the hands of Japan in 
1894-95 opened their eyes to the facts, and Yuan Shih- 
kai, during the period which followed the counter- 
reform of 1898, actually raised, trained, and equipped a 
respectable modern army. The reorganization of the 
army was initiated by Yuan in 1902, and a law of 
military reorganization was promulgated in 1905. A 
national army has been established — at least, theoretic- 
ally — with the view of replacing the heterogeneous 
forces under the Provincial Viceroys, but as yet it is 
impossible to form any accurate estimate of the calibre 
of the troops. They have been distinguished, for the 
most part, by a tendency to mutiny, which is not the 
best of signs. 

The personal courage of Chinese soldiers is usually 
estimated at a low value, but there are extenuating and 
explanatory circumstances. The manner in which an 
old-time Chinese force used to be levied, the way it was 
treated, paid, and led, should excuse much in the 
private soldier. When sent unarmed, as they virtually 
were in the Chino-Japanese War, against highly-dis- 
ciplined and well-armed hosts, the only sensible thing 
to be done was to retreat, and, as in that movement, 
at least, their commanders could generally be counted 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 23 

on to set a good example, they fell back in greater 
or less disorder before the invaders. But when they 
are paid, fed, disciplined, and armed, as was for a time 
the case in the Chinese navy, the men leave little to be 
desired in the way of courage. Even then they need 
leading. Under European officers there was no forlorn 
hope or desperate service for which they would not 
volunteer, and they rallied round the brave Admiral 
Ting, whom they were ready to follow to a heroic death, 
when he was shut in a trap in his own port, Wei-hai- 
wei. It has always been the personal qualities of a 
man, rather than a cause, which attracted the Chinese. 
Gordon could have led them anywhere ; so, no doubt, 
could Admiral Ting. It is probably a mere question of 
organization with the Chinese, who are apt learners, 
and are capable of drill and discipline. Confidence 
will do the rest — confidence in their leaders and — in 
their pay ! 

Chinese Gordon and Lord Wolseley have spoken 
highly of the courage and endurance of the Chinese 
soldier, and an excellent resume* of his qualities has 
been given by one who had experience with Gordon's 
" Ever Victorious Army." 

"The old notion is pretty well got rid of that they 
are at all a cowardly people, when properly paid and 
efficiently led ; while the regularity and order of their 
habits, which dispose them to peace in ordinary times, 
gives place to a daring bordering upon recklessness in 
time of war. Their intelligence and capacity for re- 
membering facts make them well fitted for use in 
modern warfare, as does also the coolness and calm- 
ness of their disposition. Physically they are, on the 



24 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

average, not so strong as Europeans, but considerably 
more so than most of the other races of the East ; and 
on a cheap diet of rice, vegetables, salt fish, and pork 
they can go through a vast amount of fatigue, whether 
in a temperate climate or a tropical one, where Euro- 
peans are ill-fitted for exertion. Their wants are few ; 
they have no caste prejudices, and hardly any appetite 
for intoxicating liquors." 

And, according to the Abbe Hue in his " Chinese 
Empire," it may not be impossible to find in China the 
elements for organizing the most formidable army in 
the world and for the creation of a navy. 

" The Chinese are intelligent, ingenious, and docile. 
They comprehend rapidly whatever they are taught, 
and retain it in their memory. They are persevering, 
and astonishingly active when they choose to exert 
themselves, respectful to authority, submissive and 
obedient, and they would easily accommodate them- 
selves to all the exigencies of the severest discipline. 
The Chinese possess also a quality most precious in 
soldiers, and which can scarcely be found as well 
developed among any other people — namely, an incom- 
parable facility for supporting privations of every kind. 
We have often been astonished to see how they will 
bear hunger, thirst, heat, cold, the difficulties and 
fatigues of a long march, as if it were mere play. Thus, 
both morally and physically, they seem capable of 
meeting every demand. China would present also 
inexhaustible resources for a navy. Without speaking 
of the vast extent of her coasts, along which the 
numerous population pass the greater part of their 
lives on the sea, the great rivers and immense lakes 
in the interior, always covered with fishing and trading 
junks, might furnish multitudes of men, habituated 
from their infancy to navigation, nimble, experienced, 
and capable of becoming excellent sailors for long 
expeditions." 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 25 

Distinction may be justly drawn between the popula- 
tions of different parts of the vast Empire. The 
people of Honan are known for their independence. The 
Cantonese have always been of a daring character, 
which for many years, unfortunately, expended itself in 
wholesale piracy on the coast. The natives of Shan- 
tung, however, where the Germans have established 
themselves, and whose overflow has peopled the rich 
lands of Manchuria, enjoy the finest record for both 
physical and moral qualities. It was from them the 
Chinese navy drew its best recruits; it is they who 
have proved their prowess either as brigands or as self- 
reliant and self-defended exploiters of the resources of 
Liaotung and Manchuria. 

When all is said, however, it must still be conceded 
that it is not military, or scientific, or political, but 
commercial genius that has characterized the Chinese 
in the past, and is therefore most likely to distinguish 
them in the future. They are the original, true, and 
only real shopkeepers, and in every position of life, 
even the farthest removed from the atmosphere of 
commerce, the Chinese may be said to think in money. 
As with the Jew, their instinctive habit is one of 
perpetual appraisement. No matter what object may 
be shown to them for their instruction or admiration, 
their first and last thought is what it cost ; and con- 
versations overheard among boatmen, coolies, and 
labourers turn invariably on the same topic — money. 
This trait of character cannot be better described than 
in the words of the Abbe Hue : 

" The Chinese has a passionate love of lucre ; he is 
fond of all kinds of speculation and stock-jobbing, and 



26 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

his mind, full of finesse and cunning, takes delight in 
combining and calculating the chances of a commercial 
operation. 

" The Chinese, par excellence, is a man installed 
behind the counter of a shop, waiting for his customers 
with patience and resignation, and in the intervals of 
their arrival pondering in his head and casting up on 
his little arithmetical machine the means of increasing 
his fortune. Whatever may be the nature and im- 
portance of his business, he neglects not the smallest 
profit; the least gain is always welcome, and he 
accepts it eagerly; greatest of all is his enjoyment 
when in the evening, having well closed and barricaded 
his shop, he can retire into some corner, and there 
count up, religiously, the number of his sapecks, and 
reckon the earnings of the day. 

" The Chinese is born with this taste for traffic, 
which grows with his growth and strengthens with his 
strength. The first thing a child longs for is a sapeck ; 
the first use that he makes of his speech and intelli- 
gence is to learn to articulate the names of coins ; 
when his little fingers are strong enough to hold the 
pencil, it is with making figures that he amuses 
himself, and as soon as the tiny creature can speak and 
walk he is capable of buying and selling." 

Nor is it the mere gain that inspires the passion for 
merchandizing. In common with Orientals generally, 
the Chinese are fascinated by the sport of bargaining, 
as a cat is by playing its mouse or a fisherman his 
salmon. It is said that the late Li Hung Chang 
derived a purer pleasure from " doing " an employee out 
of half a month's pay, as the result of an afternoon's 
contest, than if he had saved a province of the Empire 
— a weakness which no doubt was often turned to 
profitable account by those who had important trans- 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 27 

actions with that eminent statesman. It is held to be 
a maxim of wisdom for an undergraduate to let his rich 
uncle have the better of him at chess. Human nature 
is essentially the same everywhere ; the point of differ- 
ence to be noted here between Oriental and Occidental 
is that time seems to be of no account to the one, 
whilst to the other it is a synonym for money, which is 
of prime value to both. 

And in connection with money-making there is 
another point to be noticed and kept in mind in regard 
to the Chinese, in which they are distinguished from 
the races of the West, and perhaps of the East as well. 
Though parsimonious, the Chinaman is not mean. 
He is generous almost to a fault when the humour 
takes him — has a supreme disregard of trifles in settling 
an account, for example, takes a loss stoically, lends 
freely with small expectation of return, and rarely sues 
for a debt. The ease of the Chinese in money dealing 
contrasts strongly with the exigence with which they 
are treated by foreigners with whom they traffic. And 
yet in the essence of things there may be no real 
superiority or inferiority, for the liberality in the one 
case may be referred to the general laxity of Chinese 
reckoning and to the margin of perquisites on which 
they instinctively fall back, while the severity in the 
other case belongs to precision of accounts and the 
absence of any margin of debatable ground where 
generosity might find pasture. In the West the open- 
handed man too often comes to penury, while in the 
East " there is that scattereth and yet increaseth." 

The combination of the qualities of avarice and 
profusion sometimes produces results which, though 



28 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

entirely natural in themselves, are both comical and 
paradoxical when viewed from a foreign standpoint. 
Once upon a time the agent at one of the minor ports 
for a wealthy firm in Shanghai lived in the somewhat 
lordly style which had been inherited from the East 
India Company. His "boy" or butler and his whole 
domestic staff made a good thing out of the establish- 
ment. Times changed, and the big firm ceased 
business. Left stranded, the agent decided to set up 
for himself and work the connections he had formed 
among natives and foreign merchants. But the old 
scale of expenditure could not be supported. Sum- 
moning bis faithful " boy," he explained the situation 
to him — impossible to keep up the old expensive style 
of living, very sorry to part with such a good old 
servant, and so forth. The boy rose to the occasion in 
a somewhat surprising manner. " What for, masta, 
too muchee sollee ? My too sollee, masta, no catchee 
good chance. My like stay this side. Masta, how 
much can pay ?" (Why is master so sorrowful ? I 
am very sorry that master is not doing well. I should 
like to stay in master's service. How much can master 
afford to pay ?) The master scratched his forehead and 
paused, then named a sum which was just two-thirds 
of what his house bills had hitherto amounted to. 
" Maskee, masta; masta talkee so muchee, can do" 
(Never mind, master; whatever you say will do), said 
the accommodating serving-man. So the menage pro- 
ceeded, everything exactly as before — table as bountiful, 
servants as smart and as respectful, but the monthly 
charge 30 per cent. less. A year passed; the new 
business had been uphill work, as new businesses are 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 29 

wont to be ; the emolument was disappointing. Again 
the master had to make an explanation to the servant ; 
again the solution of the difficulty was to reduce the 
establishment. " Never mind, master, tell me how 
much you think you can pay," was the substance of his 
boy's reply? The master was seriously taken aback, 
but he named a figure which was just one-half of what 
he had originally been paying. The boy accepted as 
cheerfully as before, and went on his way rejoicing, and 
the menage proceeded not a salad leaf, or a partridge, 
or a mushroom the less ; only the cost was reduced to 
very modest proportions. Of course it is open to 
remark that the wily Chinaman had been extortionate 
in the high old time — but what elasticity of accom- 
modation, what fellowship in misfortune ! 

Take a converse case of more recent occurrence in 
Peking. A French gentleman there keeping house 
with his wife had gone on smoothly and economically 
for many years, no ripple disturbing their domestic 
felicity. By-and-by they found a substantial increase 
in their monthly budget. They remonstrated with 
their head servant, but in vain. Stolidly, month after 
month, he brought in the same bill, until at last the 
master resolved to part with the servant, and did. 
When the successor came and was being inducted he 
observed to the master: "What thing masta talkee? 
How can ? S'pose that piecee man have talkee so 
fashon, that b'long tlue. My no can makee more 
plopa. He b'long welly good man," which, being 
interpreted, meant that he could not manage any 
cheaper than his predecessor. The master was sur- 
prised at this speech, argued the matter for a little, 



30 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

but could make nothing more out of the new servant. 
At the end of the first month, sure enough, the account 
came to within a fraction of what it had been. Re- 
monstrance from master respectfully received, but the 
following month the same old charge. The master 
gave it up, and went on resignedly as if in the clutches 
of Fate. But when some time had elapsed, and all 
controversy had ceased, the master, disputing no 
longer, begged the servant, merely to satisfy curiosity, 
to explain to him how it had come about that the 
scale of charge, which had gone on the same for so 
many years, had suddenly risen without any change in 
market prices or any other apparent reason. Taken 
into confidence in this way, the boy looked blandly at 
his master and said : " Masta, six moon fore time have 
catchee good chance. Alio man too muchee glad. 
Masta have catchee good chance, alio man can catchee 
too," which means that, the master having had a piece 
of good fortune six months before, all the servants con- 
sidered themselves entitled to their share. 

We should not do the Chinese justice without carry- 
ing the money test of character a stage higher, almost 
into the region of pure ethics. It is not uncommon to 
impute ingratitude to them. But the rule applies — 
East and West alike — that a bad master never had a 
good servant, and those who most loudly cry out 
against ingratitude are usually those who have merited 
nothing else. There are two sides to all human rela- 
tions ; sentiments are not self-existent, but, like verte- 
brates, are the product of two parents. All foreigners 
who have studied the Chinese in a human, sympathetic 
manner, like Meadows, Smith, and others, testify to 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 31 

their devotion and gratitude. So many instances of 
this are recorded, that it must be taken as natural 
to the Chinese to attach themselves heart and soul to 
anyone, be he native or foreigner, who once gains their 
confidence. And the way to do that is explained by 
Meadows ; it is to show them, not by words but by 
acts, that you are thinking of their welfare as much 
as your own. There is no mystery in this; it holds 
good of all races and of all periods. But the gratitude 
of Orientals, Africans, and others has freer play than 
that of our own people because of the accommodating 
quality of their social relations and the extraordinary 
supply which their numbers afford. Stereotyped as are 
the Chinese relations in certain respects, they admit of 
great elasticity in others — thanks to the family and 
clan system — which makes it easy and common to find 
substitutes for almost any occasion. This enables a 
man to attach himself to a master, or follow a leader 
whom he appreciates, and to detach himself from his 
family, and even from business engagements, for in- 
definite periods. There are many foreigners who can 
speak from experience of such proofs of devotion and 
gratitude. 

That the family spirit expands and perpetuates the 
individual sentiment the following illustration will 
show: 

It happened to an Englishman once to revisit China 
after the lapse of many years. One day he was sur- 
prised to receive a call from some Chinese whom he 
did not know. They were well dressed and most 
respectful. After the usual conventional preliminaries, 
the principal man of the party — which seemed like a 



32 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

deputation — explained that he was the son of a Chinese 
gentleman who had died more than twenty years before, 
while the speaker was still a child ; that he had been 
told by his relatives of the kindness which the English- 
man had shown to his father in those old days, but had 
never, since he grew up, had any means of expressing 
his gratitude. Now it had come to his ears that a 
person bearing the name of his father's friend had 
recently arrived in the town, but he could not tell if it 
was the same. So he paid this visit merely to find out, 
was overjoyed to have discovered him, and begged to 
be allowed to pay his homage on another occasion. 
Exchange of family news naturally took place, and on 
his next visit the Chinese gentleman came laden with 
valuable presents specially selected for the respective 
children of his casually discovered English friend. 

Instances of large-heartedness in money matters in 
which foreigners have been the beneficiaries are indeed 
comparatively common. In the last generation they 
were still more so, for commerce, especially that portion 
of it which was centred in Canton, was conducted in a 
grander, more merchant-prince-like fashion than the 
circumstances of our day admit of. Complete trust 
was the rule between the old Hong merchants and the 
European and American traders, and business was 
transacted in whole shiploads. The friendly relations 
then established subsisted for a generation after the 
destruction of the " factories," in 1856, and the 
inauguration of the new era, which is of a more indivi- 
dualized and retail character. One well-known survivor 
of the old regime, an American gentleman, Mr. X., who 
was alive in Canton in 1884, nac ^» m consequence of 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 33 

the collapse of his firm, fallen from affluence to penury, 
and was personally deeply in debt to certain of the 
representatives of the old "co-hong." Seeing that the 
veteran remained on in Canton, never visiting his home 
and family, his Chinese friend asked him why he denied 
himself the natural solace of his old age — permanent 
separation from the family home being specially intoler- 
able to a Chinese — and guessing the reason, it is said 
he produced Mr. X.'s note of hand for a large amount, 
and tore it up before the maker, saying, "Now, are 
you free to return to your home ?" Whether literally 
accurate in its details or not, the mere currency of 
such a story goes a long way towards proving the 
contention. 

Of course, it may be said these are exceptional cases, 
and so they are. But the question is — on which side 
is the exception ; on that of the Chinese or that of the 
foreigners ? If more of the latter endeavoured to gain 
the confidence of the former in the natural way, would 
not the experience of grateful, devoted, and trustworthy 
Chinese be greatly extended? And, considering the 
race antipathy that keeps them apart, the fact that any 
instances at all of such kindly relations ever come 
within the experience of foreigners affords strong pre- 
sumption that among themselves the Chinese maintain 
a more than friendly, a really generous, intercourse. 

One of the most valuable qualities of the Chinese 
people, considered with reference to their utility in the 
future development of their country, is their marvellous 
tolerance of things disagreeable, and their invincible 
contentment under all circumstances. Every traveller, 
everyone who has had opportunities of observing them, 

3 



34 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

testifies to their unfailing good humour under every 
kind of discomfort, and under the severest bodily toil. 
Their cheerfulness is undaunted ; neither cold nor heat, 
neither hunger nor fatigue, has power to depress them, 
nor does misfortune, or natural calamity, or sickness 
provoke them to repine. As Giles says : " They seem 
to have acquired a national habit of looking upon the 
bright side." 

According to A. EL Smith, "to be happy is more than 
they expect, but they are willing to be as happy as they 
can." Possibly they follow Carlyle unknowingly, and 
do not recognize " happiness " at all as an object in 
life, and therefore they enjoy the more of it — enjoy all 
they get, instead of vexing themselves about what they 
lack. Smith tells us of a Chinese who was employed 
by a foreigner — no doubt himself — in pushing a heavy 
wheelbarrow on journeys, often months in duration. 

" Upon these trips it was necessary to start early, to 
travel late, to transport heavy loads over steep and 
rugged mountains, in all seasons and in all weathers, 
fording chilling rivers with bare feet and legs, and at 
the end of every stage to prepare his master's food and 
lodging. All this laborious work was done for a very 
moderate compensation, and always without complaint ; 
and at the end of several years of this service his master 
testified that he had never once seen this servant out of 
temper !" 

One may venture to add on one's own account that 
this description seems typical. Now, to put the merits 
of such a placid temper on the lowest utilitarian 
grounds, consider what an economy of nervous friction 
is implied in a working life passed in such a happy 



THE CHINESE PEOPLE 35 

frame of mind. Is it not alone a source of wealth to 
the people who possess it ? 

Smith adds his experience of the Chinaman in 
sickness : 

" Their cheery hopefulness," he says, " often does not 
forsake them in physical weakness and in extreme pain. 
We have known multitudes of cases where Chinese 
patients, suffering from every variety of disease, fre- 
quently in deep poverty, not always adequately 
nourished, at a distance from their homes, sometimes 
neglected or even abandoned by their relatives, and 
with no ray of hope for the future visible, yet main- 
tained a cheerful equanimity of temper, which was a 
constant, albeit unintentional, rebuke to the nervous 
impatience which," etc. 

He concludes his chapter with the observation which 
may also fitly conclude the present one : " If the teach- 
ing of history as to what happens to ' the fittest ' is to 
be trusted, there is a magnificent future for the Chinese 



CHAPTER II 

CHINA AND RELIGION 

In the preceding chapter the Chinese people are 
studied from the point of view of what they are in 
everyday life. Elsewhere we deal with their relations 
to the State and to each other as units in a vast 
community. In this chapter an attempt will be made 
to gauge the relations of the Chinese to the Unseen — 
the spiritual life which shapes and bends, and some- 
times even breaks, the man who is, perhaps, hardly 
consci-eus of its power. We are accustomed to attribute 
to spiritual influences certain qualities which have a 
moral value in our eyes, such as truthfulness, honesty, 
or mercy. When we find the Chinese devoid of these 
we rashly conclude that his conduct has no ethical 
basis. But, although it is true that the religion of 
Christianity inculcates those qualities as a moral duty, 
it is not quite clear whether we have adopted them as 
such or because, as a matter of experience, we have 
proved them to be the best policy. There are other 
qualities, equally insisted on by the Founder of the 
Christian religion, to which we pay little attention (as, 
for instance, meekness and respect for parents), because 



CHINA AND RELIGION 37 

we find they do not conduce to material well-being. 
We need not, therefore, assume the airs of superior 
beings on the ground of our higher standard of morality 
or approximation to an ideal, but where we are entitled 
to some satisfaction is in the fact that Christianity has 
certainly helped to mould a civilization which is more 
efficient than any other in the world. Whether the 
religion is essential to the civilization or not remains 
to be seen. Be that as it may, we are bound to admit 
that not abstract principles, but the conventions neces- 
sary to facilitate human intercourse, are the real factors 
in deciding, beyond a certain point, what is good 
and what bad in human conduct. Morality is largely 
a geographic question, and virtues in one zone become 
vices in another. Without any attempt to judge the 
Chinese on any ethical grounds, therefore, we are 
bound to examine their code and their conduct, not 
only to see how far the second approximates to the 
first— how true they are to their own lights — but to 
estimate the practical value of the ethical basis of their 
society when it is brought, as it must be, into contact 
and competition with others. 

It may be said at once that the Chinese are singularly 
little occupied with the problems of the universe and 
of human existence. This vast field of speculation 
interests them but little, nor are they wont to question 
themselves as to where they come from and whither 
they are going. From the point of view of persons to 
whom definite convictions on these subjects are essential 
to moral welfare the Chinese are by no means a religious 
people. On the other hand, if the careful and 
punctilious observance of certain rites, and the per- 



38 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

formance of certain duties, are to count for anything, 
they are a very religious people. The difficulty is to 
define their religion. 

The paramount influences in forming Chinese 
character (apart from geographic influences, the deep- 
rooted belief in the animation of the universe with good 
and evil spirits, and ancestor-worship) have been the 
philosophies of Confucius and Lao-tsz. Unlike Western 
philosophies, which from Pythagoras to Spencer have 
been abstract and Utopian, Confucianism is practical, 
and rules the lives of the masses, instead of making a 
purely intellectual appeal. Confucianism, moreover, is 
apparently quite independent of a specific religious 
basis, and is, in fact, a great moderating force, specially 
calculated to preserve in men's minds the truly philo- 
sophic — that is, the tolerant — attitude. The teaching 
of Confucius was an attempt to involve a standard of 
morality, based upon his interpretation of history, 
which would influence the social, moral, and political 
life of the people. Lao-tsz, who was a contemporary 
of Confucius, was the expounder of a more mystical 
philosophy, in which the keynote is tao — the " correct 
way." He who finds this "way of life " — a rightly 
adjusted attitude towards life — is independent of all 
outside circumstances ; and, although Lao-tsz re- 
cognized "that some men must inevitably be leaders in 
the^ State and that government, even by force, was 
essential, yet he preached a pure form of democracy. 
Ancestor- worship — the "very core of the religious 
and social life " of the Chinese, as M. de Groot 
calls it — enters into the life of the people more fully 
perhaps than any other influence. Buddhism and 



CHINA AND RELIGION 39 

Taoism supply the forms of ritual or outward observ- 
ances. 

A less desirable result of tao is its encouragement 
of superstition, and in its modern form this aspect has 
practically eaten up the others, and it appears now 
as the groundwork for Feng-shui and every kind of 
demonological belief. 

This Shen-tao, or divine faith, is the Shinto of Japan, 
and both Confucianism and Shintoism insist on the 
sacredness of the family as the basis of society. 
Buddhism and Christianity, on the contrary, make the 
relation of the individual to a divine ideal their main 
feature, and it is interesting to trace the conflict 
between these two fundamentally differing views of life 
in the countries of the Far East. Buddhism has 
undergone many transformations in adapting itself, 
and the twelfth century witnessed a species of reforma- 
tion in which the sacredness of the family was upheld. 
Indian pundits claim this new teaching as a reformed 
Brahmanism, and its resemblances, both in doctrine 
and ritual, to Christianity are strikingly apparent in 
Japan to-day. 

The doctrines of Confucius and Lao-tsz are not, 
however, to be considered as religious, but rather as 
ethical systems. Lao-tsz appeared to have a vague 
conception of a future life, while Confucianism re- 
cognized tacitly the underlying natural religion which 
had prevailed from the most ancient times — the belief 
in a Supreme Being. The influence of these two 
philosophers, moreover, was not altogether inimical 
to the introduction of foreign religions, since they 
inculcated tolerance and kept their disciples free from 



40 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

religious fanaticism. Buddhism, accordingly, reached 
China in the first centuries a.d., by the overland route 
followed later by Marco Polo and other travellers. I 
was encouraged by the Emperor and spread peacefully in 
China, though when it reached Japan it was for a time 
the centre of conflict. Islam came to China in the 
seventh century, both by land and sea, and its reception 
is interesting to us because, being a pure form of mono- 
theism, it might have been expected to clash with 
some of the most cherished customs and deeply-rooted 
prejudices of the Chinese. Throughout their history 
in China, however, the Mohammedans have preferred 
to bend rather than to break, and, by permitting the 
veneration of ancestors, they have removed the most 
serious obstacle in their path. In many respects their 
doctrine was sympathetic to the Chinese. The treat- 
ment of women was similar ; their fatalism, subjectivism, 
and regulations as to regime and behaviour are in no 
way strange or repugnant to the Chinese; and, as 
they refrained from propaganda and merely appealed 
for protection, they roused none of the latent suspicions 
of their hosts. It was not till the twelfth century that 
the influx of Mohammedans was considerable, but 
after that time they spread over the west, north, and 
south, and at the present time are steadily on the 
increase, especially in the western provinces of Yunnan 
and Kansuh. The outbreaks of rebellion, which have 
given the Mussulman Chinese a bad name, have been 
due to political rather than religious causes. 

There is no need to recall in detail the history of the 
introduction of the third foreign religion into China. 
Everyone is aware that the Nestorian Christians gained 



CHINA AND RELIGION 41 

a footing both with the Court and people in the seventh 
century, and during the thirteenth and fourteenth cen- 
turies, under the Mongol dynasty, both Nestorianism 
and the Church of Rome flourished not only in Peking 
but in various provinces. In the early part of 
the seventeenth century there were estimated to be 
no fewer than 13,000 Christians in as many as seven 
different provinces (and among them members of the 
Imperial family and high officials), while the Spanish 
Franciscans and Dominicans, who came over from the 
Philippines, claimed to have (in 1665) over 14,000 
Christians in the three coast provinces. It even 
seemed possible at one period that China might 
officially adopt the Christian religion, but there was a 
decisive barrier in the way — the refusal of the Church 
to sanction ancestral rights. Although the seventeenth 
century saw considerable variations in the attitude of 
the Chinese Government towards Christianity, and a 
struggle between the followers of Christ and of 
Mohammed for power at Peking, yet the former con- 
tinued to increase until, by the end of the century, 
there were 300,000 Christians in various parts of 
the country. The question which sealed the fate of 
Christianity in China was that of the rival authority 
of Church and State, also the decisive factor in 
European history. Early in the eighteenth century 
the Emperor Kang-hi practically abolished religious 
freedom in China by decreeing that in future no one 
should preach the Gospel without the Imperial licence. 
Considerable dissension occurred between the Jesuits, 
Dominicans, and Franciscans, and this served to 
aggravate the points of difference between Church 



42 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

and State. The most vital point, however, was that of 
the ancestral rites, which the Pope refused to allow, 
and from this time the light of Imperial favour was 
steadily averted from the Christian priests. 

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, on the 
suppression of their Society, the Jesuits were replaced 
by the Lazarists, and France became the most active 
power in missionary work. This was the great perse- 
cution period, when many Christians won the crown of 
martyrdom, and only the staunchest converts remained 
true. The tide rolled back so surely that in many 
provinces only ruined churches remained to tell the 
tale of Christian endeavour. Although the history of 
certain missions has been continuous, and there has 
been no break in their record of work, yet their 
harvests were small, and Christianity must be acknow- 
ledged to have been for this period almost in abeyance 
as an active force in Chinese evolution. It was not 
till the middle of the last century that the despised 
and rejected religion was to revive in a new manner. 

The first coming of Christianity was made on 
sufferance, with appeals for protection ; the second 
was, under treaty rights, practically a forcible entrance. 
China yielded to Europe under pressure the right to 
certain treaty ports for trading purposes, and by the 
treaty of 1858 foreigners were permitted to travel 
in the interior. This was the opportunity of the 
missionaries, but the situation was largely affected by 
the determination of France to make use of it for 
her own political purposes. Ever since the reign of 
Louis XIV. the eyes of the French ecclesiastics had 
turned eastwards (first to Siam), and the movement 



CHINA AND RELIGION 43 

was always politico-religious. Chinese writers in later 
days have noted the fact that even the freethinker 
Gambetta, who persecuted the Church in France, was 
ready to expend men and treasure in supporting it 
abroad. A celebrated clause interpolated in the 
Chinese version of the Convention of i860 has been 
used by France to strengthen her claims to the protec- 
tion not only of European missionaries but of native 
Christians. That these pretensions were not acknow- 
ledged by other Powers is shown by the action of 
Germany in insisting that German Catholic priests 
must apply to their own legation for passports and 
for support if needed.* No more striking illustration 
can be found of the extent to which political motives 
overruled the purely missionary element than that 
of the bitter opposition of the French Government to 
the proposal made by the Chinese to the Pope, in 1886, 
that a special legate should be sent to Peking as 
controller and protector of all Catholic missions. The 
Pope, entirely favourable to the scheme, was obliged 
by the French opposition to abandon it, but the pro- 
posal may yet bring forth fruit. 

It would take too great space to trace, even in bare 
outline, the varying steps by which those who preach 
the Gospel of Christ in China have been the instru- 
ments of political designs. The situation is summed 
up in the phrase " extra-territoriality," and it may 
safely be said that no religion has ever been presented 

* It is not generally known that, by the German Treaty of 1861, 
Article X., to Germany (and presumably therefore to other nations) 
security is guaranteed for the persons and property of missionaries 
and their converts. 



44 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

to a people under such peculiar conditions. In 1871 
Wensiang, the head of the Chinese Foreign Board, one 
of the fairest and most open-minded of Chinese states- 
men, drew up a circular reviewing the whole position, 
and in a series of categorical proposals for the regula- 
tion of intercourse with the people, plainly indicated 
the main grievances of the Chinese. Briefly these 
were : Grave offence to Chinese ideas of propriety 
(such as the mixed attendance of the sexes at public 
worship), the legal status of the missionaries and their 
attempt to remove even their native converts from 
local jurisdiction, the desire of the missionaries to move 
about without being clearly traceable, the neglect of 
certain etiquette in intercourse with officials, the 
reclamation of ancient sites and churches which had 
sometimes to be taken from Chinese owners who had 
honestly acquired them, and the method of requiring 
vengeance on anti-Christian rioters not only from the 
men themselves but from whole districts. These 
grievances, with slight modifications, exist to this day, 
and the last-named in particular has been made a 
source of fruitfulness to foreign Governments, who 
have claimed monstrous indemnities for outrages on 
their nationals. It may be mentioned here that a 
recent act of the Peking Government has been to 
obtain a complete list and valuation of missionary 
property throughout the empire, which looks like a 
characteristic piece of Chinese business acumen. 

The legal status of European missionaries in China 
has been that of superiority to the laws of the country 
whose hospitality they have enjoyed and whose ancient 
customs they have attacked, not infrequently with 



CHINA AND RELIGION 45 

imprudence. It is not necessary to dwell on the 
mistakes of individuals, since it is evident that the 
whole position was one which could not fail to rouse 
the deepest resentment in a people so proud as the 
Chinese. The irritable condition set up has been 
aggravated in several ways, first by the order, resulting 
from pressure brought to bear on Peking, that all 
ancient church property should be restored. This led 
to real hardships, and apart from these, the contempt of 
Chinese susceptibilities and prejudices (which, for 
instance, led to the erection of a cathedral actually 
overlooking the palace and to many outrages on the 
feng-shui superstition) has not tended to reconcile the 
Chinese to the situation. The last straws have been 
the right to acquire and hold real estate through- 
out the empire, and, infinitely more, the obtaining of 
official rank for European missionaries, a measure 
wrung from China in 1897, just after her disastrous 
defeat by Japan and territorial losses. Since the 
treaty of Nanking, European civil and military officials 
have enjoyed the privilege which the ceremonious 
etiquette of China rendered useful in official 
relations, but the claim of a Christian bishop to 
equal a Viceroy or Provincial Governor and of an 
ordinary priest to the rank of prefect (their influence and 
authority, of course, corresponding so far as possible) 
was a new and dangerous political weapon bound to 
bring evil consequences. The Protestant missioners 
declined to accept the privilege, although some of them 
regard it as due to their position, not as individuals but 
as representing a mass of people in Europe. 
The actual growth of mission bodies is of less 



46 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

importance, however, than the broad aspect of the 
question ; but it may be roughly said that, while the 
Catholics have a great advantage in being organized 
and directed, while the Protestants arouse the wonder 
and scorn of the Chinese by the variety and incom- 
patibility of their doctrinal teaching, and while the 
former avoid preaching in the streets or open air (which 
is opposed to Chinese ideas of decorum), yet the 
Protestants have of late years been developing their 
work on lines which are more promising than any 
hitherto adopted. The Catholic educational work is 
almost entirely ecclesiastical or literary, and their 
method of filling orphanages with children, who as 
they grow up serve the Church in various capacities, 
has led to hatred and suspicion on the part of the 
Chinese. The Protestants are now making a grand 
effort to promote secular education, and to diffuse good 
literature throughout the length and breadth of the 
country ; and since the terrible massacres of 1900 there 
has been a genuine attempt to draw all Protestant 
workers together. The estimated number of Catholic 
workers is 47 bishops, 1,391 European and 640 native 
priests, and nearly 1,300,000 converts (inclusive of 
children) ; and of Protestants, 4,500 missionaries (in- 
cluding wives and women-workers), while their converts 
number over 287,000. In passing, it may be noted that 
the writer finds it difficult to believe that the presence 
of lady missionaries in the remote interior does not, 
as their champions declare, offend the Chinese sense 
of propriety. 

There has been one remarkable change in the 
missionary outlook. Up to recent times we were 



CHINA AND RELIGION 47 

always told that the common people were ready to 
welcome Christianity and (what is more) the Christian 
missionary, but that the Government and literati 
were hostile. Now we find the Government and 
officials almost ostentatiously friendly, while at the 
same time the signs of anti-Christian feeling are still 
apparent. The truth is that in a country like China, 
with a truly democratic basis of society, no actual 
artificial line can be drawn between the classes; but 
whereas the Manchu rulers and the officials dependent 
on them have become convinced that China's needs 
and capacities will not permit her the luxury of murder- 
ing foreigners, the mass of the people are too ignorant 
to appreciate the situation. They are, moreover, moved 
by a new spirit, and it becomes increasingly doubtful 
whether any Government can long exercise that control 
over them which, despite frequent rebellions, it has so 
long possessed. 

What are the prospects of Christianity in China ? 
To answer that we must ask another question — What 
has Christianity to offer to China ? We offer her a 
system of ethics which is in some repects inferior to 
her own. Our moral system is founded on individualism, 
hers on the family life. Christianity bids a man leave 
father and mother and cleave to his wife. It preaches 
war even in the family, and its Founder said, " I came 
not to bring peace, but a sword." These are hard 
sayings for China, and it will be long ere she can 
accomplish so entire a change of moral vision as to 
perceive their true meaning. She is able now to gauge 
how far the abstract principles of Christianity have 
been abandoned in building up our ethics ; and she can 



48 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

see — for instance, in France — how far the Christian 
people are from recognizing the influence with which 
we desire to supplant Confucius, Lao-tsz, Buddha, or 
Mohammed. The Chinese are too subtle a people to 
be drawn away from the worship of one set of words to 
another without being convinced that the new form 
has a more vital force than the old. To them, un- 
fortunately, Christian doctrine must seem mostly a 
form of words, since its very propagation among them 
is founded on what they consider untruth. " Chris- 
tianity," they say, " was permitted to be preached 
because it taught virtue; we find it teaches a great 
many things which are not virtue, such as defying 
the law of the land ; and it is, in fact, a political and 
not a religious propaganda." Readers will make 
allowance for the Chinese point of view. 

But, again, what has Christianity to offer to China ? 
The spiritual consolations and upliftings of our religion 
do not have the same appeal to a people whose funda- 
mental idea of virtue is stoicism, and whose mystical 
side has never developed. In fact, when we remember 
how little the Chinaman is aware of his own need of 
religion, it is hard to formulate in words any exact 
spiritual benefit which we can promise him in exchange 
for long-cherished customs and traditions. To borrow 
an expression, the conviction of sin and the longing for 
salvation do not enter into his purview of life ; and, 
when we reflect that many things which we call sin are 
virtues in his eyes, it is hard to see how we are to bring 
these things home to him. 

But Christian civilization, without Christian doctrine, 
has much to offer China ; and the benefits of advanced 



CHINA AND RELIGION 49 

humanitarianism, of applied science, and of personal 
devotion to an ideal are beginning to bear good fruit 
after a long period in which their connection with the 
hated foreigner and his ways was the great obstacle. 
The opening, under official patronage, of a medical 
college even at Peking, promoted by missionaries but 
secular in character, is one of the signs of a new order 
of things. It must be remembered that surgical work 
has been greatly hindered by the Chinese hatred of 
mutilation, which rendered operations in hospitals the 
subject of frightful misrepresentations. This most 
Christian form of teaching— the alleviation of human 
suffering — has had to fight its way through many 
obstacles, and has illustrated well the wide gulf which 
separates the Eastern and Western modes of thought. 
The whole fabric of taoism, with its pseudo-scientific 
jargon of elements and essences, breaks down before a 
training in elementary chemistry. 

It is notorious that a new era has begun in China, 
and that the " new learning " is no longer to be despised 
but has become the fashion. The insecurity of the 
Manchu dynasty in the midst of these new conditions 
drove the Court and officials into an attitude of great 
complaisance to Foreign Powers, and now we see a 
Chinese Christian elected as the head of the republic 
which the reform party wishes to establish. Is this 
the beginning of a fresh era in the history of Chris- 
tianity ? Despite everything — the Chinese attitude, the 
false position created by the extra-territorial rights of 
missionaries, the transparent political designs of those 
who protect Christianity — despite all these and many 
other handicaps, are we yet to see Christianity as a 

4 



50 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

practical and efficient force in the rebirth of the Chinese 
people ? 

Naturally, we turn to Japan at this point, as China 
has done. We see, as China sees, that Japan has taken 
Christian civilization and left its religion — that is to 
say, the husk without the kernel — and Japan has been 
extraordinarily successful. The period of her renascence 
has coincided with a greatly increased missionary 
activity in the East, and might have been reasonably 
expected to show a proportionate increase of Christian 
converts. We know that the opposite has been the 
case — that the last decade has seen the worst Christian 
persecution on record in China ; and that even the 
optimistic Americans, who are the principal workers 
in the Japanese missionary-field, acknowledge some- 
what barren records. Japanese influence in China is, 
in fact, solidly anti-Christian, not in the sense of 
stirring up anti-Christian riots but in stimulating the 
national and racial pride which, unfortunately, have 
been most sorely wounded by the politico-religious 
European propagandists. There is actually a pan- 
Buddhist revival, artificially stimulated by Japan, which 
makes its appeal to racial rather than religious feeling. 
Moreover, the success of the Japanese in adapting, 
rather than adopting, Western civilization has been 
the subject of much remark in China, and the con- 
clusion drawn is that to be efficient like the barbarian 
it is not necessary to accept his religion. 

Between religious disputes among the missionary 
bodies, which from time immemorial have disagreed as 
to the best method of presenting Christ's teaching to 
the Chinese, and between the political rivalries of the 



CHINA AND RELIGION 5* 

Christian European Powers, it is evident that China 
must find it hard to accept the religion of peace on 
earth as anything more than a convenient pretext for 
foreign aggression. Were she inclined to do so her 
experience of the last half-century would disillusion 
her. Her own faults of misgovernment and vacillation 
are largely to blame for the state of affairs ; but nothing 
can alter the main fact that, by placing Christianity 
on a different footing to other foreign religions, Europe 
has enormously increased the difficulties of the position. 
In the words of the late author of " The Englishman in 
China," one of the acutest observers of the relations 
between East and West who has written in the English 
language : 

" When all suspicion as to (the Christian missionary's) 
motives shall have been removed ; when he shall have 
learned to live on amicable terms with his Chinese 
neighbours, and they to regard him not as a danger, 
but as a reasonable friend ; when there shall be no 
more local sources of irritation ; when, in short, the 
missionary shall be treated on his proper merits — what, 
then, will be his position towards the Chinese ? Will 
it not still be that of a destroyer of their traditions, 
their morality, their philosophy — in a word, of that on 
which they build up their national and individual pride 
and of all that now sustains them in an orderly and 
virtuous life ?" 

These words represent very accurately the attitude ot 
many earnest and thinking men towards Christianity in 
China, but the troubling of the waters which has taken 
place since they were written has modified some of the 
conditions. Chinese philosophy and morality are 



52 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

breaking down of themselves before the impact of 
materialism, and, dark as the outlook has been and 
still is for the spread of the dogmas of Christianity, 
there is reason to believe that the efforts of Christian 
men to raise the Chinese standard at just those points 
where it is lowest — in humanitarianism, respect for 
women, and freedom from degrading superstitions — 
will eventually win for the religion which prompted 
them a recognition which no mere doctrinal propo- 
gandism could attain. 

But the question of religion in China is not, to the 
mind of the writer, only concerned with the future of 
Christianity. Though the amalgam of Confucianism, 
Taoism, and Buddhism (which for the average Chinese 
has supplied the place of a religion, that is a moral and 
ethical basis to his material existence) may be inferior 
as an elevating influence to Christianity, yet it has 
certainly had some very striking effects, and has helped 
to produce a type of man with some sterling qualities 
and a society whose very longevity is a guarantee of 
efficiency. The precepts of Confucius and Lao-tsz, 
and the Buddhist doctrines of the purer kind, are of the 
loftiest character. But, just as the English schoolboy 
or girl may contract a lifelong aversion to the Bible 
from being compelled to memorize solid chunks of it, 
so the " classics " of China are in danger of being 
neglected in the rush for Western education. More is 
said on this subject in the chapter on " the New Learn- 
ing." The real danger is that Young China, rejecting 
the fashions of their fathers, may grow up without 
religion at all. It is the experience of mission schools 
that their best pupils passing on to Government 



CHINA AND RELIGION 53 

universities are concerned only with the secular side 
of education. How many Japanese, trained abroad, 
return in fact to the nominal faith which it is still their 
patriotic duty to profess ? The Chinese are extremely 
tolerant in religious matters. The persecution of 
Christians has always been connected with politics, 
even when the ostensible reason was some infraction of 
Chinese codes by missionaries. Tolerance in religious 
matters is not always a positive virtue ; more often than 
not it is a question of indifference. It has been asked 
whether the Chinese people, who so recently persecuted 
Christians, will accept a Christian ruler. Probably his 
record as a patriot will quite outweigh any slight 
disadvantage attaching to his profession of a foreign 
faith. But the latitudinarianism of the Chinese con- 
stitutes a real danger, to which some of their wisest 
men are already awake, and, unless they are to lose 
altogether the moral rudder by which they have 
hitherto been guided, a strong effort should be made to 
preserve the teaching of their own classics. That this 
can supply the place of religion is not advanced, but a 
man's religion is the outcome of his own spiritual 
needs. He can be guided, but not driven, towards it. 
The ethical training on which his character and his 
relations with other men are largely founded must, on 
the contrary, be given him early and in large doses. 
Young China may find Christ, but cannot dispense 
with Confucius. 



CHAPTER III 

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 

Perhaps the simplest conception of the Government 
of China is to regard it as an ancient theocracy, the 
Emperor being Pontifex Maximus, and ruling by divine 
right. There is no Church or priesthood, no dogmas 
to become obsolete, no ritual to be corrupted, no scrip- 
tures to be perverted or criticized, but only one Solitary 
Man standing between Heaven and Earth. Hence, 
perhaps, the unexampled duration of a system whose 
ethereal essence, unencumbered with perishable integu- 
ments, has hitherto been superior to time and change. 
The Emperor worshipped Heaven pure and simple. 
It was his place to declare the will of Heaven to the 
people, which it must be admitted he did with much 
modesty and reserve. He was responsible to Heaven 
alone, and was in his own person the blame of Heaven's 
judgments on the people, humbling himself in sackcloth 
and ashes to avert the Divine wrath. But as none 
could share his responsibility, so none could share his 
authority. 

Viewed from the terrestrial standpoint, we reach the 
same result by an inverse process. The Imperial struc- 
ture may, with as much accuracy, be regarded as the 

54 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 55 

supreme development of the family idea. The people 
are the children, the Emperor the great father : absolute 
obedience on the one side, protection and nourishment 
on the other ; such is the theoretical relationship. The 
family, the master key to all Chinese polity, is a mighty 
power in support of order culminating in the Throne. 
Parricide is the most heinous of crimes, and rebellion is 
parricide. Nevertheless, with that bewildering com- 
bination of two opposing theories which often confront 
us in China, the right to revolt against bad rule is 
an acknowledged privilege of the Chinese democracy. 

It is, of course, hard to bring lofty ideals into harmony 
with the grisly reality of Palace intrigues which place 
this or that infant in the seat of the Son of Heaven to 
the accompaniment of assassination, but it is convenient 
nevertheless to bear the theory in mind, were it of no 
greater utility than to keep us from error in interpreting 
the forms and phraseology of edicts and other State 
papers. 

More important for practical purposes is the Chinese 
civil administration, which may be considered apart 
from the abstract theory of government. And the first 
point deserving notice is the position of the absolute 
Monarch in the governing machine. He has not, in 
practice, governed any more despotically than a con 
stitutional Sovereign or the President of a republic : he 
only says Yes or No to projects submitted to him, or 
refers them " to the board concerned for further con- 
sideration and report." Though the power of initiative 
may be vested in the Emperor, it is sparingly used. 
Besides the check automatically applied by the official 
mechanism, an influence less definite though no less 



56 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

effective over the acts of the Sovereign has always been 
exerted by the body of educated opinion. From the 
literary oligarchy, indeed, Hue considers the central 
government derives its real inspiration and moral 
authority. The regular procedure is by memorials, 
which are addressed direct to the Throne and, as has 
been stated, are generally sent to the boards to report 
upon. This may cause convenient delay in giving a 
decision, and the members of the Great Council have 
also their final say. In the end the matter may be 
approved, dismissed, or deferred by the Emperor on the 
advice of the Privy Council. The system is probably 
as effective a way of sifting a question as a parliamentary 
discussion would be, especially as the Chinese govern- 
ment has its own way of making officials personally 
responsible for the advice they give. The operation of 
this principle of personal responsibility runs, indeed, 
through the whole scheme of Chinese life, and is impor- 
tant to be kept in mind by all who have dealings with 
them, whether political or commercial. An official 
who criticizes the conduct of another in a matter of 
difficulty is often taken at his word and sent himself to 
carry out his own alternative plans. In this way some 
of the results of party government are attained by a 
different process. 

The attempt to classify the Chinese system of 
administration so as to bring it within the group of 
governmental forms with which the Western peoples 
are familiar is apt to lead to erroneous impressions, for 
it cannot be described by any of the names in common 
use. If we call it a despotism we are confronted with 
facts which would show it to be the most democratic 



GOVERNMENT ANi> ADMINISTRATION 57 

polity extant, and, if we caL the empire a federation of 
independent states, we are met by the absolute power 
vested in the Throne to remove the provincial governors 
at pleasure. It is best, therefore, to leave the system 
without a name, except that it is Chinese; for the 
" labels " have in times past sometimes misled Western 
governments into assuming what was non-existent, and 
into basing their policy on the fallacy. 

The ultimate unit — the germ-cell as we may call it, 
of the Chinese body — is the family, compact and in- 
divisible, theoretically living on the soil which contains 
the family altar and the family tomb.* It is the first 
course of the political pyramid, which is but little 
affected by the storms that may blast its apex, and 
which survives the wreck of dynasties and the march 
of conquerors. Groups of families constitute villages, 
which are self-governing, and the official who ventures 
to trench on their immemorial rights to the point of 
resistance is, according to an official code not confined 
to China, disavowed by his superiors, and generally 
finds a change of scene imperative. The family system, 
with its extension to village and town groups, the re- 
spective heads of which are responsible, in an ascending 
series, for all the individuals, is the cheapest form of 
government extant,! for it dispenses with police, while 

* In dealing with the Chinese this all-important fact is usually 
forgotten by Westerners, with whom the individual is the unit. 

t So cheap that, according to M. Simon, Chinese taxation 
amounts to three francs per head of the population ; and so good, 
that crime is comparatively rare. In the preservation of order the 
interested vigilance of the people themselves goes hand in hand 
with the official organization in the prevention of disturbances or 
crime. And both forces receive a vital sanction from the indis- 



58 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

disposing effectually of offenders against the peace or 
respectability of the community. 

Where the aboriginal government, which has grown, 
so to say, out of the soil, meets the artificial rule which 
has been imposed from above, the line cannot perhaps 
be drawn with absolute precision, but it may, for the 
purposes of this work, be assumed that the official 
hierarchy begins with the chi hsien, who rules a district 
(hsien) about as large as an English county. He is 
usually called by foreigners the " district magistrate," 
but this title, like that of an Indian " collector," very 
inadequately represents his multifarious functions, 
which are educational, fiscal, judicial, and all that 
belongs to an executive ; indeed, as the last link in the 
long official chain which connects the Imperial Throne 
with the peasant's hut, there is nothing that concerns 
the life of the people which does not concern this very 
hard-worked officer. As the family is the unit of the 
Chinese nation, so may the district be considered the 
unit of the administrative system of the empire. 

soluble tie which binds every individual to the family, even in 
exile. As has been well said: "The man who knows that it is 
almost impossible, except by entire seclusion, to escape from the 
company of secret or acknowledged emissaries of Government, will 
be cautious of offending the laws of his country, knowing, as he 
must, that though he should himself escape, yet his family, his 
kindred, or his neighbours will suffer for his offence ; that if unable 
to recompense the sufferers, it will probably be dangerous for him 
to return home ; or if he does, it will be most likely to find his 
property in the possession of neighbours or officials, who feel 
conscious of security in plundering one whose offences have for 
ever placed him under a ban." — T/ie Fortnightly Review ', 1895, 
p. 578. 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 59 

A group of districts forms a department, or/w, which 
is governed by the chi fu, or prefect, whose place of 
residence takes rank as a fu city, as Hangchau fu. 
The prefect is the court of appeal from the magis- 
trate. 

A group of departments forms a circuit, at the head 
of which is an official whose title is very familiar to 
readers of newspapers — the taoiai, or intendant of 
circuit. If the magistrate be the important official for 
the Chinese people, the taotai is the important one for 
foreigners, for he is the pivot on which all business out- 
side the territorial administration turns. Meadows tells 
us* that the taotai is the lowest civilian who exercises 
a direct ex-officio authority over the military. Though 
he would naturally reside in a departmental or fu city, 
the exigencies of business often require him to select one 
of district rank, as, for instance, Shanghai. Tientsin is 
a fu city and also a hsien, and thus has a prefect as well as 
a district magistrate. It is not only the official residence 
of the territorial and other taotais, but has been the seat 
of the vice-regal court of the province of Chihli ever 
since 1870, when the great massacre took place there. 
Its peculiar position as the gate of the capital renders 
the presence in Tientsin of an officer of the highest 
responsibility a necessity of State. 

The next grade in the administrative system is the 
province, the chief executive officer of which is the 
governor, or fu tai. The number of the provinces has 
remained for such a length of time eighteen that China 
proper is usually known to the inhabitants simply as 
" The Eighteen Provinces." Each province is autono- 
* " Chinese and their Rebellions." 1856. 



60 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

mous, with a difference. It is as independent as an 
army corps, possessing the complete machinery of 
government, civil and military, educational and fiscal, 
judicial and penal. The province administers its own 
revenue, provides for its own defence, holds its own 
competitive examinations, and performs all State func- 
tions without any interference from the central govern- 
ment. Since October, 1909, the province has had its 
own representative Assembly or Parliament. It is true 
that the functions of these bodies were fixed by edict as 
purely consultative, but it was clear from the first that 
they held more ambitious views. Officials are appointed 
from Peking, and each province has to remit tribute — 
or, as it may be called, its quota of the Imperial 
revenue — to the capital. This done, the province is 
freed from all interference from above. The whole 
duty of a governor may be summed up in two articles : 
Keep the peace and pay the tribute. The governor is 
absolute, the chain of responsibility in the ranks below 
him being complete. The provincial officials next in 
rank below the governor are the finance minister, the 
criminal judge, and the literary chancellor. The 
governor, however, is the only one who in his sole name 
enjoys the privilege of memorializing the Throne, and, 
as he is thus in a position to report on all his sub- 
ordinates, thereby wields absolute authority over them. 
We thus reach the last link in the chain. The district 
magistrate connects the official hierarchy with the 
people ; the governor with the Throne. There remains, 
however, another high provincial officer, who is not 
essential to the system, since in certain cases he is dis- 
pensed with, and that is the tsung in or chih tai or 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 61 

governor-general. He usually superintends the affairs 
of two provinces (each with its own governor), and 
sometimes only one (as in the cases of Chihli and 
Szechuan), while some provinces, as Shantung, have no 
governor-general. This high authority is rather in- 
aptly called " viceroy " by foreigners, a word which 
finds no equivalent in the Chinese title. Those best 
known are : The Viceroy of Chihli, the office held for 
twenty-four years by the late Li Hung Chang ; the 
Viceroy of Kiangnan (Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Kiangsi 
provinces), whose capital is Nanking ; the Viceroy of 
the Hu Kwang, or Liang Hu (Hunan and Hupei), whose 
residence is at Wuchang, on the Yangtse ; the Viceroy 
of Min-Che (abbreviation for provinces of Fukien and 
Che kiang), who resides in Fuchau ; the Viceroy of the 
Liang Kwang (the two Kwangs, Kwangtung and 
Kwangsi), whose capital is Canton ; of Yun-Kwei 
(Yunnan and Kweichau), who resides at Yunnan fu ; 
of Shen-Kan (Shensi and Kansu), who governs at 
Sian fu. 

Great as are the powers of governors and governors- 
general, that of life and death is not one of them, except 
in certain special cases — such as piracy or crimes which 
may be construed into seditiousness — where drumhead 
court-martial would apply in Western countries. In 
ordinary cases no death-warrant can be signed save by 
the Emperor himself. As is notorious, the Chinese 
system in practice does not protect the accused from 
the misery of protracted imprisonment. 

Two important characteristics of Chinese officialdom 
need to be constantly borne in mind by foreigners who 
desire to have a just appreciation of the merits and 



62 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

demerits of the man and of the system. The first is 
that the aspirant enters the ranks through the portal of 
competitive literary examinations. These examinations 
form, perhaps, the most remarkable feature in the whole 
fabric of Chinese polity ; they are so ancient, and have 
taken such a complete hold of the ambitions of the 
people. No part of the administration is so minutely 
organized as this. The prize of a literary degree, and 
then a higher, and yet a higher, is the blue ribbon for 
which the whole nation seems to be contending ; at 
once an honourable distinction and a passport to official 
appointment. As is explained in the chapter on " The 
New Learning," the introduction of modern education 
has only modified the training, it has not altered the 
system. The gaining of the prize is an occasion of 
public festivity in the birthplace of the successful can- 
didate. The results of the system are, as might be 
expected, both good and bad ; but, at any rate, it has 
secured hitherto that every Chinese official shall be a 
scholar, and generally an expert in style and penman- 
ship. Not only on entering the service, but in his sub- 
sequent career, the power of the pen serves its owner 
as well as the power of the tongue does in parliamentary 
countries. " Junius " would have risen to high office in 
China. One of the most prominent of the viceroys, 
the late Chang-Chih-tung, was just such another master 
of invective. 

The second characteristic follows naturally from the 
first and marks the shade in the picture. Scholarship 
being the essential qualification for office, no other was 
sought for, nor were the State functions so differentiated 
as that a young official could gain special training for 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 63 

any department of duty for which he might have parti- 
cular aptitude. From the district magistrate upwards 
one man has had to discharge many duties, as revenue 
officer, literary examiner, coroner, sheriff, prison in- 
spector, and judge. From his induction into public 
service the young official has had to be jack-of-all-trades ; 
and, even when in the higher grades some separation of 
function took place, it was a mere chance, or at least 
depended on no consideration of special fitness for the 
duties, whether one was promoted to be provincial 
judge, literary chancellor, or provincial treasurer. 
Although these conditions will now be modified, under 
whatever form of rule, yet the ingrained characteristics 
of Chinese administration will not be lightly altered. 
No doubt this promiscuous experience sharpens the 
general intelligence, and it is, perhaps, therefore, not 
so much a matter of surprise as it is sometimes thought 
that Chinese officials thrown into novel relations with 
foreigners should acquit themselves so well. Of course, 
the principal lesson of their lives is caution, which 
educates their instinct for evasion and delay. The 
reality, they think, will always keep, and it is never too 
late for compromise. Hence they become adepts at 
plausible representations, which are so ingenious as 
to puzzle, and sometimes nonplus, an inexperienced 
foreigner who attempts to follow them through their 
mazes of argument. But they are not at all disconcerted 
when confronted with their own false premises. Honour 
is not stained by what is euphemistically termed by the 
Chinese, "big-talk"; in other words, untruth. From 
the point of view of the efficiency of the Government 
service, however, it is obvious that the jack-of-all-trades 



64 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

system must be fatal whenever an emergency arises. 
During the Japanese war its breakdown was conspi- 
cuous in the case of Li Hung Chang. He alone had 
to conduct the campaign, as Minister of War and as 
Commander-in-Chief of both army and navy, while at 
the same time he had to carry on his territorial duties 
as Governor-General of a large province, his special 
duties as Superintendent of Trade, and numerous other 
functions. And all this without any organized staff! 
Yet the Emperor and his advisers probably had no real 
insight into the reasons of their military collapse, so 
completely were they wrapped up in their traditional 
practices, in military tactics two thousand years old, 
and in the bow-and-arrow exercises of the Manchu 
garrison in Peking. 

Taking the scheme as a whole, and as applicable to 
internal affairs, which were the sole concern of the 
empire until fifty years ago, the Chinese administra- 
tion was very well thought out. The Government 
neither attempted impossibilities itself nor expected 
miracles of its distant agents. It could not follow out 
the intricacies of every local question that might arise 
in so vast an empire, so it cut every such consideration 
short by simply making the provincial authorities re- 
sponsible for success, which amounted to little more, 
as has been said, than keeping the peace and paying 
the tribute.* The " barbarians " on the coast were, of 

* " Keeping the peace," however, includes the absolute obliga- 
tion to discover and bring to justice an offender, an obligation 
which extends in an unbroken chain through all official grades 
from the lowest to the highest, who are successively responsible, 
like the series of endorsers of a bill of exchange. No excuse for 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 65 

course, a serious element of disturbance, and a man 
who had a reputation for " soothing and bridling" 
them had a good chance of receiving an appointment 
at a treaty port. The essential thing always was to 
prevent the intruders from ever being heard of in the 
capital. 

Many precautions were devised to prevent any kind 
of malfeasance in the provinces, such precautions, 
indeed, as must d priori have commended themselves 
to any wise ruler. For one thing, the term of office in 
one post was limited to three years. Further, a mandarin 
could not hold office in the province of his birth. By 
such means as these it was sought to guard against 
local interests growing up to compete with Imperial 
duty, and especially against territorial attachments 
which might become the bases of disloyalty to the 
Throne. Where distances were so great and com- 
munications so slow, such checks cannot have been 
considered to be superfluous, but the drawbacks to the 
system are obvious, for it is the absence of local and 
territorial attachments which encourages some of the 
worst official abuses. Rapacity makes hay while the 
sun shines all the more ruthlessly when there is no tie 
of sentiment between the parties, and no forebodings of 
reprobation in old age or retirement in the locality 
where the family of the official is domiciled. Neither 
in such a short term of office is an official likely to 
interest himself in, still less to spend his own money 

failure is admissible, and it is on this principle that the governor 
of a province is punished for a crime if he has not been vigilant 
enough to prevent it, or energetic enough to arrest the culprit. 

5 



66 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

on, local improvements, such as roads and bridges, in a 
place which may know him no more during his whole 
official career. Some of the worst features of the Indian 
" Nabob " system are thereby perpetuated. 

Checks of various other descriptions have been devised 
for keeping the mandarinate in the path of rectitude. 
The literary examinations and the granting of degrees 
must always qualify an immense number of candidates 
for whom no immediate employment can be found, and 
besides these the number of officials temporarily out of 
office is always very large. These together form an 
army of expectants who congregate about every pro- 
vincial capital on the chance of something turning up. 
They are at the disposal of the governor to fill chance 
vacancies pro tern., to execute commissions, or to spy 
on the doings of other officials and make reports. It is 
in the ranks of these unemployed scribes that are found 
the chief literary assailants of foreign missionaries, and 
the fomenters of riots based on gross imputations which 
they circulate by placard and pamphlet. 

A more organized form of precautionary measures is 
the institution of what is generally known as the 
" censorate," a body of men, fifty-six in number, who are 
appointed to " censure " in the various provinces and 
the capital itself whatever they see amiss in the conduct 
of any official, not even exempting the highest personages, 
and to watch over the welfare of the people. The 
memorials which these censors present are often wonder- 
fully outspoken, and sometimes are efficacious for good. 
Occasionally, however, a too bold arraignment of the 
Imperial family draws down a fierce reprimand on the 
head of the author, and lucky for him if he escapes 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 67 

with that. It is interesting to know that the scheme 
of republican government, as explained to the writer 
by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, includes the board of censors in a 
modified form. 

From the forms in use and the evident care that has 
been taken by the Imperial legislators to secure pure 
and efficient government, one would be justified in con- 
cluding, on theoretical grounds, that the Chinese adminis- 
tration was a supremely good one ; and those Western 
scholars who are engrossed in the study of Chinese lore 
have usually been inclined to that view. But between 
the theory and the practice in politico-ethical affairs 
there is necessarily a great difference, which is strongly 
accentuated in China by the enormous extent of its 
public service and the extraordinary length of time 
during which abuses have been propagating themselves. 
Not only are exceptions made to all salutary regulations 
-for instance, Li Hung Chang held one office for over 
twenty years-but evasions have become so systema- 
tized that, as in the giant forests of the Himilaya one is 
puzzled to distinguish between the parasite and the tree 
round which its luxuriant foliage is entwined, so in the 
Chinese administration the best principles are lost to 
view m a rank growth of false practice. Evasions have 
become legitimized by universal recognition. Peremptory 
orders are issued in the "tremble and obey" style 
They are received with the profoundest obeisance ; but 
they are not obeyed; and he who issued them forgets 
or at least ignores them, and there is an end. The 
war operations with Japan were carried on in this 
same fashion. Sham is the all - pervading element 
which reduces the finest precepts to nought, and as 



68 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

" they all do it," it seems to be considered that no one 
need feel aggrieved. Like a debased currency, it is as 
fair to buyer as to seller so long as it is current and no 
one is deceived. Perhaps one of the greatest difficulties 
to be faced by the Chinese reformer is the restoration 
of its face value to official speech. 

To reach the heart of the national weakness, however, 
we must come to the apex of the pyramid, the central 
government itself.* In all grades of the provincial 
service there is, in spite of the resources of evasion, a 
certain sense of responsibility, an apprehension of being 
called to account, the Argus eye of a master personated 
by an army of spies, a wholesome influence in keeping 
up efficiency and even — to a certain extent — purity. 
But in Peking these checks fail through sheer familiarity. 
There one has nothing higher to defer to, nothing 
unseen to apprehend. A dissolute parent may, notwith- 
standing his own lapses, exercise a restraining influence 
on his family ; but quis custodiet custodes ? It is in the 
action of the central government, therefore, that we 
should expect to find the greatest inconsequence, the 
greatest vacillation, where gravitation has lost its 
direction, where the needle has no pole to turn to. 
Only seclusion could hide the weakness and rottenness 
of the capital and of the palace. The most casual 
visitor was met by proofs that the government of 
the city was far behind that of any provincial town. 
As a town, indeed, it was laid out on a magnificent 
scale, and it once had sewers of Titanic proportions. 

* This paragraph is left as written in 1897. The question of 
the central government is treated from the point of view of 
recent developments in later chapters. 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 69 

But the streets had became cesspools, worn into 
huge hollows, in which, during the summer rains, 
drowning was no uncommon thing for man and beast. 
Such as were the streets, such was the government. 
Its heart also had been worn away and become a 
receptacle for waste material. 

The rebuilding of Peking after the Boxer rising 
indicated the arrival of a new era, but the modern 
Peking, with well-laid streets, buildings, police, and 
Western appliances, was not accompanied by a regenera- 
tion in court circles. It is easier to recreate a town 
than a dynasty. The court became more than ever 
an anachronism. 

As has been well said by Mayers, the scheme of the 
central government of China was not to assume any 
initiative, but to control the action of the provincial 
administrators, to register their proceedings, to remove 
them, and degrade or promote them as occasion may 
require. No legislative change or progress seems to 
have been contemplated or provided for by the con- 
stitution. But as change was forced upon China from 
without, when the " barbarians " would no longer rest 
satisfied with intercourse with subordinate provincial 
officials, some accommodation had to be made by the 
Imperial authorities in order to admit of diplomatic 
relations in the capital. The first step in this direction 
was the establishment of what became familiar as the 
Tsungli Yamen by Imperial decree in January, 1861, 
which was originally composed of three ministers, who 
were also members of other boards. This new creation 
never acquired any status or authority until the pressure 
of external events compelled the Emperor's Council to 



70 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

make use of it, and to recognize it as an integral part 
of the government. It was only in 1890 that it first 
figured in the Red Book, a complete record of State 
departments. Owing to the pressure put on China by 
the foreign Powers after the Boxer rising, the Tsungli 
Yamen became the Wai-wu-pu. The change of name 
was practically the only difference. 

Pressed also by the needs of the time, another Board 
was constituted in 1890, which was to take the control 
of the navy out of the hands of Li Hung Chang. But 
there was no one connected with it who had any 
acquaintance with naval affairs, and when the Japanese 
war broke out in 1894, the members of the Board of 
Admiralty, none of whom knew a ship's stem from its 
stern, were fain to relinquish the control and let it 
revert to the one man who was deemed competent to 
take it. There was a talk of abolishing the institution 
after the war on the not unreasonable ground that there 
was no navy to manage. 

Another office may be mentioned in connection with 
foreign relations ; it is that of the two Superintendents 
of Trade — one for the northern and one for the southern 
coast. The former has been held since 1870 by the 
Viceroy of Chihli, whose official residence is at Tientsin; 
the latter by the Viceroy of the Liang Kiang, at Nan- 
king. The first holder of the office in Tientsin was not, 
however, the Viceroy (whose court was located in the 
provincial capital, Paoting fu, a city some two hundred 
miles inland), but a Manchu of high degree, named 
Chunghow, known to fame in connection first with the 
Tientsin massacre of 1870, and next with the Livadia 
treaty, which was repudiated in Peking and very nearly 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 71 

cost the envoy his head. The odium incurred by 
Chunghow in connection with the massacre was scarcely 
deserved. The latest administrative change, also indica- 
tive of the important part played by foreign relations, 
was the appointment in 1910 of a Commissioner for 
Foreign Affairs for each province, to take rank after the 
Treasurer. 

An interesting circumstance applying to the whole 
administrative system has been that the officials are 
intensely laborious, hardly ever get a holiday except in 
case of serious illness or the time prescribed for mourn- 
ing the death of a parent — which is also liable to be 
abrogated when the exigencies of the service demand 
it — and there is no superannuation. They must work, 
like a cab-horse, till they drop. Amusements, also, are 
denied them. A minister seen at a theatre would be 
promptly denounced by a censor. This severe regime 
is necessarily depressing to the whole official body. 
Its strictness, of course, has led to evasion, and the 
Peking Gazette was sometimes filled with the tragi-comic 
memorials of provincial mandarins, who enter into the 
minutest details of their pathological condition in order 
to obtain a brief holiday or to be excused from obeying 
the Imperial summons to the capital. The success of 
such appeals probably depends more on judicious 
palmistry than on the actual merits of the case. 

Were it possible for us to set up the complete skeleton 
of Chinese polity, of which we have presented a very 
meagre sketch, we should still have gone but a short 
way towards a real apprehension of either its methods 
or its motives. For that, the dry bones must be clothed 
in flesh and blood, and we should need to know some- 



72 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

thing of the cerebral functions of the organism, which 
experience alone can teach, and even that slowly and 
imperfectly. The closest observer will constantly be 
obliged to correct one observation by another, and the 
longer he lives the more he will feel the necessity of 
revising his generalizations. So much being premised, 
a few salient features of Chinese political psychology 
may be not unprofitably studied. The machine being 
fitted together, the dual question is, What sets it in 
motion, and what is it set to accomplish ? To this, the 
general answer must of course be : The same impulse 
that sets every political machine in the world in motion, 
and for the same ends — individual ambition tempered 
by public spirit. Out of this combination the best and 
the worst results are obtained, depending on the propor- 
tions in which the two elements are blended. In the 
government of China hitherto we need not hesitate to 
affirm that the mixture has not been a favourable one, the 
personal being unduly preponderant over the altruistic 
factor. That government, moreover, exhibited the 
widest discrepancy of any known system between 
theory and practice, the purest ideal cloaking the 
grossest aims; a terrible example, in fact, of corruptio 
optimi pessimal. And the preternatural exaltation of the 
ideal places it so far beyond the reach of the highest 
attainment in real life that the standard of public duty, 
lost in the clouds of inflated verbiage, is wholly discon- 
nected from practical affairs. It would, therefore, be 
quite in vain to seek the key to the politics of Peking in 
any theory which could he deduced from official utter- 
ances, constitutional formulae, or codes of law. The 
remark applies, of course, to every government in the 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 73 

world. But the difference is that, whereas in other 
countries there is still some relation between the pro- 
fession and the procedure — as, for instance, when the 
minor is alleged as the major reason — this relation 
practically disappeared in China, and the substitution 
of the false for the true has become an organized 
system, already consecrated by unwritten law. 

We have spoken of the reign of sham in the general 
administration ; but it has had its roots in the central 
government. It may be laid down as a general rule 
obtaining throughout the public life of the Empire that 
things are never what they seem. Whether there may 
or may not be a real patriotic spirit in China among 
officials or people, there has been little outward evidence 
of it in the inner circles of the capital. Instead of 
defending the Empire and the Dynasty the natural 
defenders have seemed ready to sell both, and it is a 
problem how far even the Dynasty was true to itself. 
Each individual among the Ministers of State and the 
Princes of the Empire have been intent on " saving his 
own skin " by making friends of the strongest invader. 
For many years the politics of Peking were swayed by 
a bitter palace feud, the young Emperor and his party 
on one side, the late Empress-Dowager on the other. 
Of a passionate nature and imperious will, inspired by 
purely selfish considerations, the Empress-Dowager 
dominated and even terrorized the Emperor, who was 
of feeble physique and incapable of wielding the 
authority which belonged to him. Into this quarrel 
the courtier Li Hung Chang and the soldier Yuan 
Shih-kai were thrust. The position of the former nearly 
cost him his head on his return from concluding the 



74 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

humiliating treaty with Japan in 1895, for the Emperor's 
adherents endeavoured to compass his death first by 
assassination, and next by quasi-judicial process on the 
ground of treachery. These designs were frustrated by 
the countermining of the Empress, who struck sudden 
terror into the opposite party, and then, to get her 
protege out of harm's way for a while, manoeuvred him 
into the post of Special Envoy to Russia in 1896. 
Quelled for the time, however, the conspirators waited 
an opportunity to revenge their defeat. Li Hung 
Chang's fate hung on the protection of her whom he 
served so long and so faithfully, and fortunately for him 
she outlived him. Yuan, on the contrary, lost his 
mistress and protectress at a most critical moment. 
But palace intrigues and the warfare of powerful 
ministers interested the Chinese people less and less. 
They asked themselves how a government could volun- 
tarily surrender its territory and itself to an invader 
without an attempt at resistance ? Where matters 
have come to such a pass as that, we may almost 
as well discuss the machinery of the government of 
Babylon as that of Peking, so far as the practical 
interests of the day are concerned. China, like a pear, 
was most rotten at the core. 

The woman factor is a potent one in Chinese govern- 
ment, but never in a worthy sense. Historic courtezans 
become empresses make profitable subjects for literary 
portraiture and description, but they have usually 
marked the debacle of a dynasty ; and in meaner 
capacities women have played their part in the 
intrigues of court and camp. How much the collapse 
of China may be due to the personal qualities of the 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 75 

real but illegitimate ruler for years, the late Empress- 
Dowager, may not be known, but there seems to be no 
doubt that every surrender made to foreigners while 
she held the reins was dictated by her and her personal 
convenience. Remembering her experience when, as 
the secondary consort of the Emperor Hienfung, she 
followed him in his flight to Jehol, she resolved rather 
to yield everything than risk such an experience again. 
A threat of the invasion of Peking — if believed in — was 
always sufficient to bring her to terms. When the 
late Emperor was prepared to abandon the capital 
during the Japanese war, and resist to the bitter end, 
it was that imperious lady who insisted on peace at 
any price ; and it was chiefly on her sensitive feelings 
that foreign threats took effect. The constant sur- 
renders which were the features of Chinese foreign 
policy in her day were largely responsible for the grow- 
ing discontent of the Chinese with Manchu government, 
and the Empress Tze Hsi, so eulogized by feminine 
press writers in Europe and America, certainly did a 
great deal to destroy respect for the Throne. Never- 
theless, she was clever and strong-willed, and therefore 
had a better grasp of affairs than her successors. 

Official and political corruption occupies such a 
prominent place in most treatises on matters Chinese, 
that it is commonly regarded as something peculiar to 
that nation. The peculiarity, however, lies rather in 
the extent and the organization than in the nature, or 
even the form, of the Chinese system of peculation. 
In substance it is the same which prevails in the 
Western hemisphere, where it is called " perquisites." 
That this destructive parasite should have attained a 



76 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

higher development in China than elsewhere may very 
well be accounted for by the circumstances under which 
that country itself has developed. The extent of terri- 
tory and relative difficulty of control, multiplied by the 
number of centuries during which customs (good and 
bad) have been growing, would yield a product adequate 
to account for both the magnitude and the methodiza- 
tion of Chinese embezzlement. 

Though universally condoned, the system is, of 
course, illegal, and, just as certain forms of mal- 
practice which are winked at in Western countries 
come, occasionally, into awkward collision with the 
judges, so officials who have enriched themselves in 
China continue to be at the mercy of blackmailers. 
The liability to denunciation and ruin which thus hangs 
over them goes a long way towards accounting for the 
universal timidity of Chinese statesmen. Yet the in- 
dividual is as much to be pitied as blamed, for against 
the system which has come down from venerable 
antiquity it would be as hard to struggle as against 
one's personal heredity. Fair consideration should be 
extended to the rank-and-file implicated in a debasing 
system which it requires real heroism to resist, for here, 
as in the midst of a slave-owning society or in the 
bondage of vice, there are those who would welcome 
a way of escape from the necessity of their lives, as well 
as those who revel in the full current of it. 

The root of the matter, no doubt, lies in the fact that 
Chinese officials have, hitherto, been virtually unpaid, 
their merely nominal salaries being insufficient for their 
necessary expenses. Hence the official naturally ob- 
tained as much gratuitous service as possible, under the 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 77 

tacit understanding that his dependants must take care 
of themselves, while, at the same time, he must cast about 
for the wherewithal to maintain his family and position. 
From this simple beginning the whole complex system of 
what we call peculation may be traced.* The younger 
officials begin life, as a rule, in debt; they have fre- 
quently had to pay for their appointments, borrowing 
for the purpose at usurious interest, and they have to go 
on paying their official superiors on pain of being 
reported on. The highest personages in the Empire 
receive large gratuities from officials gazetted to the 
provinces, and become rich from that source. And 
when a term of lucrative service is over, and the 
governor or prefect is graciously summoned to court — 
an honour which he strives to escape, as a rule — it is in 
order that the sponge which has been absorbing in the 
provinces may be squeezed in the capital. The cow has 
been turned into the green corn, destroying more than 
she has eaten; she must come home to be milked. 
One highly lucrative post — that of Hoppo, or collector 
of Native Customs at Canton — was specially reserved 
for some worthy connection of the Imperial family, who 
was expected to amass so much in three years as to be 
able to deal handsomely by his kinsfolk on his return to 
the capital. This post was abolished in 1904 as " no 
longer profitable," owing no doubt to the regularizing 
of the Customs service since 1901. An official incurs no 
odium and loses no good name unless his exactions are 
excessive or lead to public scandal. In the rare case of 

* Meadows assumes the highest mandarins to get by means of 
"squeeze" about ten times, the lowest about fifty times, the 
amount of their legal incomes. 



78 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

a veteran being made to publicly disgorge, it is only the 
computed excess that is dealt with. But, obviously, 
when such a matter is left to the conscience of the 
interested party (with no fear of an audit, unless he, 
from overweening confidence in his influence, is 
niggardly towards the censors) the door is thrown wide 
open to the most extravagant abuses. As no official is 
expected to render a true account, and there is no 
machinery for checking him that would not itself need, 
in turn, to be checked, the sovereign of an oriental 
country — for China is no exception — would get no 
revenue at all under a fiduciary system. To meet this 
case, the revenue collection is simplified by fixed levies 
— taxes are farmed, monopolies are granted, and thus 
the most powerful stimulus is supplied to the con- 
cessionnaires to raise as large a surplus as possible for 
themselves. The provinces are assessed in a similar 
manner for their quota of the Imperial revenue.* 

The arrangement is, of course, clumsy and wasteful in 
the highest degree. It is beyond our purpose to follow 

* " . . . Each district has a fixed quota, which the magistrate 
must produce by hook or by crook, but beyond the minimum all 
the rest is practically his own, not to keep exactly, because if he 
holds a lucrative appointment he is expected to be extra liberal in 
his presents to the Governor, to the Literary Chancellor, to the 
Provincial Judge, the Treasurer, and so on, not to mention still 
higher dignitaries, if he wishes to get on. But there is no magis- 
tracy that does not at least make up its limits of taxation and 
leave something over, while the greater number leave a handsome 
surplus. To hand this over to the Imperial Exchequer is about 
the last thing that anyone would think of doing. It is the fund out 
of which mainly the fortunes of viceroys and commissioners have 
been built up" (G. Jamieson, "Foreign Office Reports," 1897). 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 79 

its ramifications, and show in detail how extremely 
injurious it is to the national interests and how 
demoralizing to the civil service itself. A single illustra- 
tion will show how the system operates on public 
affairs. Foreigners who serve the Chinese and have to 
get money for public purposes are sometimes surprised 
at the seeming contradictions in the official temper. 
They will, for example, plead in vain for small outlays 
for repairs or up-keep of buildings, while the demand 
for a large sum to erect new ones is granted readily. 
The reason is that no one is interested in the small 
expenditure, while the large one affords an opportunity 
of intercepting a worthy percentage. The lower official 
recommends the outlay, his superior sanctions it — and 
they share the profit or commission. The practice is, 
of course, ruinous in military matters, for it starves the 
service, while lavishing large sums on heavy guns and 
ships. Thus the Chinese had at Port Arthur and Talien- 
wan, during the Japanese war, the heaviest fortress 
guns, enormously costly, the contracts for which made 
the fortunes of certain officials, but the men trained to 
use the guns were entirely neglected. The rule has 
been that the Chinese officials would promote that 
enterprise which afforded them the largest douceur, and 
the possibilities of material progress in China depended 
chiefly on the operation of that principle. Estimates 
are sometimes made of the loss of public revenue from 
wasteful modes of collection, a small percentage only of 
what is taken from the people being returned to the 
treasury. Yet it is doubtful whether the pecuniary loss 
is more ruinous to the country than the destruction, in 
the governing class, of public spirit, which is the neces- 



80 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

sary consequence of the wealth of the country being 
made the subject of a scramble in which every official 
of the Empire, up to Princes of the Blood, have hereto- 
fore been engaged. We know, by our own Western 
experience, how demoralizing is a scramble, no matter 
what the object of it may be. 

The most important feature in most administrations 
is the method of raising revenue. As has been several 
times repeated, the central government in China evaded 
the principal difficulty by fixing the responsibility on 
the shoulders of the provincial officials. The Imperial 
revenue is derived from two main sources (apart from 
tribute and certain monopolies) — the contributions 
from provinces, and the Imperial Maritime Customs. 
As to the first it is chiefly derived by the provinces 
from the land tax, which is an ancient institution in 
China, and was supposed to be proportioned to the 
original value in rent. In the year 1713 the Emperor, 
in a reckless and unprincipled effort to acquire popu- 
larity at the expense of future generations, decreed that 
the amount of the tax should be fixed and immutable 
for all time, with only authorized reductions in case of 
drought and flood. But, though the assessment is made 
on a value of 200 years ago, the occupier of the land 
(who for the most part will be treated as the owner) 
does not get off quite as easily as he might, for he has 
to pay a surcharge as " cost of collecting," and this is 
fixed by the tax-collector at an amount which allows 
a margin not only for himself but for the officials above 
him. This surcharge must be disputed between tax- 
payer and tax-collector each year, and forms the subject 
for bargains on both sides. Then there is an allowance 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 81 

to be made for meltage, as the money may have to be 
converted into other currency more than once before 
it reaches the Imperial treasury. The most reliable 
foreign observers, such as Mr. Jamieson and Sir Robert 
Hart, have estimated the taxable capacity of land in 
China considerably higher than the supposed yield. 
Under a different system of administration it is prob- 
able that the tax would have to be increased, since the 
central authority will obviously need a much larger 
revenue if it is to pay the officials instead of expecting 
them to help themselves. There is probably no feature 
of occidental administration which is less congenial to 
Asiatics than what they consider our soulless, cut-and- 
dried method of taxation, as inevitable and undis- 
criminating as old age ! No chance of a bargain or 
evasion, no scope for individual skill — nothing but 
"pay, pay, pay!" Some such feeling as this will have 
to be encountered and overcome before China can 
place her administration of revenue on a proper foot- 
ing. Only acquaintance with the advantages of good 
public services will discount the aversion to paying 
for them steadily and systematically. 

Customs receipts form the second great item in the 
Imperial Budget. Statistics and information regarding 
what is known as the " Native Customs " are hard to 
come by. Land stations are established at various 
points ; but their receipts are a matter only for them- 
selves, so long as they transmit punctually the sum at 
which they are assessed. In 1901 all Native Customs 
within fifteen miles of a treaty port were transferred to 
the Maritime Customs Department, with the result that 
irregular collections are abolished, and a full collection 

6 



82 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

is made and reported. In view of the present situation 
it is interesting to inquire what are the principal sources 
of Imperial funds.* The land tax will be at the disposal 
of the Central Government, unless indeed the people, 
who usually connect revolution with "no taxation," 
refuse to pay. This is estimated at Tls. 49,ooo,ooo.t 
The tax in kind on the provinces known as " tribute," 
commuted in some cases for a money payment, will 
not be paid in future. The tea and salt tax account 
for some Tls. 47,000,000. The latter will be difficult 
to collect, being partly in official and partly in non- 
official hands, with a very confused and corrupt system. 
A large item is likin — Tls. 44,000,000 — but this serious 
barrier to trade has been abolished. A large, and by 
far the most reliable, asset is the revenue collected by 
the Imperial Maritime Customs — Tls. 35,000,000 net 
(given as Tls. 42,000,000 in Imperial Budget, 191 1) — 
and there can be no more crucial question to-day than 
the problem of how this foreign operated and controlled 
department of the Chinese administration is to act while 
the future government of China remains undetermined 
and there is no real central power to deal with. The 
revenue could be legitimately raised, according to Sir 
Robert Bredon, late Inspector-General of Customs, by 
about Tls. 80,000,000. 

The Imperial Maritime Customs, under foreign direc- 

* See Appendix III. 

f The possible collection was estimated by Mr. G. Jamieson 
some twenty years ago as Tls. 375,000,000, and by Sir Robert 
Hart at Tls. 400,000,000 ; but Sir Robert Bredon (and he speaks 
with authority) estimates this, "with a crude re-survey of the 
land," at Tls. 100,000,000. Other authorities estimate it at a 
considerably higher figure. 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 83 

tion, grew out of Chinese necessities, not foreign 
demands. The Taiping rebellion destroyed Imperial 
administration up to the gates of the foreign settlement 
of Shanghai, and as there was no one to collect the 
dues the foreigners themselves appointed a board of 
three inspectors to perform this duty and hand over 
the revenues. When Imperial authority was restored, 
a considerable section of the trading community wished 
to return to the old Chinese method, which they de- 
scribed as easier and less onerous, but instead of this a 
Commission on Tariffs decided that the foreign inspec- 
torate should be extended to all the treaty ports. The 
man selected for this post was Horatio Lay, and when 
he failed to agree with his Chinese employers and fell, 
Mr. Robert Hart, who had acted for him during his 
absence, succeeded him (1861). The part played by 
the " I. G." in China during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, both as a most successful adminis- 
trator and the unofficial channel of communication 
between China and Great Britain, is a chapter of history 
which yet remains to be written. 

The business of the Customs is to collect duty, not 
only on imports from foreign countries but also on 
exports, whether abroad or to other Chinese ports. 
They collect tonnage dues on shipping, transit dues on 
foreign imports conveyed inland, and, since 1889, likin 
on foreign opium. For a considerable period the 
superior staff was recruited entirely from foreign 
sources, but an increasing number of Chinese have been 
drafted in. Although such a system, under a man of 
different calibre to Sir Robert Hart, might have become 
an imperium in imperio, no such development has taken 



84 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

place. The service has always been as loyal as it is 
efficient. 

Out of the Maritime Customs Department developed 
one of the most important reforms in China — the estab- 
lishment of a modern post system which has been 
administered for the past two years as an independent 
department, under a foreign controller, M. Piry. It is 
impossible to overestimate the part played by this im- 
proved service in the awakening of China. At present 
there are three departments under the Inspector- 
General of Customs — the Revenue Department, Marine 
Department (with engineer, harbour and lights' staff, 
for the construction and working of lights and for 
harbour and coast work), and (nominally) an Educa- 
tional Department. 

Attempts have been made during recent years to 
reform the currency, which is in a lamentable state of 
confusion. The coinage used by the people is the cash, 
forty of which go to one penny and 9,600 to one pound. 
The tael or Hang is a silver standard, the weight and 
quality of which vary in different parts of the country ; 
the Haikwan tael (in which duties are paid to the 
Imperial Maritime Customs) has a value of about 
2s. 8d. An Imperial decree of May, 1910, ordered 
that the yuan, or silver dollar, should be the standard, 
and that after twelve months all payments were to be 
made on that basis. An agreement for a loan of 
£10,000,000, to be devoted to the reform of currency 
and the industrial development of Manchuria, and to 
be advanced in equal shares by British, American, 
French, and German banks, was signed on April 15, 
191 1. A decree establishing a uniform system of weights 



GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 85 

and measures was issued in 1907, but the confusion in 
this respect is still an unabated chaos.* 

A very fascinating article could be written on the 
methods and incidents in the transmission of letters 
and documents in China from prehistoric times. A 
literary people like the Chinese naturally did not neglect 
facilities for the exchange of written matter. It is well 
known that long before we had any such convenience 
they had adopted a system for transferring not only 
news but money about their vast country. It was 
only in the last few years that Government undertook 
postal duties for any other than official purposes. The 
official mail service and a foreign-initiated system to 
and from the treaty ports were in existence, but ordinary 
people belonged to postage hongs, run by merchants 
like any other form of business, and on the whole very 
efficient. The hongs find it yearly more difficult to 
flourish in competition with a cheap Imperial service, 
which is run at a loss. Uniformity of rates is not 
attractive to the Chinese, who, without meanness, 
always want to make a bargain. The letter hongs meet 
his views by having different rates for different classes 
of service. They do not have limited hours of service 
— essential in a Government post-office — but keep open 
all day and the best part of the night. But despite 
all this there is no doubt that the hongs are doomed, 
and that the operation of a public service has enor- 
mously increased the volume of correspondence, and 
facilitated that dispersal of newspapers and modern 

* Those who wish to study the intricacies of these questions 
and of trade generally may be referred to Mr, H. B. Morse's 
" Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire." 



86 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

literature which has had so marked an effect on Chinese 
development. There are countries in the world, with 
nothing like China's area and population, which are 
not so well off for postal and telegraphic facilities. 

This sketch of Chinese government and administra- 
tion, slight as it must necessarily be, will give some 
idea of the anomalies and confusion existing in the 
year 1912. The Manchu dynasty, tottering to its fall 
(unless a miracle happens) typifies the old regime. 
The provincial parliaments and the reorganized postal 
system are at the other end of the scale. Whatever be 
the outcome of the present upheaval, no student of the 
progress of China along the path of political evolution 
in the last ten years can fail to recognize the energy 
and virility of her people. We have been accustomed 
to speak of stagnation in China ; no one has ever sug- 
gested that, apart from her rulers, China suffered from 
decay. The virility, the energy, and, in the present 
crisis, the self-control of the nation are self-evident; 
and China, which has long been a crying exception to 
the well-known aphorism, should eventually get the 
government she deserves. 



CHAPTER IV 

CHINESE DEMOCRACY 

It is natural that every serious observer of Chinese life 
should exercise his mind on the causes of the nation's 
longevity. Several of our best writers, including the 
more philosophical, have, with a considerable amount 
of confidence, assigned quasi-scientific grounds for the 
perpetuity of China in defiance of what over the rest of 
the earth's surface has been the " law of nations " — the 
succession of youth, maturity and decay. It is due to 
the form of government, say some, the principles of 
government, the principle of selection of officials, the 
chain of responsibility, the literature, the maxims of 
Confucius and Mencius, filial piety and the promise 
attached to the fifth commandment (the only "com- 
mandment," the other nine being prohibitions) of the 
Mosaic decalogue, and so on. We cannot consider 
any one or all of these, or sundry other explanations, 
as satisfactory ; neither do we presume to offer one. 
The true cause of Chinese permanence is probably 
very complex, and it will require a good deal more of 
sympathetic and persevering study before the philosophy 
of the Chinese race and policy can be formulated in any 
acceptable manner. 

87 



88 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

But of the contributory causes of a national vitality 
which has vanquished all conquerors, certainly not the 
least interesting is the faculty of local self-government 
which runs in the Chinese blood.* While it may help 
to prevent the development of nationality in its wide 
sense, this quality of the race keeps alive the con- 
stituents of nationality in separate small communities, 
and in a form as indestructible as protoplasm which 
cannot in fact be broken up except by extermination. 
Or they may be likened to an infinite multitude of 
water-tight cells, which keep the whole mass afloat in 
the most turbulent sea. And supplementing the family 
and village groups which lie at the bottom of the 
national life, which are rooted in the soil and have 
their fixed rallying-points visible to the public eye, 
are an indefinite number of other groupings — special, 
variable, not territorially attached — which are the spon- 
taneous outcome of felt needs, wherein professions, 
classes, interests, and aims form the organic pivot. 
This disposition of the Chinese people to arrange 
themselves in special organizations or coteries is clearly 

* " Amid all political convulsions the people have remained un- 
changed, and that mainly because they are a non-political people. 
They are indifferent to affairs of State, but intent on their own 
business. Yet they have the faculty of self-government developed 
in an eminent degree. They are quiet, orderly, and industrious ; 
averse to agitation of any kind, and ready to endure great sacrifices 
for the sake of peace. Such a people are easily governed, and 
their instinct of self-government is one important element in their 
longevity as a nation : it has enabled successive dynasties, often 
weak and vacillating, arbitrary and corrupt, to control three 
hundred millions of people. This constitutes the elasticity by 
which they regain lost ground " (" The Siberian Overland Route," 
A. Michie, 1864.) 



CHINESE DEMOCRACY 89 

congenital and its action automatic, as in the elective 
affinity of crystals, for they carry it with them wherever 
they go ; and of them it may be truly said that wherever 
two or three are gathered together they will promptly 
form themselves into a " society " of some sort. 

In treating of the Chinese Government in a previous 
chapter, the two heterogeneous departments — that which 
is indigenous to the soil and that which has been im- 
posed from without or from above — were indicated. 
There can be little doubt which of the two is the more 
ancient, and, paradox though the statement may seem, 
there is equally little doubt which is the more authori- 
tative. It is the peasant who rules, by a human right which 
no " Son of Heaven " dares to question. It has been the 
wisdom of successive dynasties to respect this " law of 
the land," to protect the people in all their privileges, 
and to base on this universal suffrage their own right 
to reign. In the " Shuking " — that most ancient 
classic — three canons of government are laid down, 
of which one is " That the people have the right to 
depose a sovereign who, either from active wicked- 
ness or vicious indolence, gives cause to oppressive or 
tyrannical rule." " Public opinion," says Hue, " is 
always ready to check any excesses on the part of the 
Emperor, who could not, without exciting general in- 
dignation, dare to violate the rights of any of his 
subjects "; and again, " though they are in general 
submissive to authority, when it becomes too tyrannical 
or merely fraudulent, the Chinese sometimes rise and 
bend it to their will." The evidently widespread dis- 
content with the dynasty, which culminated in the 
1911 revolution, can be traced to an interruption in this 



go CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

time honoured scheme of relations between rulers and 
ruled. Foreign relations forced upon the central 
government not only a responsibility but a line of 
action, in which the Chinese people were not — could 
not be — consulted. The cessions of territory to foreigners 
in itself constituted an abrogation of the rights of the 
subject. Confucius represents the sovereignty as a 
sacred mission entrusted for the time being to the 
" Son of Heaven," but a successful revolutionary easily 
becomes the Elect of Heaven. 

The rights of the people are primarily the possession 
of their land, freedom of industry and trade, and the 
control of their local affairs. As to the land, the 
Emperor is in theory the sole proprietor of the soil — a 
convenient legal fiction ; but in practice his right is 
limited to the collection of the land-tax, except in case 
of rebellion or other cause of forfeiture. And it is a 
fundamental law of the Empire that the land-tax can 
never be increased. No people in the world, says 
Richthofen, are more exempt from official interference. 

Nevertheless, the two great systems, a centralized 
autocracy and a democratic self-government, are far 
from homogeneous ; they resemble two extensive alien 
territories possessing a long common frontier. With 
the greatest submissiveness on the one side and the 
most prudent accommodation on the other, there must 
be friction and occasional aggressions. The benevolence 
of the Emperor, when filtered down through nine 
grades of officials, might be turned to vexation and 
sheer tyranny when it reached the last rank, which is 
in contact with the people. The question must there- 
fore be never absent from consideration how the people 



CHINESE DEMOCRACY 91 

are to defend themselves from arbitrary officials ; and, 
as the question must have arisen in primitive times, it 
has, of course, been long since answered by experience. 
In public affairs the people have no share whatever; 
the elective principle does not operate above the village 
or group of villages, whose head-man is the go-between, 
the joint, between the people and the Government. 
But it is a weak joint, quite inadequate to the duties 
expected of it, and is only maintained in working order 
by being spared, as much as possible, the strain of 
actual use. Having no representative system through 
which their grievances could be made known, the 
censors would appear to be the sole constitutional 
machinery for the protection of the people from rapacity 
or tyranny, But they number only two to a province 
as large as a kingdom, and they share in the common 
corruption, so that there is practically no means pro- 
vided by the State whereby the oppressed may obtain 
a hearing in the superior courts. This seems a serious 
defect in a system which is so elaborate, and which is 
based on popular content. But what the framers of 
the Constitution have failed to supply in a regular 
manner the exigencies of their life have compelled the 
nation to provide by irregular means. In the absence 
of a tribunal they simply take the law into their own 
hands — a rough-and-ready, cruel and often disastrous 
remedy for grievances. In small local questions the 
populace will sometimes resent an imposition by seizing 
the official sent to enforce it, dragging him by the heels 
out of his sedan-chair, pulling his official boots off — a 
great indignity — and throwing him into the nearest 
ditch. That ends the matter : it is the last court of 



92 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

appeal. The magistrate who has failed is reprimanded 
as incompetent, and sent to another part of the country, 
although the governor who thus condemns him be him- 
self the culpable party. In this we see how much 
officialism in China resembles that in Christian countries. 

When the grievance is more widespread and is long 
continued, and the officials are obstinate, there may be 
what is called a " local rising," which has to be put 
down by massacre, else the smoking flax may spread to 
a conflagration. And this, the ultimate remedy in the 
West, is the proximate remedy in the East, for want of 
any adequate intermediate machinery of redress. 

Thus the sacred " right of rebellion " has asserted 
itself in China. Meadows, writing in the midst of the 
Taiping devastation and in immediate touch with its 
horrors, justified it by elaborate arguments, and showed 
historically that such outbreaks had been an essential 
feature in the nation's development. China has, in- 
deed, been called the classic ground of revolutions, as 
many as twelve having occurred between a.d. 420 
and 1644. Rebellions have been innumerable. The 
Empire is never, indeed, free from them ; they are 
of all dimensions, and of varied durations. During 
the past sixty years there have been many important 
ones. The province of Yunnan has been depopulated 
by them ; likewise Kweichau ; several times have 
serious rebellions, besides that of Yakub Beg, arisen 
among the Mohammedans in the north-west of China 
proper itself; the great Taiping calamity has been 
followed by numerous smaller insurrections in a con- 
siderable number of the provinces. 

In the rebellions of 1865 — when China lost control 



CHINESE DEMOCRACY 93 

of Shensi, Kansu, and Kashgaria — the operations were 
carried on in the usual desultory Chinese fashion. 
Tso, who crushed the rebellion, had as many as 
100,000 troops under his command, and was more 
energetic than is usual ; but it was by making roads, 
by starving out the towns, and especially by the em- 
ployment of diplomacy — namely, by the judicious use 
of " rewards," and by winning over the Mohammedan 
religious leaders through titles and buttons — that the 
Chinese " strategy " eventually was successful. 

The rebellion in Kansu, in 1896, was conducted in 
much the same fashion, but the Mohammedans were in 
smaller numbers and showed a less decided front. 
In their risings the Moslems have always failed for 
want of concerted action ; they work in isolated bands, 
and therefore were only able to devastate the country, cut 
off straggling bodies of the Chinese troops, or massacre 
the inhabitants of outlying villages. Nothing could 
possibly have demonstrated more clearly in recent 
times the total absence, on the part of the Chinese, 
of the organization and discipline necessary in modern 
warfare than the campaign conducted by the Chinese 
in Kansu. And yet for the particulars of that civil war 
we are indebted to the missionaries, the whole episode 
hardly obtaining a paragraph in the Western Press. 

Whatever provocation there may have been for the 
original outbreaks in any, or all, of these cases, it was 
completely eclipsed by the atrocities of the insurgents ; 
and the conclusion that the average man would prob- 
ably arrive at in balancing the pros and cons would be 
the very obvious one that the remedy was worse than 
the disease. Yet these scourges do serve a purpose — 



94 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

that of holding up to the authorities the risk of an 
uprising wherever there is misgovernment ; a fear 
which weighs on all provincial officials, and imbues 
them with their guiding principle of action : peace-at- 
any-price. The clearest line of demarcation must be 
observed between all previous rebellions and that of 
1911-12. This has been, not a popular rising against 
local officials, or against foreigners, but a combination 
of provincial officials, literati, and men of the highest 
standing against the Manchu race and dynasty. Whole 
provinces have " gone over " to the rebel side without a 
blow. Moreover, save for a few regrettable massacres 
of Manchus, the proceedings have been conducted in 
an orderly fashion. 

The Chinese people, however, have other and less 
tragic methods of expressing themselves, and of main- 
taining democratic rights as against the aggressions 
of despotism. The most notorious are their secret 
societies. Some of these aim at revolution, as the 
great Triad Society (Heaven, Earth, and Man), which 
seeks more " light " (ming) ; but, as " Ming " was also 
the appellation of the last native dynasty, Giles sug- 
gests that the word is used in the latter sense. It is 
not easy to get at the real objects or the actual working 
of this and other " secret " societies ; else were the 
epithet a misnomer. They have been frequently pro- 
scribed, and secrecy is maintained even as to member- 
ship. Some facts, however, are obtainable respecting 
them where large bodies of Chinese happen to settle in 
British or Dutch colonies. Even there, also, the Triads 
were at one time feared and proscribed by law ; but 
for many years past they have been recognized, as 



CHINESE DEMOCRACY 95 

trade unions have been in Great Britain, and perfectly 
good relations now subsist between them and the 
colonial governments of Hong-Kong and Singapore. 
Mr. W. A. Pickering, who, as Protector of Chinese in 
the Straits Administration, had special opportunities of 
informing himself regarding the organizations of the 
brotherhood, has given many interesting particulars 
concerning them. Some account of the establishment 
of the Triad Society in 1674 is given in the introduc- 
tions to its manuals, and in a sketch of the history, 
of the society since its creation which Mr. Pickering 
had occasion to study. In its origin it was a purely 
political society, but it had in time become the refuge 
for doubtful characters, who use the organization for 
their own purposes, lawless or otherwise — for prose- 
cuting vendetta warfare, and so forth. The funds are 
raised by general subscription, levied chiefly upon the 
gambling establishments in the various districts, and 
the " lodges " or branches are in effect so many rival 
organizations. A society which gained greater and 
more unenviable notoriety was the Boxers, of which 
mention is made elsewhere. At one time, under the 
guise of athletics, a good deal of time was spent by 
secret societies in drill and martial exercises. The 
anti-dynastic propaganda has been carried on vigorously 
through the medium of these clubs, and China is liter- 
ally honeycombed with them. 

Whatever the original aim of these societies, they 
have frequently wandered far from it, in the process of 
time and under changing circumstances, and have 
tended to become the tools of private schemers or the 
hobbies of busybodies and agitators. As the reason 



96 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

for their existence ceased (as is the case in British 
colonies) they become more and more degraded. But 
so long as the organization was kept up, and the ritual 
was carried out, the society was ready to be put to any 
use which might tempt its leaders. While waiting for 
higher game, the wire-pullers have busied themselves 
in plots to obstruct the execution of local laws, whether 
in China or in foreign countries where the Chinese 
congregate. 

Some societies may be properly termed sects, seeing 
that they require a strict observance of certain rules of 
private conduct. Vegetarian societies are common, and 
the Tsai li sect, in Northern China, which enjoins 
abstinence not only from animal food but from alcohol 
and narcotics, is said to number 200,000 members. 
Even these, however, on occasion play a political part, 
and an outbreak in Mongolia in 1891, which became an 
insurrection, originated in a misunderstanding between 
the Tsai li sect and the Catholic converts and priests — 
a quarrel which had no relation to religion or morals 
but to purely mundane interests. 

The great fact to be noted, as between the Chinese 
and their quondam Government, is the almost un- 
exampled liberty which the people enjoyed, and the 
infinitesimally small part which Government played in 
the scheme of national life. It is the more necessary to 
emphasize this, that a contrary opinion is not uncommon 
among those who are unacquainted with the country. 
The Chinese have perfect freedom of industry and trade, 
of locomotion, of amusement, and of religion, and what- 
ever may be required for regulation or protection is 
not supplied by Act of Parliament or by any kind of 



CHINESE DEMOCRACY 97 

Government interference, but by voluntary associations. 
Of these the Government takes no cognizance, though 
it may sometimes come into collision with them — never 
to the disadvantage of the popular institution. Every 
trading interest has its own guild, which maintains 
order among the members, acting as a court of arbitra- 
tion, and for breach of regulations enforces penalties, 
which usually take the form of payment for a theatrical 
representation or a feast. When the local authorities 
propose to put a new or increased tax on merchandise, 
it is usually made the occasion for a conference and 
bargain between the parties; and when these cannot 
agree, the particular trade affected brings the officials 
to terms by simply closing business until satisfaction is 
obtained. Foreign merchants also come occasionally 
into collision with the guilds, whose decision in case of 
dispute sometimes appear to them arbitrary and unjust, 
a notion which may be attributed to the opposite points 
of view from which the question is approached by the 
respective parties, as has been noted in a previous 
chapter. But it would appear that experience renders 
the foreign commercial bodies more tolerant of the 
Chinese guilds, as the Colonial Governments become 
more tolerant of the Triad Society; and in several 
instances the local guilds have even been appealed to 
by chambers of commerce in a friendly spirit. 

Thus, in all practical matters — politics not being con- 
sidered such — the Chinese genius for association has 
the freest play, and achieves most useful results. So 
thoroughly national, or racial, is the institution, that 
individual isolation is unknown. Nobody stands alone, 
says Hue ; and no commercial firm or bank stands 

7 



g8 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

alone. The system of association here fits in with the 
principle of linked responsibility, and provides a 
guaranty most valuable for business. As the London 
bankers came to the rescue of Barings, so do the 
Chinese sometimes unite to support a member of the 
guild. In the case of bankers, indeed, the guaranty is 
in constant action, all those who belong to the inner 
circle being strictly bound to aid each other in emer- 
gency and prevent catastrophe. This makes it virtually 
impossible for a bank of the first class to fail, except by 
some flagrant breach of propriety. 

Benefit and tontine societies of all sorts abound 
throughout the country— anti-gambling societies, asso- 
ciations for protection from thieves, associations of 
girls who forswear marriage and agree to take poison 
rather than be forced into that " honourable estate," 
vigilance committees, and hundreds of others. In a 
word, the country is full of societies of every kind, 
which fill up a very important space in the life of the 
Chinese people. 

Even the poor, as Hue tells us, 

" are formed into companies, regiments, and battalions, 
and this great army of paupers has a chief, who bears 
the title of ' King of the Beggars,' and who is actually 
recognized by the State. He is responsible for the 
conduct of his tattered subjects, and it is on him the 
blame is laid when any disorders occur among them 
that are too outrageous and dangerous to public peace 
to be endured. The ' King of the Beggars ' at Peking 
is a real power. . . . Whilst they swarm about like 
some devastating insects, and seek by their insolence 
to intimidate everyone they meet, their King calls a 
meeting of the principal inhabitants, and proposes, for 



CHINESE DEMOCRACY 99 

a certain sum, to deliver them from the hideous in- 
vasion. After a long dispute, the contracting parties 
come to an agreement, the village pays its ransom, and 
the beggars decamp, to go and pour down like an 
avalanche upon some other place." 

Doolittle explains the diplomacy of the " King," who 
is enriched by the industry of his subjects : 

"A head-man of the beggars may make an agree- 
ment with the shopkeepers, merchants, and bankers 
within his district, that beggars shall not visit their 
shops, warehouses, and banks for money for a stipu- 
lated time, and the beggars are obliged to conform to 
the agreement. Religious mendicants or refugees from 
other provinces do not come under these regulations. 
The head-man receives from each of the principal 
business firms with which he comes to an agreement a 
sum of money, from a few to ten or twenty dollars per 
annum, as the price of exemption from the impor- 
tunities of beggars, and in proof of the agreement he 
gives a strip of red paper on which is written or printed : 
The brethren must not come here to disturb or annoy." 

The beggars, in their rags and loathsomeness, are 
unpleasant objects, but they know that however aggres- 
sive they may be, even to pawing a smart foreigner 
with their scaly fingers, they are immune from chastise- 
ment, and they naturally presume on their immunity. 
They may be abused with the full artillery of Chinese 
objurgations, but that makes no impression on them. 
Yet even they are ruled by etiquette, and have their 
professional code, like all other sections of society. 
They must not call at private houses, except on certain 
special occasions of mourning or festivity, but that 



ioo CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

privilege may be also compounded for by a covenant 
between the head of the family and the chief of the 
beggars. The roadside is always free to them, and 
visitors to Peking know how the main approaches to 
the city are lined with the whining fraternity. They 
are sometimes really enterprising, and Doolittle relates 
the circumstance of the burial of a native Christian 
in Fuchau, when " a company of beggars and of lepers 
gathered round the grave and demanded 20,000 cash 
as the condition of allowing the coffin to be lowered. 
One of the rabble actually got down into the grave, 
and thus prevented the lowering of the coffin." They 
eventually compromised for 800 cash. 

Nor does the faculty of association end with the 
Beggar Guild. The thieves are also organized, and 
have their codes of honour, more elaborate than Dick 
Turpin's. There are certain matters in which ignorance 
is more affected than knowledge, at least by the respect- 
able Chinese, and no one of them can be found to boast 
of his acquaintance with the articles of association of 
the fraternity of thieves, but these are known by their 
fruits. Even foreigners, who know so little of the real 
life of the Chinese, have observed some curious pheno- 
mena in connection with their own residence in China. 
It is customary to keep a doorkeeper and a night- 
watchman. The duty of the latter is to jog round the 
premises at long intervals, beating the watches on a 
rattle or gong ; then he subsides into the sleep of the 
man who has done his duty, for half an hour or an hour 
as the case may be. Every opportunity and encourage- 
ment is thus offered to the housebreaker, but he does 
not take advantage of it. Let the householder, how- 



CHINESE DEMOCRACY 101 

ever, seeing — what is perfectly evident — that his watch- 
man does not " watch," only part with that functionary, 
and then it is ten to one if the burglar does not promptly 
make his presence felt. A blind and deaf old dotard 
may prove an economical form of insurance ! 

The potency of the Thief Guild is felt in many ways. 
In the north of China, for example, highway robbery is 
not unknown ; indeed, is sometimes alarmingly preva- 
lent. But there is a valuable traffic on wheels, a very 
slow traffic, over exceedingly bad roads, most favourable 
for attack. Between Peking and Tientsin, in particular, 
there is a constant exchange of silver bullion for gold, 
and large amounts of treasure are conveyed on Govern- 
ment and mercantile account. The conveyance is the 
common travelling cart of the country, the custodian an 
ill-paid driver. There may sometimes be an extra man, 
with a rusty spear or an antiquated musket, riding on 
the shaft of the cart. But no harm ever comes to those 
expeditions of the precious metals. Whence comes 
their security? The livery stable, or " cart company," 
which undertakes the conveyance, makes none of those 
exceptions to its liability about " acts of God " and 
" King's enemies," and a host of other matters, which 
make the modern bill of lading such a voluminous docu- 
ment. The Chinaman undertakes absolutely to deliver 
the treasure. He guarantees it against all accidents 
whatever ; and the remarkable feature in the transaction 
is that, for the transport, including plenary insurance, 
the charge is ridiculously small — not a per " centage " 
but a per " mileage " on the value. Yet the business is 
remunerative, the owners of carts and mules prosper, 
and are men of substance sufficient to make good any 



102 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

loss that may be brought home to them. But evidently 
they make no losses. Out of their fractional charge they 
no doubt spare a trifle for some occult personage, as one 
would pay to gain the favour of the King of the Fairies, 
and thus all the world is content. Weird stories are 
sometimes heard of the diplomacy of the King of the 
Thieves, and the efficacy of a dingy little flag to protect 
untold wealth in silver and gold, but that is a subject on 
which it is precisely those who know the most who have 
the least to say. 

It is only fitful glimpses which strangers are able to 
obtain of the inner working of Chinese national life — 
quite insufficient to form a coherent theory of the whole, 
except by supplementing what is known by inferences 
drawn as to the mass which remains unknown. But 
the data ascertained seem sufficient to warrant the 
inference of a vast, self-governed, law-abiding society, 
costing practically nothing to maintain, and having 
nothing to apprehend save natural calamities and 
national upheavals. Perhaps the least understood 
feature in the Chinese democracy is the sentiment 
by which the innumerable societies are held together, 
and by which, in fact, the whole scheme of self-govern- 
ment is sustained. That is a proposition which is, 
prima facie, contradictory of many observed facts; it 
is opposed to the common opinion which has been so 
well illustrated by Arthur H. Smith, in his chapter on 
the "Absence of Altruism"; yet it is established on 
no less incontrovertible evidence than this, that the 
principle of self-sacrifice is an essential element in the 
preservation of Chinese social institutions. It is often 
cited as an example of Chinese eccentricity that a 



CHINESE DEMOCRACY 103 

substitute may be hired to undergo capital punishment. 
But if we consider the number of occasions on which 
self-immolation is practised to gain an object, we can 
hardly dispose of them all as eccentric freaks. They 
proceed from some principle which we do not as yet 
understand. Suicide, which is penal under English 
law, is meritorious in China. The sacrifice of a widow 
on her husband's demise, whether by hanging, poison- 
ing, or drowning, still exists, and such widows receive 
posthumous honours. The devotion of a daughter who, 
in despair of other remedy, gives her sick father her 
own flesh to eat, is always highly commended in the 
Peking Gazette. To be avenged on his adversary, a man 
will commit suicide on his enemy's threshold. It is 
related of Cheo and Chang, leaders of a riot in Ningpo 
to reduce taxation, that they surrendered themselves to 
certain death — although they defeated the Government 
forces — in order to gain their object and put an end to 
the contest without the further shedding of blood. Two 
governors who disobeyed the orders of the Empress- 
Dowager to exterminate foreigners, did so with the 
knowledge that their lives must pay forfeit. In acknow- 
ledging their acts they asked only that their families 
might not suffer. And so we find, running like a thread 
through the complicated web of Chinese social life, a 
constant readiness to die when the need arises, and one 
cannot but consider this an element of strength and 
stability in the Chinese nation, especially if we regard 
this spirit of sacrifice in its relation to the family cult, 
which is to the Chinese the realization of immortality. 
Whether or no this spirit is sufficient to replace the 
tie to the Throne as the bond which kept China one 



104 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

remains to be proved. Dr. Sun Yat Sen and his fol- 
lowers believe that it is, and are prepared to reorganize 
their country as a democracy not in spirit only but in 
form. No one with any care for his reputation would 
care to prophecy on the subject, and naturally every- 
thing depends on the precise form the new republic 
takes and the men who direct her government. But 
that China has some surprises in store for the world 
is a prediction one can safely make. 



CHAPTER V 

THE NATIVE PRESS 

In the state of ferment into which the Chinese nation 
has been thrown by the pressure of recent events it is 
reasonable to expect that new social forces will come into 
play, while old ones may assume a new development. 
The future is therefore full of interest, and there may 
be many unlooked for developments in the process of 
adjustment to new conditions on which China has now 
entered. Among the factors in the new evolution none 
deserves more attention than the Chinese Press, which, 
though only in its infancy as yet, has shown such signs 
of vitality that its influence on the course of events in 
the Empire must henceforth be taken seriously into 
account. 

Although of Western origin, for the most part owned 
by foreigners, and printed with foreign appliances, there 
is no civilized institution that has so really commended 
itself to the non-official classes of the Empire as the 
modern daily paper. The Chinese Peking Gazette, how- 
ever, is the oldest newspaper in the world, compared 
with whose hoary age the Times with its hundred sum- 
mers is but of yesterday. This doyen of newspapers 
began, and is still carried on, with the special object of 

105 



106 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

supplying the people with news regarding the acts of 
the Government. More valuable illustrations of poli- 
tical and social institutions may be gathered, as Sir 
Rutherford Alcock contended, and a clearer insight 
may be obtained of the actual working of the governing 
machinery, by a careful study of the Peking Gazette 
than from any other source. And the glimpses it 
affords into Chinese life, manners, and customs, make 
it singularly valuable as a guide to further inquiry. 

" If the visitor at Peking," says Sir Rutherford, 
" extend his researches into the Chinese city, and even 
penetrate into one of the narrow side streets near Lieu- 
li-chang, the Paternoster Row of the capital, he may 
pass the door of one of the offices whence the printed 
copies are issued. This is the quarter of booksellers, 
and their associate instruments, bookbinders and wood- 
engravers. On entering the shop, cases of wooden cut 
characters may be seen ranged against the wall, and 
sorted according to the number of strokes in each. 
Some of frequent occurrence together are arranged as 
double characters, such as * Imperial edict,' mandarin 
titles, the official title of the reign, etc. About a dozen 
of these printing-offices suffice to issue several thousand 
copies, from whence they are distributed, as in London, 
to their customers, or despatched in batches to the 
different provinces. But these offices are all private, 
and trust to the sale of copies for their reimbursement 
and profits. For six dollars a year the Pekingese may 
keep himself posted up in all that the Government 
thinks it desirable he should know as to its acts, or the 
course of events in the provinces. Or he may hire his 
Gazette for the day, and return it if he does not approve 
of the cost of purchasing."* 

* Eraser's Magazine, 1873. 



THE NATIVE PRESS 107 

Although in origin and aim somewhat similar to our 
own newspaper, in one respect there is a vast difference : 
never was there need in China for men like Dr. John- 
son to listen to debates in Parliament and carry them 
home in their retentive memories to be furbished up, 
for the Government itself orders copies of Imperial 
decrees, rescripts, and papers that have been presented 
before the Imperial Council to be placarded upon boards 
every morning, for the information of the people. These 
papers are permitted to be printed and circulated, but 
without comment, and, as was to be expected, con- 
stituted, before the advent of the regular newspaper, 
the staple news and almost only subject of discussion 
amongst literary men throughout the Empire, the veto 
against written criticism doubtless giving all the greater 
zest to criticism by the living voice. 

One would have thought that the next step would be 
the general newspaper ; but, as in the case of several of 
the arts and inventions, the Chinese seem to have been 
suddenly arrested on the threshold of a great discovery 
and forced to bide their time until circumstances bade 
them take a fresh departure. There has, however, 
always been in the hands of the people, through the 
anonymous proclamation and placard, an effective in- 
strument by which popular wrongs were ventilated and 
the objects of hatred denounced. During times like 
those of the Franco - Chinese and Chino - Japanese 
wars squibs and pasquinades, written with endless 
satiric force and fun, were freely passed from one to 
another ; and illegal placards, in which official corrup- 
tion and incapability are exposed to the indignant 
people, are found on many a blank wall. There is no 



108 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

doubt that many local disturbances in various parts of 
the country have been caused by those potent though 
irresponsible appeals. A single placard has been known 
to suddenly change the attitude of a whole district 
towards foreigners. 

"When it is desired," Hue says, "to criticize a 
Government, to call a mandarin to order, and to show 
him that the people are discontented with him, the 
placards are lively, satirical, cutting, and full of sharp 
and witty sallies : the Roman pasquinade was not to 
be compared to them. They are posted in all the 
streets, and especially on the doors of the tribunal 
where the mandarin lives who is to be held up to 
public malediction. Crowds assemble round them, 
they are read aloud in a declamatory tone, whilst a 
thousand comments, more pitiless and severe than the 
text, are poured forth on all sides, amid shouts of 
laughter. 'We Chinese,' they say, 'print whatever 
we like — books, pamphlets, circulars, and placards — 
without any interference from Government. We may 
even print for ourselves, at discretion, provided we do 
not find it too troublesome, and have money enough to 
get the types carved.' " 

As it was a combination of historical and other 
circumstances that led to the successful adoption 
of the discovery of Gutenberg or Faust in the West, 
so in Far Cathay the native newspaper is the out- 
come and legitimate result of foreign intercourse, and 
of the moral pressure exerted, often unconsciously, 
by consular agents, merchants, and missionaries who 
have resided along the coast since the time of the 
Treaty of Nanking. Without this pressure, and 
without the mechanical appliances of the foreigner, 



THE NATIVE PRESS log 

the native Press would not have come into existence. 
One difficulty in its way was the Chinese method of 
printing from wooden blocks, employed as early as 
a.d. 581. This was practically surmounted by the 
East India Company, which defrayed the cost of 
casting successfully a fount of movable metallic type, 
in the year 1815, for the use of their factory at Macao, 
but more particularly for the printing of Dr. Morrison's 
invaluable dictionaries, and other works bearing on 
Chinese subjects. This fount was destroyed by fire in 
1856. It is said that movable metallic types were 
made in China and Japan centuries ago — as far back as 
A.D. 1040, but they were articles de hixe, not intended 
for popular use. The cost of casting founts of movable 
Chinese type prevented the more extended use of what 
has since proved to be a success. The task of pro- 
viding cheap type was reserved for another class of 
men. The more enlightened missionary bodies being 
fully alive to the fact that most of the grosser super- 
stitions of the Chinese were due to ignorance, to an 
incorrect apprehension of " natural truth," began, soon 
after their settlement in China, to issue works of useful 
knowledge ; but as the cutting of blocks and printing 
from them was both costly and tedious, not to mention 
other inconveniences connected therewith, means had 
to be devised to print from metallic type ; and the 
result is that, through the enterprise of British and 
American missionaries, elegant founts of type of every 
description are produced by electrotype and other pro- 
cesses with ease and cheapness, in every way suitable 
for the purpose of a daily newspaper. 

As, however, every governor in his province, indeed 



no CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

every prefect in his department, is almost an inde- 
pendent satrap, invested with vast powers to crush 
any attempt at independent criticism of the acts of the 
Imperial or the local government — for such a pro- 
ceeding is against the letter, though not the spirit of 
Chinese law and institutions — some position was neces- 
sary from which papers could be published with safety ; 
near enough to be sent into the Empire, yet beyond 
the jurisdiction of its officers. Such a position was 
found in our colonies of Hong-Kong and the Straits 
Settlements, and in the foreign concessions at Shanghai ; 
the fact that the papers were in many cases owned 
by foreign capitalists being an additional element of 
security. A considerable part was played in the recent 
revolution by the circulation of journals and other 
literature printed in Japan, Europe and America and 
circulated in China. 

Such are the successive steps that have accompanied 
the establishment of a native Press, in our sense of 
the term. As has already been said, the newspaper, 
from the first, commended itself to the people, con- 
servative though they are in education and character, 
and has become one of the necessaries of life not only 
to every intelligent and thoughtful native at the treaty 
ports and provincial yamens, and to Chinamen living 
abroad, but to the dwellers in the most remote provinces 
of China. The circulation of periodic literature has 
been facilitated by the improvement in postal and other 
communications, and the result has been the creation, 
for the first time in China, of a genuine national con- 
sciousness, and the foundation of an intelligent public 
opinion. 



THE NATIVE PRESS in 

The issue of the first independent Chinese newspaper, 
while it heralded the dawn of a brighter day for the 
whole Chinese people, held out hopes especially for one 
class, which individually, though not collectively, has 
always deserved our sympathy — the disappointed 
"scholars of fortune." These men collectively con- 
stitute the literati, a class that wields enormous power 
in virtue of the deference spontaneously accorded to 
letters, and of its being socially at the head of the 
four classes — namely, scholars, farmers, artisans, and 
merchants — into which the population of the Empire 
is divided. Impecunious though they generally are, 
they are still able to wield with effect the power thus 
placed in their hands — a power that has been likened, 
and with some truth, to the influence exerted by the 
squirearchy and country clergy in Britain before 
Reform Acts disturbed the repose of rural parishes. 
When all the possibilities of the newspaper Press dawn 
upon the minds of this hungry horde of educated 
paupers, this poverty-stricken, restless, intellectual 
class, who is there dare venture to foretell the results 
upon an active and inquisitive race like the Chinese ? 
It seems likely that the story of the Japanese native 
Press will be again repeated, but with a power in direct 
ratio to the vastly greater forces that are sure to be 
exerted in China. It will be remembered that after the 
abolition of the feudal system in Japan thousands of 
the lieutenants and retainers of the Daimios, the very 
flower of the intellect, the pick of the prowess of the 
country, unable to procure employment under the 
altered conditions violently introduced by the new 
system, found themselves homeless and helpless. They 



ii2 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

could not dig, to beg they were ashamed. The native 
Press, brought into existence with the Restoration, was 
a God-sent gift to such men. Old samurai of bluest 
blood, who had lived lives of lettered ease in feudal 
castles, wielded the pen in the editor's sanctum ; and 
swordsmen, who had made stand with their lord for 
Mikado or Shogun, now stood at the composing-case 
and printing-press, admitting and permitting no loss of 
dignity, conscious that they were working, as of yore, 
for the glory and advancement of Dai Nippon. It was 
a wonderful revolution, of which even yet only some 
of the results are apparent. So may it be in the 
phenomenal revolution which the forces of modern 
civilization are effecting in China, though the results 
may be widely different. 

The number of literary men, graduates, aspirants for 
office, who, out at elbow, throng every city and village 
— some years ago there were at Lanchau, in Kansu, 
nearly a thousand such " expectants " — will, it is to be 
hoped, find in journalism something more useful, more 
honourable, and more conducive to self-respect than 
writing odes on fans or composing scrolls for some 
native Maecenas. And as, while waiting for office, 
they constitute the unrecognized Opposition, and by far 
the ablest critics of those in office, the newspapers will 
afford them an opening for their talents and energies, 
and an unfailing means of criticizing measures before 
they have been confirmed for good or evil and have 
passed beyond recall. Such action is quite in harmony 
with existing Chinese institutions, and is merely a 
popular extension of what has obtained in China for 
ages. And here the mind recurs not merely to Con- 



THE NATIVE PRESS 113 

fucius and Mencius, who are nothing if not political 
critics, but to the College of Censors, their legitimate 
descendants. It may be expected that a growing public 
opinion will hedge in these journalists with privileges, 
just as the Government have recognized the preroga- 
tives of the censorate ; and as long as literary ability 
is applied to public and moral ends, and to the reform 
of existing institutions, it will find wide countenance. 
The adoption of a reform of government on Western 
Republican lines must, of course, enormously increase 
the power of the press and the literate class. 

It has been my endeavour to indicate the possibilities 
open to newspaper enterprise in the vast field of China 
as soon as the people may be able to override the high- 
handed proceedings of the mandarins, and to insist that 
this growth of freedom should be directly grafted on a 
plant grown on Chinese soil. That a Chinese Press 
would, if altogether left to itself, be moral in tone and 
endeavour to elevate the people might be assumed from 
the almost unsullied purity of Chinese classic literature 
from the days of Confucius to the present time ; but 
the street literature, it must be confessed, hardly justi- 
fies this assumption. The influence of the literati and, 
particularly, the attitude of the Censorate have been 
alluded to elsewhere, and the episode there cited — that 
between the celebrated Censor Sung and the Emperor 
Kiaking — shows that even censors may be bold, and at 
the risk of life, and that outspoken criticism will always 
exist. 

Apart from local intelligence, advertisements, and 
other items, we may divide the contents of native 
papers into four chief divisions — articles on purely 

8 



ii4 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

Chinese affairs ; leaders on international relations, and, 
if there be a war on hand, of course also war news ; 
translations from the foreign Press ; and precis from 
the Peking and provincial Gazettes. Considered as a 
whole, they are truly strange amalgams of ancient 
political and philosophical maxims and curiously dis- 
torted statements of modern facts, reflecting closely 
indeed the Chinese method of dealing with matters — 
accepting words for facts, the shadow for the substance. 

It is, however, in criticism of purely native affairs 
that the Chinese journalist is at his best, that his 
previous training tells, that he is on solid ground. As 
his readers, like himself, have read the very same books, 
in the very same order, elucidated by the very same 
orthodox commentators, the writer can easily sway 
their minds by reference to the well-known but never 
worn-out principles laid down by the Sages, according 
to which kings reign and princes decree justice. He 
appeals frequently, indeed almost in every passage, to 
the teachings of history, stimulating his readers' feelings 
by calling to witness their long line of ancestors who 
have distinguished themselves in a not inglorious past. 

From a literary point of view these articles are th e 
most valuable, as they are the most difficult, part of the 
paper. The simplex munditiis, the simple elegance of 
the classics, is the point aimed at. The theme of an 
able Chinese literary man, by means of the mono- 
syllabic form of the language and its ideographic 
writing, acquires a concentrated energy exceedingly 
difficult to describe, indeed impossible to convey to the 
Western mind, appealing as it does to the eye, the ear* 
and the intellect. Chinese prose style sparkles with 



THE NATIVE PRESS 115 

epigram, antitheses, and the other figures of speech 
depending on brevity for their force. It abounds with 
curiosa felicitas ; and nothing delights writer and reader 
more than the suggested quotation aptly hidden in the 
text, just apparent enough to give a delicate archaic 
aroma to the period. As Sir Stewart Lockhart states 
in his " Manual of Chinese Quotations ": 

" One of the chief characteristics of the written 
language of China is its love of quotation. The more 
frequently and aptly a Chinese writer employs literary 
allusions, the more is his style admired. Among the 
Chinese it might almost be said that style is quotation. 
With them to quote is one of the first canons of literary 
art, and a Chinese who cannot introduce, even into his 
ordinary compositions, phrases borrowed from the 
records of the past might as well try to lay claim to 
literary attainments as a European unable to spell 
correctly or to write grammatically. Letters on the 
most common subjects, and newspaper paragraphs 
detailing ordinary items of intelligence, are seldom 
written without the introduction of quotations, and, if 
these quotations are not understood, it is impossible to 
grasp the meaning of the writer." 

And what have been the practical results of all the 
newspaper criticism of the officials ? At first the 
mandarins by no means liked this outspoken expression 
of opinion, and it took them rather by surprise to find 
their acts, hitherto above open criticism, subjected to 
hostile comment. The newspaper, much to the chagrin 
of the hangers-on about the yamen, was at first for- 
bidden ; but when the great man learnt that his brother 
prefect in the adjacent department was also coming in 
for a share of the lash, under which he himself had 



n6 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

been writhing, curiosity and the appreciation of the 
misfortune of one's friends got the better of dignity, and 
the paper was restored — and there it still remains. 

The history of the Shen Pao, or the Shanghai Gazette, 
started in 1870, is instructive. This, the leading native 
paper in China, distinguished itself in successfully ex- 
posing official abuse. It spoke out manfully against 
torture, no matter by whom inflicted, whether by high- 
placed mandarin or underling of low degree. More 
than this, it succeeded in securing the reversal of unjust 
decrees of provincial governors by the supreme authori- 
ties at Peking, in spite of the etiquette and dilatoriness 
of Chinese law, and, above all, the obstructiveness at 
the capital of the friends of the officers attacked, for 
every official has his band of friends — they are neces- 
sary to his existence. In another direction it did excel- 
lent work in encouraging liberality, by publishing the 
names of the donors to relief funds, as, for instance, 
when the famine ravaged the provinces of Chihli and 
Shantung, and on other similar occasions. During the 
forty years of its existence it has shown the way to 
many reforms, and by means of its ability and independ- 
ence has acquired a comparatively large circulation, 
attaining to a position of real influence unequalled by 
any other native paper. 

It has not, however, been all plain sailing with the 
Shen Pao. Many attempts have been made to suppress 
or ruin it by subsidizing official rivals, but in vain. A 
special effort was made by the Governor of the Chekiang 
Province, who had been attacked in the paper for being 
involved in a disgraceful case of judicial murder. He 
appealed to Prince Kung, then head of the Tsungli 



THE NATIVE PRESS 117 

Yam6n, to suppress it. The Prince's reply was a snub 
to the Governor and a vindication of the raison d'etre 
of the paper. He intimated that it was rather a ticklish 
thing for him to deal with a foreign-owned concern 
published in a foreign settlement, and pertinently added, 
" We rather like to read it in Peking." 

The native papers in Hong-Kong have exerted a 
similar though a far inferior influence in South China. 
The T sun-Wan Yat-Po, or Universal Circulating Herald, 
while under the editorship of the Chinese " teacher " of 
Dr. Legge, late Professor of Chinese at Oxford, was 
remarkable for the emphatic and almost savage way in 
which it attacked official abuse and misconduct. 

Reform is steadily making its way by means of the 
Press, directed by the right class, the younger educated 
men. When the Reform Club was closed at Peking 
in the winter of 1895-96, the spirit of reform, which 
exists in China as elsewhere, had not been killed, as was 
assumed; it had merely been scotched. Suppressed 
at Peking, the leaders moved their headquarters to 
Shanghai, where an active propaganda was conducted, 
chiefly by means of a magazine entitled Chinese Progress. 
At first published every ten days, this journal has 
become a daily paper. It commands a large staff 
of writers, and is supported by some three hundred 
students and eighty benevolent societies pledged to sup- 
port the reform movement. Nor is this support merely 
from the younger and non-official classes ; even vice- 
roys and lesser officials subsidize the society by sub- 
scriptions and letters of recommendation, not always, 
it is true, without some ulterior motive, for there is 
such a thing, or will be, as " capturing" the Press in 



n8 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

China. The tiny paper of earlier days, with its four 
narrow pages, has already grown into thirty broad 
leaves, with a circulation of ten thousand through- 
out the provinces, as against the former edition of one 
thousand chiefly sold at the capital. 

In their treatment of international questions and of 
matters connected with the Franco-Chinese and Chino- 
Japanese wars, or the Boxer rising, the writers of 
native papers are seen at their worst. Here it is that 
their insufferable literary conceit, which begets in them 
a contempt for everything outside their own literature, 
stands in the way of progress. Refusing to recognize 
the altered conditions around them, and shutting their 
eyes to what has been actually accomplished within 
their own borders, many of them have continued to 
treat any matter in which foreign interests are con- 
cerned as if no foreigner had settled along their coast- 
line — as if China, secure in its isolation, were still the 
suzerain of all the many lands once hers. Incredible 
as it may seem, the British colony of Hong-Kong, even 
in 1898, was still marked in many Chinese maps as 
part of the Empire of China ! 

In the Franco-Chinese campaign of 1884 the French 
were considered merely " outside intruders " or fili- 
busters egging on traitorous Tongkingese vassals to 
rebellion, and in the Chino-Japanese war the Japanese 
were the " little dwarfs " attacking the Chinese " Goliath," 
and were to be driven into the sea at one fell swoop of 
the Chinese army. A very different estimate obtained 
after Japan's victory over Russia ; but, indeed, that 
epoch-making event has altered the perspective of 
world-questions all over the globe ! The British are 



THE NATIVE PRESS 119 

still known as " the red-furred devils," while Europeans 
generally are termed Kuei Tsze, " devils." Needless to 
say, these views are no longer found in enlightened 
Chinese circles, and even among the more ignorant 
there is an awakening to the futility of the attitude of 
vainglory so common in China in the past. 
• The military tactics recommended to Chinese generals 
were, till recently, abstracted from works of a thousand 
years ago — while archers were still effective soldiers — 
when not borrowed from the altogether impossible 
" stratagems " (on a par with the Trojan horse) of the 
heroes of the remotest antiquity. The attitude of the 
Chinese Press in time of war has been one of un- 
compromising chauvinism, which neither disaster nor 
incapacity seemed to modify. This may be merely an 
easy method of earning a reputation for ^patriotism, or it 
may arise from a desire to " save face " — that universal 
trait of the Chinese character, at all times and under 
all circumstances — but probably there is a complexity 
of causes to account for it. How was the Franco- 
Chinese war fever kept alive ? Both newspapers and 
officials concealed the truth and pandered to the popular 
taste. They described battles—always a pet subject 
with literary men in China, as elsewhere — that had 
never been fought ; they sang paeans of congratulation 
over victories that were never won ; and illustrations of 
the audacious "barbarians" being driven back pell-mell 
at the point of the Chinese trident were widely circu- 
lated among eager purchasers. They raised enough 
fervour of patriotic enthusiasm to make it dangerous 
for a Chinaman to even hint at the possibility of victory 
being on the other side. The populace were unanimous 



120 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

in allowing themselves to be fooled — they seemed to 
like the process. At the suggestion of the Press, in 
1884 a patriotic fund was established to be subscribed 
to by Chinese emigrants oversea. Large sums were 
at once raised from men who had already contributed 
to war expenses through the representatives of their 
clans in the villages of their own country. From Cuba 
and Peru and elsewhere contributions came pouring in 
from those who were the survivals of the fittest of 
the nefarious and despised " coolie trade." The rich 
" companies " of San Francisco also subscribed most 
liberally for the defence of the Canton Province. 
Editors were not slow in driving home the lesson. 
" These men," wrote one, " have encountered the wind 
and waves for thousands of It to earn a living in a 
foreign land. Yet when they hear that their country 
is involved in war, intolerant of delay, they at once 
raised a subscription to aid the Government and assist 
the revenue. Alas ! when men living outside the border- 
line act in this way, what should we do that live within 
the country itself? We respectfully write this appeal, 
urging all public-spirited men to go and do likewise." 
" I should add that there is no deception," continues 
the writer, " as to the amounts, as the list of donors is 
published, and the committee of management are all 
honourable men." Not only did the editors do their 
best in sober prose to stir up the war feeling, but the 
aid of song was also invoked, one of the poets being no 
less a personage than a commander-in-chief. 

In international questions the Chinese editor relies on 
foreign papers. Articles on contraband, blockades, 
duties of neutrals, and so forth, can all, as a rule, be 



THE NATIVE PRESS 121 

traced to a foreign source. The opinions of the Times 
during the Franco-Chinese and Chino-Japanese wars 
were well known, and were referred to with respect, our 
newspapers generally being alluded to as " Western 
friends " — the equivalent of " our contemporary." It is 
in the department of the paper dealing with foreign 
matters that grave mistakes are made, mainly through 
the sheer ignorance of the translators, who are too 
often incompetent for their posts. Except the Shen Pao, 
and one or two other papers which have had foreigners 
to advise on all foreign questions, the translations on 
which the editor bases his " leaders " are made, for the 
most part, by English-speaking Chinese, who have not 
been out of China. Their ideas of " things foreign" 
are inaccurate, but not quite so inaccurate, perhaps, as 
many of our ideas regarding matters Chinese. The 
newspaper translator handles the most abstruse and 
delicate subjects, those requiring special knowledge, 
with the utmost assurance, and as most things are seen 
through the spectacles of his own prejudice, the accuracy 
and value of the translation may be estimated. The 
less conceited carefully avoid pitfalls, and confine them- 
selves to what is plane-sailing. 

Some high officials have been fully aware of the 
unreliability of native newspaper accounts of foreign 
affairs, and have engaged more competent translators to 
give them the news direct from the English Press. On 
the whole, there is decided improvement in the native 
Press ; and, as the Chinese now know that there is 
money to be made through a successful newspaper, it 
may be anticipated that ere long, when communications 
open the country, the better-class papers will engage 



122 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

competent men to deal with foreign affairs. Telegraphic 
information is "conveyed " from their " Western friends," 
though not infrequently Chinese versions of foreign 
affairs are written by secretaries or hangers-on of the 
yamens, who increase their scanty pay by forwarding 
their rendering of some telegram to the papers in 
Shanghai or Hong-Kong. 

Along the upper border of the newspapers, where in 
the West is placed the title and date, is written the 
exhortation, " Please respect written paper, the merit is 
boundless " — an exhortation always heeded, for papers 
are carefully filed in shop and office, and are read and 
reread until at last they almost fall to pieces. Then 
comes the man from the society that makes written 
paper its special care — for there is in China a society 
for this, as for everything else under the sun — and 
takes away the well-thumbed printed rags and tatters, 
to be reverently burnt in a crematorium attached to the 
Wen Miao, the Literary Temple. These usages are 
mentioned as instances of the delicate regard of the 
Chinese for their sacred letters. The native news-sheet, 
though printed on paper with foreign appliances, 
already receives a welcome wherever it goes in China. 

What will be the evolution of the native Press in 
China it would be rash to prophesy. It may yet rouse 
a nation which has been too long under the spell of the 
dead hand and the dead brain ; may teach it to break 
away, not from the characteristics stamped on them by 
nature and environment, but from the benumbing con- 
servatism which has succeeded so long in preventing 
the progress of liberalism ; may teach the people to 
understand that there is an intellectual and moral life 



THE NATIVE PRESS 123 

more active and more restless than their own ; may 
teach the most literary nation in the whole world — too 
long spell-bound by past great names and great reputa- 
tions — to at last think for itself. And when such a 
nation once begins to think 1* 

* This paragraph has been left exactly as written in 1897. 
Already the native Press has accomplished some of the feats 
predicted. The revolution of 1911-12 is largely its work. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE NEW LEARNING 

The old system of education in China is too well 
understood now to need anything more than a brief 
reference. It was founded on — nay, practically con j 
sisted of — a memorizing of the classics, nor was there 
any teaching in the Occidental sense of the term. The 
study of mathematics, for instance, had to be attacked 
by the student through books, and it is recorded by 
China's greatest mathematician, Professor Hua, that it 
took him years to learn addition and subtraction in 
this way. The principal feature about the old system 
of education, however, was that only through the 
portals of official examination could the class be 
reached from which officials and civil servants of all 
kind were selected. The poorest boy, if his parents 
were able to make sacrifices sufficient to permit him to 
sit for examination, might rise to the highest post ; but 
although talent and industry of an extraordinary kind 
might be needed for the feat, yet the general effect of 
the system was certainly to stifle and deaden all 
initiative, to foster pedantry, and to keep the most 
powerful class in the land in the swaddling clothes of 
an out-worn classicism. 

124 



THE NEW LEARNING 125 

When " China in Transformation " was first pub- 
lished there was very little sign of any change in this 
age-long system. The few Chinese who, in mission- 
schools or foreign settlements, acquired a foreign 
education had little prospect of employment in their 
own country. Impulses, which in 1880 led the Viceroy 
of Nanking to send some forty students to the United 
States with a promise of employment on their return, 
had ended in disappointment and disillusion. A better 
fate awaited the forty-six students who, in 1876, were 
sent out by the Foochow Arsenal to study shipbuilding 
and navigation. Some were drafted into the diplomatic 
service, others became distinguished in various lines of 
work. But, on the whole, the foreign-trained student 
of the 'eighties had few prospects. The writer had an 
interesting instance of this in the person of a man, 
very intelligent, highly educated on Western lines, and 
an accomplished writer, who was engaged to act as 
interpreter on an exploration in Southern China. He 
was uncongenial and overbearing to his own fellow- 
countrymen, and grumbled so much at the hardships 
of the expedition that he was finally sent back. His 
after career was one of disappointment, and ultimately 
he returned to Chinese dress and habits and became 
violently anti-foreign. The position of this man, who 
in a homely phrase was neither fish, fowl, nor good 
red herring, owing to his training on Western lines at 
a period when China still clung to her conservatism, is 
in strong contrast with the policy recently adopted, 
whereby not only do we find that the court had begun 
to send Imperial clansmen to study overseas, but, more 
remarkable still, a foreign-trained, Christian Chinese 



126 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

has been proclaimed President of the provisional 
republic. 

The real change began after the Chino-Japanese 
war of 1894-95, and the first definite sign was an Edict 
of the Emperor, promulgated by the Tsungli Yamen 
in 1896, commanding the study of foreign mathematics 
and science in all colleges of the Empire, and that all 
candidates at the literary examinations should qualify 
in at least one of the science subjects, while every can- 
didate must pass in mathematics. The despatch of 
Chinese students to Japan began at this time, the 
Government setting the example. The coup d'etat of 
1898 temporarily checked the impulse from above, and 
it has been evident to all competent observers since 
that time that reform in China, though sanctioned 
under pressure by the Manchu dynasty, must come 
from below and be accomplished by popular will and 
pressure. This has been the case. The Commercial 
Press, a Chinese printing and publishing enterprise, 
was founded in 1897. Its phenomenal success is 
detailed elsewhere. Other channels for the dissemina- 
tion of " Western learning," and especially the Press, 
helped to swell the rising tide of the demand for a 
more catholic and up-to-date system of education. 
The work accomplished by the Christian Literature 
Society has been remarkable, and that of the mission- 
schools must not be overlooked. Considerable con- 
troversy rages over the question of how far the Chinese 
benefit by the preaching to them of Christian doctrines, 
and, considering the devotion and faith of propagandists, 
the results can hardly be pronounced to be satisfactory. 
But the policy of Protestant missionaries of late years 



THE NEW LEARNING 127 

has been to bring education — medical, technical, and 
scientific — to the doors of the Chinese, and when his 
attention and interest have been engaged and his pre- 
judices overcome, to attempt the work of evangelization. 
The religious aspect of this question is treated else- 
where : it is enough here to say that when China comes 
to look back on the years of her awakening, she will 
realize what she owes to Christian missionaries in 
letting in the first rays of the new learning. And 
even those who do not wish to see China forsake the 
ancestor-cult, which is the root of her whole social 
fabric, must acknowledge that she has gained enor- 
mously from the presentation to her of Christian 
civilization at the hands of missionaries. 

The coup d'etat of 1898 and the reactionary wave at 
Peking were answerable for the flight of reformers, many 
of whom went to Japan, whence their writings were 
very widely disseminated. The favourable impression 
made by the Japanese troops in the Boxer rising of 
1900 led to a rapid increase in the number of Chinese 
students in that country. At one time it was estimated 
that at least 15,000 were there, and they cultivated 
extreme revolutionary doctrines with a crudity due to a 
far too hurried and ill-digested course of the so-called 
" Western learning." This tendency led to a restriction 
in the number permitted to go there, and to an effort 
to divert the stream rather to Europe and America. 
It was not till after the Russo-Japanese war that the 
Government sent students to Great Britain ; but after 
the Boxer rising the American Government refused 
part of the indemnity awarded on condition that the 
money should be spent on education, and this led to 



128 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

the despatch of students to American colleges. The 
Viceroy of Wuchang, Chang Chih Tung, sent students 
to Belgium, Germany, and France ; and Yuan Shih-kai 
also sent some to France on the invitation of the 
French Government. Yuan was always a keen pro- 
moter of education in his own province, and both he 
and Chang Chih Tung hold honourable places as the 
foremost of Chinese educational reformers. 

The impetus given to education after the Boxer 
trouble was undoubtedly due to the shock given to 
Chinese self-sufficiency and to the fears of the 
Empress-Dowager and her advisers. Having actually 
given orders at one time for the extermination of all 
foreigners in two provinces (an order which was altered 
in transmission by two patriotic officials, who paid for 
the act with their lives), the opportunist Tze-hsi made 
a complete volte face as to foreigners, and in 1902 she 
permitted the inauguration in Peking of a University 
on Western lines. The University of Shansi, which 
until it reverted to the Chinese did most excellent 
work, had been already founded. But the Russo- 
Japanese war must be regarded as the true turning- 
point in the fortunes of Chinese reform. Not only did 
it revolutionize the theory of relations between East 
and West, which, despite Chinese obstinate vanity, had 
been gradually forcing itself upon the minds of her 
better educated people, but it drove home the moral of 
Chang Chih Tung's celebrated pamphlet, so largely 
circulated ten years before. Education was, indeed, 
"China's only hope." The flood of light thrown 
through the medium of " the printed word," even to 
the hitherto obscure corners of China, enabled thou- 



THE NEW LEARNING 129 

sands to realize the truth of that saying. The eager- 
ness of the people of all classes for the " new learning " 
far outstripped the power of Government to supply 
teachers. It must be acknowledged, even by China's 
best friends, that the difficulty of reconciling the grow- 
ing desire for " Western learning" with an equally strong 
anti-foreign bias has handicapped Chinese educa- 
tion. The growth of the national, or " China for the 
Chinese," movement has prevented the employment of 
foreigners in a great many capacities, and their places 
have been filled by half-educated Chinese or Japanese, 
whose acquaintance with the " new learning " was 
extremely superficial. At the same time, this new 
type of literati either forgot or neglected his national 
literature to such an extent that even the works of 
Confucius are now rarely in evidence in Chinese book- 
shops and libraries. A recent observer, who visited 
both missionary and Government colleges, comments 
on this feature, and adds that the majority of instructors 
are not qualified to do much more than to teach collo- 
quial English, and go as far in science teaching as their 
apparatus permits.* 

In a desire to follow the popular will the Imperial 
Government issued various educational edicts, and in 
1906 a system which is almost perfect on paper was 
evolved, including not only the essentials of the " new 
learning " but a proper attention to what is best in 
national literature and philosophy. The curriculum 
adopted throughout the system has no special features 
to distinguish it from that of Western countries, and 
includes physical as well as mental training. At the 

* Leslie Johnston, "The East and the West," January, 191 2. 

9 



130 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

present time the skeleton of national education (on 
paper, at all events) is very complete. Elementary 
education, technical, agricultural, and scientific schools 
are established in many provinces, and each is to have 
its own university. So far only three universities are 
actually established by the Chinese, though nine are 
maintained by foreign missions, as well as twenty-five 
colleges. There is a military training college at Peking, 
and a medical college founded in 1906 largely through 
missionary effort. Engineering has received special 
attention, the courses given (for instance, in the Peiyang 
University at Tientsin) covering much the same ground 
as similar graduate courses in Europe or America. 
The school founded at Tangshan has three foreign 
professors, and is considered to give a good training, 
and there are courses in different branches of engineer- 
ing to be had also in the Peking Polytechnic and 
in the University of Shansi. There are, moreover, 
no fewer than seven industrial colleges, according 
to Government returns. Finally, as perhaps the most 
significant reform of all, it must be stated that 
girls are sharing in this national education, special 
schools and normal colleges being provided for them. 
When, in 1905, five commissioners visited the United 
States, Harvard, Yale, and Wellesley Universities 
offered scholarships to Chinese students. An examina- 
tion was held at Nanking in July, 1907, and out of 
600 candidates thirteen were chosen, of whom three 
were women. At the present time twelve women are 
studying in Great Britain ; two lady doctors, trained in 
the United States, are in charge of a hospital for 
women in Kiukiang ; a third is the head of a hospital in 



THE NEW LEARNING 131 

Foochow ; and a fourth edits a paper in Peking. 
Another examination was held for students to be sent 
to America at Government expense, in 1909, and 
again there were 600 candidates, but only forty-seven 
successful in qualifying, and in 1910 fifty were selected. 
The standard, judging from some sample questions, 
is very high, and demands a general education of a 
very catholic nature. It has been settled that 100 
students are to be sent to the United States for 
four years (from 1909), and fifty in succeeding years 
for a period of twenty-nine years. 

The graduates have to pass an examination on 
return to China, and are classed in three grades, and 
those not in the first class must present themselves 
again in the following year. Official appointments 
are dealt out to them in order of merit. It is through 
the portals of literary examination, therefore, that 
Young China, like Old China, will reach the coveted 
goal of official employment, but the difference in 
training and experience will be vast. It is hoped 
that the successful candidates will be able to take 
their places in the new social and political order 
and lead their country on the path of reform. As to 
this experience only can show. That it is an ideal 
arrangement no one with any knowledge of education 
would be prepared to admit. The doubts entertained 
among educationists as to the value of any educational 
system which is founded on competitive examination 
are too well known to be elaborated here, and there is 
a widespread feeling in Great Britain that our own 
services would never have attained their present 
efficiency under such cut and dried conditions. The 



132 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

writer, who entered the administrative service by a side 
door, at a time when such short cuts were not only 
possible but usual, is perhaps not an unbiassed judge. 
Japan adopted a rather different system. Her ruling 
classes went abroad and returned home to reassume, in 
different ways, the leadership they had exercised before 
by force. China could not work in this fashion, but 
must keep the path of advancement open to all. 
Nevertheless, the best hope for her lies not in getting 
as many machine-made civil servants as possible out 
of a Western-education-sausage-machine, but in the 
knowledge acquired by her own better classes, a large 
number of whom now send their sons as students 
to Western or Chinese universities. Reference has 
already been made to students sent specially to 
study naval affairs, and it must be understood that 
this practice has been steadily continued, though the 
numbers are small. Military students go to France, 
Austria, and Germany. There are also opportunities 
for special studies afforded to Chinese born in the 
Straits Settlements, of whom several have taken up 
important posts in their motherland. 

In this necessarily brief outline of educational pro- 
gress in China it is impossible to attempt any estimate 
of the work done or the influences set to work, but 
attention must be drawn to certain important features. 
The influence of Japan during the years 1895-1908 
appears as the most vital factor. That period saw the 
rush of Chinese students to Japan. Now the number 
there is reduced from 15,000 to 3,000; and, while 
Japanese influence is still strong, it is evident that 
it is no longer the only one. The adoption by the 



THE NEW LEARNING 133 

revolutionaries of a republican form of government, 
even though the model is not quite that of the United 
States, indicates a swinging away from Japanese ideas, 
and indeed must be extremely unwelcome to that 
country in which the monarchy is the central fact both 
from a political, social, and religious point of view. 
Japan has always favoured the moderate reforming 
views of Liang Chi-chao. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the pro- 
visional President, has resided in the United States, and 
has many friends there. At the present time there are 
717 Chinese students in American universities, colleges 
and schools, of whom 443 are private and the rest 
Government students. The flow of these students will 
be continuous, and is guaranteed for nearly thirty years. 
A certain number go to Germany, France and Belgium. 
There are only 140 Chinese Government students in the 
United Kingdom, for we did not, like the Americans, 
embrace the opportunity offered by the indemnity to 
secure a share in moulding China's future. We asked 
less than we were entitled to, and insisted on having it 
paid, thereby securing odium for ourselves. There is a 
considerable number of private students in the United 
Kingdom, but, when it is remembered that we have a 
large Chinese population in the Straits and Hong- 
Kong, the number is not remarkable. The Hong- 
Kong University, which owes its inception largely to 
the generosity of a Parsee gentleman, will probably 
attract many students in the south, since it is near 
their own shores, and there is already a tendency not 
to send so many Government scholars abroad, but to 
encourage their going rather to one of the Chinese 
universities. The necessity that the men who are to 



134 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

interpret the " new learning " should have it pure from 
the source makes it desirable that the stream to 
Western universities should be kept up for a time at 
all events, but it is essential that properly qualified 
foreign instructors should be employed in the early 
days of the new Chinese universities. 

This last essential has been realized by friends of 
China in Europe and America, and already Yale 
College has founded a school at Changsha, in Hunan, 
once the seat of the most rabid anti-foreign pro- 
paganda, which is to have fourteen fully-qualified 
foreign professors and a large staff of Chinese in- 
structors. A more ambitious scheme is the one 
fathered by the Rev. Lord W. Gascoyne Cecil. The 
British public is asked to subscribe £125,000 to endow 
an educational centre in China as far as possible on 
the lines of a British university, and a similar sum is 
to be raised in America. The idea — an excellent one — 
is to have a thoroughly equipped college in the heart ot 
China, among their own people, and using the best 
traditions of China and of Western schools. The 
special aim of this scheme is to bring the less material 
forces of our university system to bear on Chinese 
character, in order to counteract the rather mundane 
tendency of the present training. The inclination, 
already noted, to reject altogether the Chinese classics 
is accentuated in non-government schools by the diffi- 
culty : first, of meeting the demands of the students for 
a "practical" training; and, second, by the fact that 
really good Chinese teachers are mainly in official 
employment. The result is an exotic and denational- 
izing type of education. It has been said, very truly, 



THE NEW LEARNING 135 

that in taking from us only the so-called practical side 
of education the Chinese are getting the husk without 
the kernel, and it is hoped that, by providing a central 
university to which might converge students from every 
kind of mission school or college, the gulf might be 
bridged between the teaching of certain subjects and 
education in its true sense. Whether any transplanta- 
tion of university customs or even personalities can 
supply the atmosphere of Oxford or Cambridge remains 
to be seen, and it is more likely that the frank material- 
ism and the more democratic methods of American 
universities (in which so large a proportion of Western- 
trained students will graduate) will flavour the new 
China too strongly to allow of a more subtle and 
delicate aroma. Very likely, however, the Chinese, 
even more than the Japanese, will eventually evolve 
an atmosphere and an aroma of their own ; and when 
they do so it will be upon the shoulders of the young 
graduates of to-day to lead the way. Their education 
is a matter of vital importance to the future of the 
Empire, and it should be as liberal as possible. 

Having in view the philosophic basis of their national 
life and their artistic achievements in the past, we 
must hope that the finer and more delicate of their 
national characteristics will survive the inevitable rush 
to secure the greatest possible measure of that modern 
shibboleth " efficiency." 



CHAPTER VII 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 

The subject of the earlier foreign relations with China 
can only be dealt with here in the briefest manner 
possible — merely so far as to enable the reader to 
understand the later relations between China and the 
outer world. Those readers who may be anxious to 
acquire some further knowledge of this interesting 
subject will find in the works of the Jesuit Fathers, of 
Davis, Yule, Richthofen, and other writers, a large fund 
of information. 

At eras far apart China has been distinguished by 
different appellations, says Yule, "according as it was 
regarded as the terminus of a southern sea-route coast- 
ing the great peninsula and islands of Asia, or as that 
of a northern land traversing the longitude of that con- 
tinent. In the former aspect, the name applied has 
nearly always been some form of the name Sin, Chin, 
Sinse, China. In the latter point of view the region in 
question was known to the ancients as the land of 
Seres ; to the Middle Ages as the Empire of Cathay." * 

* " The region of the Seres is a vast and populous country, 
touching on the east the ocean and the limits of the habitable 
world ; and extending west nearly to Imaus and the confines of 

136 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 137 

Besides Ptolemy, Pliny has notices of the Seres, 
whose country he places upon the eastern ocean of the 
extremity of Asia. The information contained in these 
two authors was all that was available down to the 
time of Justinian, and, though the account given by 
them was not of a very comprehensive character, their 
description of the Chinese of that time is, as Yule 
remarks, applicable to-day. The old reputation of the 
Seres for honesty is frequently referred to by Yule: 
" Indeed, Marco's whole account of the people here (in 
Kinsay) might pass for an extended paraphrase of the 
Latin commonplaces regarding the Seres." The reputa- 
tion of the Chinese for integrity and justice, in spite of 
much that has been said against it, must have had some 
solid foundation, he truly says, for it has prevailed to 
our own day among their neighbours in various parts 
of Asia which are quite remote from one another. 

The early Chinese writings make frequent mention 
of trade relations with a land called Tatsin-Kwoh, 
believed to have been the Roman Empire, and 
emissaries passed between Rome and China. The 
traffic in the rich productions of China and India was 



Bactria. The people are civilized men, of mild, just, and frugal 
temper ; eschewing collisions with their neighbours, and even shy 
of close intercourse, but not averse to dispose of their own products, 
of which raw silk is the staple, but which include also silk stuffs, 
furs, and iron of remarkable quality. It seems probable that 
relations existed from the earliest times between China and India, 
and possibly, too, between China and Chaldaea. The ' Sinim ' of the 
Prophet Isaiah is by many taken to mean China, and Ptolemy's 
'Sinae' are generally understood to have been the Chinese." 
(Yule, " Cathay.") 



138 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

the chief stimulus to trade adventure, and the gradual 
springing up of this commerce led to the Nestorian 
missionaries penetrating those regions, which they did 
from Persia in the seventh century, seemingly through 
the north-western region of China. These Nestorians 
disappeared from the face of history, leaving no trace 
but that of a stone — the famous tablet of a.d. 781 — 
which till lately was to be found in the yard of a temple 
at Sian fu. This monument, excavated in 1625, which 
is held to have attested the ancient propagation of 
Christianity in China, was inscribed partly in Chinese 
and partly in Syriac. The story that a holy man named 
Olopuen went from the country of Tatsin to China in 
the year 636 of our era, and that he was well received 
by the Emperor, who caused a Christian church to be 
built, is wrongly treated by Voltaire as the merest 
fiction. " II y a assez de verites historiques," he says, 
" sans y meler ces absurdes mensonges." 

In the ninth century China was visited by two 
Arabs.* The travels of Buddhist pilgrims from China 
to India, notably those of Fahian (399-404), of Hiuen- 
tsang (628-645), and of Hwui-sing (518) ^contain much 
information regarding the peoples of Central and 

* " Abu Zaid (one of the Arabs), like his predecessor," says Yule, 
" dwells upon the orderly and upright administration of China while 
in its normal state. This, indeed, seems to have made a strong 
impression at all times on the other nations of Asia, and we trace 
this impression in almost every account that has reached us from 
Theophylactus downwards ; whilst it is also probably the kernel of 
those praises of the justice of the Seres which extend back some 
centuries further into antiquity. And the Jesuit historian, Jarric, 
thinks that 'if Plato were to rise from Hades he would declare that 
his imagined Republic was realized in China.' " 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 139 

Western Asia. The most recent explorations in Central 
Asia, especially Dr. Aurel Stein's excavations of buried 
cities, confirm the accuracy of these early travellers, 
and more particularly of Marco Polo. The official 
histories from 300 B.C. to a.d. 900 give useful informa- 
tion regarding Syria and Persia, Greece and Parthia; 
but the information is fragmentary, the position of 
places uncertain, and the generalization from mere out- 
lying borders both incorrect and unwarranted. A few 
embassies, up to the year 1091, are noted by Pauthier, 
and the Russian Bretschneider has established that the 
visits of the Arabs were frequent down to the Sung and 
Tang dynasties. He gives much interesting information 
regarding the Chinese medieval travellers to Western 
countries between a.d. 1220 and 1260. 

The Franciscan monks sent on missions to the Great 
Khan about the middle of the thirteenth century were 
the first to bring to Western Europe the revived know- 
ledge of a great and civilized nation lying to the extreme 
east, upon the shores of the ocean ; and a Franciscan 
monk was made Archbishop in Khanbalig (Peking), and 
the Roman Catholic faith spread. Friar Odoric made 
his way to Cathay at the commencement of the four- 
teenth century, and from Zayton journeyed north- 
wards to Peking, where he found the aged Archbishop 
Corvino, and remained some three years. The journey 
homewards was through Lhassa, and probably by a 
route via Cabul and Tabriz to Europe, ending at Venice 
in 1330. Many now well-known characteristics of the 
Chinese, unknown or unnoticed by other travellers of 
his time, are given by Odoric* Ibn Batuta, the Moor, 

* " His notices of the custom of fishing with cormorants," says 
Yule, " of the habits of letting the finger-nails grow long, and of 



140 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

travelled in China about 1347. The Far East was, in 
fact, frequently reached by European traders in the 
first half of the fourteenth century, "a state of things," 
says Yule, " difficult to realize when we see how all 
those regions, when reopened only two centuries later, 
seemed almost as absolutely new discoveries as the 
Empires which, about the same time, Cortes and 
Pizarro were annexing in the West." European mis- 
sions and merchants were no longer to be found in 
China after the middle of the fourteenth century, at the 
period when the Mongol dynasty was tottering before 
its fall. The voyage of Nicolo di Conti, the Venetian, 
who travelled " quite through India," returning home 
after an absence of twenty-five years, is considered 
apocryphal. Having, according to his own account, 
made denial of his faith to save his life, he had to seek 
absolution of the Pope in 1444. Much information is 
given by Mayers regarding Chinese explorations of the 
Indian Ocean during the fifteenth century. 

The existence of a Jewish colony in China was dii* 
covered by the Jesuit Fathers in the seventeenth century, 
if not even earlier ; Kaifung, some 450 miles south-west 
of Peking, being the headquarters of this colony. When 
Martin visited the place in 1866, he found the syna- 
gogue (supposed to have been built in 1164) in ruins; 

compressing the women's feet, as well as of the divisions of the 
Khan's Empire into twelve provinces, with four chief viziers, are 
peculiar to him, I believe, among all the European travellers of the 
age. Polo mentions none of them. The names which he assigns 
to the Chinese post-stations, and to the provincial Boards of 
Administration, the technical Turki term which he uses for a sack 
of rice, etc., are all tokens of the reality of his experience." 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 141 

the Jews had dispersed, some having become Moham- 
medans, and not one being able to speak a word of 
Hebrew. In 1850 certain Hebraic rolls were recovered 
from the few remaining descendants of former Jews, but 
little really seems to be known regarding this Jewish 
colony, and the chief information on record is found in 
a memorandum on the subject in the Lettres edifiantes. 

There is no need to deal at length with the wonderful 
journeys accomplished by Marco Polo, who visited the 
court of Kublai Khan in 1274. The Venetian, as is 
well known, became a favourite with the Emperor, and 
spent in all some twenty-one years in the East, return- 
ing to Venice in 1295. In his edition of Marco Polo, 
Yule has given to the world the most erudite, and also 
the most charming, annotation of the great Venetian 
traveller's life-work. On nearing the provinces of 
Cathay, Marco Polo passed through towns containing 
Nestorian Christians, who were met with again in 
Yunnan and other parts of the Empire. 

In 1644 tne Manchus completed their conquest ot 
China. In 1627, while in possession merely of Liao- 
tung, an edict was issued compelling their Chinese 
subjects, under penalty of death, to adopt their mode of 
wearing the hair, as a sign of allegiance, and the custom 
thus compulsorily established became the fashion long 
held in such esteem by the Chinese. It was not only 
this custom of the coiffure which was introduced by the 
Manchus. The opinion prevalent in the West is that 
the exclusive and anti-foreign feeling met with in China 
is something peculiar to the Chinese character, and 
dating from remote antiquity. It is clear that it was 
the conquering race, the Manchus, who forced this 



142 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

spirit upon the Chinese people, in the attempt, so long 
maintained, to hermetically seal the Empire against the 
intrusion of the foreigner. From the brief summary 
already given it will be seen that, before the advent of the 
Manchus, China maintained constant relations with the 
countries of Asia, traders from Arabia, Persia, and India 
trafficking in Chinese ports and passing into the interior. 
The tablet of Sian fu, already mentioned, shows that 
missionaries from the West were propagating the 
Christian religion in the eighth century; in the thir- 
teenth not only was Marco Polo cordially received, but 
held office in the Empire, the Christian religious cere- 
monies being tolerated at Peking, where there was an 
Archbishop. To the close of the last Chinese dynasty 
the Jesuit missionaries were well received and treated 
at the capital, and, as Hue remarks, the first Tartar- 
Emperors merely tolerated what they found existing. 
This would seem to show conclusively that the Chinese 
did not originally entertain the aversion to foreigners 
which is usually assumed. The explanation given by 
Hue that it was the policy of the Manchus— a small 
number of nomad conquerors holding in subjection a 
vast population — to preserve China for themselves by 
the exclusion of foreigners, seems reasonable ; and Hue 
foretold that this very policy, which served to establish 
the Manchu power, would eventually lead to its de- 
struction.* 

* "The Mantchoos, it is evident, were, on account of the smallness 
of their numbers in the midst of this vast empire, compelled to 
adopt stringent measures to preserve their conquest. For fear that 
foreigners should be tempted to snatch their prey from them, they 
have carefully closed the ports of China against them, thinking thus 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 143 

The history of Russian intercourse with China may 
here be briefly recited. 

The first record of Russians appearing at Peking is 
that of two Cossacks who made their way there in 
1567, and fifty years later another Russian reached the 
capital, both visits being without any result. It was 
not till about the year 1643, at a time when the 
Manchus were engaged with the war which ultimately 
made them masters of China, then in the throes of 
rebellion, that commanders of the Russian settlements 
north of the Amur Valley commenced exploring ex- 
peditions, regarded as hostile excursions by the 
Chinese. In 1649 ChaborofT made an incursion into 
Chinese territory. The Tsar Alexis sent an envoy in 
1653, who refused to perform the act of obeisance and 
was dismissed ; and Stepanoff made a fresh expedition 
across the border. But, shortly after, the Manchu- 
Chinese army, inured to warfare by the campaigns in 



to secure themselves from ambitious attempts from without ; and in 
the interior of the empire they have sought to keep their enemies 
divided by their system of rapid and constant change of public 
officers. These two methods have been crowned with success up to 
the present time ; and it is really an astonishing fact, and one, 
perhaps, not sufficiently considered, that a mere handful of nomads 
should have been able to exercise, for more than two hundred years, 
a peaceable and absolute dominion over the vastest empire in the 
world, and over a population which, whatever may be the common 
opinion respecting them, are really extremely stirring and fond of 
change. A policy, at the same time adroit, supple, and vigorous, 
could alone have obtained a similar result ; but there is every 
reason to think that the methods which once contributed to establish 
the power of the Mantchoo Tartars will ultimately tend to overthrow 
it" (Hue, "The Chinese Empire.") 



144 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

China, defeated the Russian troops, which were then 
numerically weak. In the years 1658, 1672, and 1677 
trading caravans reached Peking, and, disputes between 
the Russian and Chinese soldiers and settlers along the 
banks of the Amur having become frequent, hostilities 
for the possession of the river were maintained in a 
desultory manner. After a five years' war, China 
imposed peace upon Russia by the Treaty of Nerchinsk 
(in 1689) when a frontier between China and Russian 
Siberia was agreed on, by which the whole of the 
Amur Valley was placed in the hands of the Chinese 
Emperor Kanghi, Russia retaining merely one bank of 
a portion of the Argun River, an upper affluent of the 
Amur. The frontier thus decided upon was watched 
closely, the Chinese commander at each frontier post 
having daily to inspect the posts on the line of de- 
marcation. " Only in this manner," says Plath, 
" could the frontier be kept for a hundred years against 
the Russians. Across the rivers horsehair ropes were 
drawn for the same purpose." The Tsar sent a 
Russian embassy in 1692, under Eberhard Ides, to 
Peking. In 1715 a considerable number of Russians, 
who had been taken prisoners by the Chinese, were 
permitted to settle at Peking, and four years later 
Peter the Great sent IsmailofT to arrange certain 
questions regarding trade. In 1727 the frontier was 
again demarcated, leaving the eastern boundary as it 
then was but rectifying that lying westward from the 
Argun, and this arrangement remained unaltered till 
the middle of the last century. The Russians were 
allowed to erect a church and school at Peking which 
developed into a permanent mission. The early 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 145 

diaries of de Lange, who accompanied Ismailoff to 
Peking, throw light on the first relations of the 
Russians with the Chinese court. It was under the 
1727 treaty that a caravan was allowed to make its way 
to Peking every three years. It appears, however, that 
these caravans met with so little success that, though 
in the first twenty years six journeys were made, they 
became afterwards less frequent. The general policy 
of Russia seems to have been one of inaction or (as 
Prjevalsky calls it) subserviency towards China until 
Muravieff and Ignatieff appeared on the scene in the 
Amur region. In 1858 Muravieff obtained for Russia 
a large territory, the Amur Province, while General 
Ignatieff in i860, by a dexterous use of the victory of 
the Anglo-French troops at Peking, with a stroke of the 
pen transferred to Russia the whole coast of Manchu- 
Tartary, from the mouth of the Amur River to the 
frontier of Korea. 

Russia's objective — an ice-free port on the Pacific, 
and the acquisition of territory suitable for the con- 
tinuation in a southerly direction of her transconti- 
nental railway — appeared to be in sight in 1895, when 
the Chino-Japanese war revealed the weakness of the 
Chinese Government. After some years diplomatic 
pressure at Peking, and largely owing to the cynical 
views of Li Hung Chang (who was prepared to pur- 
chase peace with Russia at almost any price), the lease 
of the Liaotung peninsula was acquired, in 1898, for 
twenty-five years, which gave Russia control of Port 
Arthur and Talienwan and the adjacent territories. 
After the Boxer rising in 1900 a fresh advance was 
made by " regularizing" the occupation of Manchuria, 

10 



146 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

which had been proceeding under the guise of peaceful 
penetration; and it was this state of affairs, coupled 
with Russia's obvious intention to round off her Eastern 
Asiatic sphere with Korea, which led, in 1904, to the 
declaration of war by Japan. The comparatively in- 
efficient character of Russia's occupation of Manchuria 
was revealed in the war, and, as a matter of fact, the 
economic conquest by the Chinese was actually pro- 
ceeding faster than the converse political movement. 
The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 bound Russia and 
Japan to evacuate Manchuria except the Liaotung 
peninsula, where Japan succeeded to the leasehold and 
other rights held by Russia. Moreover, the railways 
were divided, as to control and administration, between 
the two quondam combatants ; and although Man- 
churia was thus nominally restored to China, its 
alienation, with Japan and Russia in competition, has 
gone on much faster than before. Nevertheless, China's 
rights under the Treaty of Portsmouth are inexpugnable, 
with this proviso — that she cannot enforce them unless 
she is strong enough to maintain law and order in the 
territory. Turned back in the Far East after the 
disasters of 1905, Russia became quiescent for a time, 
but has once more resumed her former activity. 
A fresh development in Russo-Chinese relations was 
an ultimatum presented by St. Petersburg in 191 1 
regarding some alleged infringements of Russian rights 
in a district of Chinese Turkestan. The demand for 
an answer within three days resulted in assurances 
being immediately given. The most recent develop- 
ment is the move in Mongolia, long contemplated by 
Russia. 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 147 

To turn for a second to the intercourse of China 
with Holland, Portugal, and Spain. The trade of the 
Dutch with China commenced after they had achieved 
their independence in Europe, when they made war 
upon the Oriental possessions of Spain, capturing 
Malacca, the Spice Islands, and other positions. In 
1622 they were repulsed at Macao, but established 
themselves in the Pescadores, and a couple of years 
later in Formosa. The Portuguese first visited a port 
of China in 1514, and three years later took place the 
trading expedition to Canton under Andrada, convey- 
ing the unfortunate Ambassador Perez, who died in 
fetters in China. Besides Macao, Formosa was in- 
cluded among the Portuguese dependencies, but the 
former was the only permanent foothold of Portugal in 
China. From 1543, the date of the capture of the 
Philippines, the Spaniards carried on a trade between 
Manila and the Chinese coast, and in the next century 
two Spanish forts were established in Formosa (Spain 
and Portugal being at this time under one Crown). 
The Dutch drove the Spaniards out of that island in 
1642, but twenty years later were themselves expelled 
by the Chinese pirate Koxinga, and thenceforward held 
no possessions in the Chinese seas. In 1732 Danish 
and Swedish traders, in 1736 French, and in 1784 
Americans, appeared at Canton. 

Of all Western countries it has been the intercourse 
of France with China which, apart from trade, has 
been considerable ; and both the earlier knowledge of 
the West acquired by China, and that of China acquired 
by the West, were mainly achieved by French mis- 
sionaries, who have played an important part politically. 



148 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

No French Government sent a mission to Peking merely 
to seek advantages of trade as others have done, but 
as early as 1289 Philip the Fair received despatches 
from Persia and China suggesting common action 
against their enemies, the Saracens. Some four cen- 
turies later Louis XIV. addressed a letter to the 
Emperor Kanghi, whom he termed " Most High, Most 
Excellent, Most Puissant, and Most Magnanimous 
Friend, Dearly Beloved Good Friend," signing himself 
" Your most dear and good friend, Louis." In 1844 
an important mission, under the direction of M. 
Lagrene, proceeded to Peking, and a treaty was signed 
between France and China. The French treaty of 
1858 was supplemented by a Convention signed at 
Peking in i860, which led to controversy between the 
French and Chinese, culminating in an understanding 
in 1865, the formal ratification of which, however, was 
only procured in 1894. Further Conventions were 
concluded in 1885, 1887, and 1895, the latter two con- 
taining important clauses affecting Southern China. 

The initiation of a Chinese policy on the part of 
France may be said to have begun seriously with the 
expedition of Doudart de Lagree in 1867, described in 
the most charming manner by the gifted Louis de 
Carne, when it was first seen that France could acquire 
in Tongking one of the keys of China. The colonial 
policy of France, after her defeat at the hands of 
Prussia, turned her eyes to the East ; and in 1884 the 
Franco- Chinese war in Tongking took place, partly 
owing to a misunderstanding as to the terms of an 
agreement arrived at by the diplomatists. A terrible 
incident in the war was the attack on the river forts of 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 149 

the Min River by Admiral Courbet. In 1885 peace 
was declared, China giving up all claim on Tongking. 
In 1898 France obtained a ninety-nine years' lease of 
Kuaug - chau -Wan (opposite Hainan), and next year 
two islands commanding the entrance to the bay. 

The relations of Germany with China are of recent 
date. The first Prussian expedition was undertaken 
in 1861, under Count von Eulenberg. Some years 
later German traders in China suggested that their 
Government should seize a portion of Chinese territory, 
Formosa or Korea, in order to found a " German 
Australia." Treaties were concluded in 1861 and 1880. 
But nothing was accomplished in this direction until 
Kiaochau was occupied in 1897-98. 

This act of aggression was, perhaps, the most brutal 
manifestation of the " mailed fist " policy in which even 
Prussia has ever indulged. Nominally in return for 
the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung, 
Germany demanded and secured from the weak 
Manchu Government the ninety-nine years' lease of a 
port in Shantung — the harbour, town, and hinterland — 
with rights of railway construction in the province 
itself. A great deal of money has been spent on 
Kiaochau, and the German thoroughness and mastery 
of detail are evidenced in all the arrangements, but the 
German merchant and trader continue, on the whole, 
to prefer the more elastic system to be found in ports 
not under the German flag. In 1900 the German 
Ambassador was killed in the streets of Peking during 
the Boxer rising, and possibly it should be placed to 
Germany's credit that, instead of demanding a province 
as compensation, she merely exacted a monetary pay- 



150 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

ment and various acts of humiliation on the part ot 
the Peking Government. 

English intercourse with China commenced later 
than that of some other maritime Powers of the West, 
but has grown to great proportions. The history of 
British trade with China preceding the direct con- 
nection with India is that of the East India Company, 
which in 1613 established a factory in Japan, and some 
two years later opened agencies in Formosa and Amoy. 
An attempt in 1627 to commence trade with Canton 
through Macao proved unsuccessful owing to the 
opposition of the Portuguese, who had been established 
there some seventy years. Nominal participation in 
the trade of Canton was granted to the British in 
I 635, but little progress was achieved until Oliver 
Cromwell concluded the treaty with Portugal by which 
free access was obtained throughout the East Indies. 
When the Ming dynasty was replaced by that of the 
Manchu in 1664, a complete contempt for trade and 
strong antipathy to foreigners was a marked trait 
of the new ruling house. The Company's factory at 
Amoy was destroyed in 1681 ; but the agents (in those 
days called " supercargoes "), finding that the Manchus 
permitted trade to be carried on, provided their 
supremacy was humbly acknowledged, sent ships to 
Macao, re-established the factory at Amoy, and soon 
after founded another on the island of Chusan. Till 
that time every vessel upon arrival was boarded by an 
officer of the Hoppo (the Imperial Superintendent of 
the Native Customs), and by an officer of the Imperial 
household, who were propitiated by a cumshaw, or 
present, upon the amount of which depended the 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 151 

extent of the rates and duties to be levied. When the 
mutual difficulties had been overcome, after the employ- 
ment of arguments usual on such occasions, the ship pro- 
ceeded to Whampoa, at that time the port of Canton, 
where trade was opened through the intermediary of 
a Chinese trader who was officially recognized. 

The East India Company having appointed a chief 
supercargo, who was also to act as King's Minister or 
Consul for China, the Manchu Government nominated 
an official, with the title of the " Emperor's Merchant," 
to supervise foreign trade. This officer was naturally 
far from being a persona grata with the supercargoes 
and traders. A contest arose between the two officials, 
and every endeavour was made by the Chinese to 
depreciate the position of the King's Minister, and to 
reduce him to the level of a mere taipan, or chief 
manager. The foreigners had now to placate not 
merely the Hoppo and his many underlings, but also 
the " Emperor's Merchant " and his horde of hangers-on. 
The Manchu Commissioner became not merely the 
intermediary between the foreigners and the native 
merchants, but also the means of communication 
between them and the local Chinese authorities. 
Thus was established a powerful Chinese combination, 
which maintained itself by submitting to a heavy 
" squeeze " at the hands of the Viceroy and Governor 
of Canton on the one hand, and of the Hoppo on the 
other. The office of the Hoppo was a remunerative 
one, but he in turn had to purchase his five years' 
term for collecting the Customs, both foreign and 
native, by a heavy payment to Peking. Foreign trade 
was therefore carried on under great disabilities ; but 



152 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

notwithstanding all obstacles commerce flourished, and 
by the year 1715 British ships commenced to sail 
direct to the Bogue, where, after the settlement of fees 
and duties, the required " chop," or stamped permit, 
was obtained, and permission granted to proceed to 
Whampoa for the purposes of trade. 

In 1720 a fresh change was made in the conduct of 
foreign trade, the " Emperor's Merchant " being re- 
placed by a body of Chinese traders, known as the 
" Co-Hong," with power to levy an ad valorem duty of 
4 per cent, on imports and exports. The Co-Hong 
was under the supintendence of the Hoppo, and 
responsible to the Viceroy and Governor for their 
share of the profits and the solvency of each member. 
The members of the corporation, moreover, were 
answerable for the payment of all fees and duties, and 
even for offences and crimes committed by the ships' 
officers or crews. An import duty of three taels per 
picul was sanctioned by Imperial edict in 1722, and 
an attempt made shortly after by the Imperial Govern- 
ment to introduce a fixed tariff; but the conditions of 
affairs was not improved, the tariff being treated with 
contempt by both the Hoppo and the Co-Hong. A 
special tax of 10 per cent, on foreign imports and 
exports followed, concerning which a strong appeal 
was made by the foreigners to the Throne — in the 
attitude of humble, or rather abject, suppliants, be it 
noted — but not till 1736, on the occasion of the 
accession to power of the Emperor Kienlung, was 
exemption obtained from the impost. The vessels of 
nationalities other than the British now commenced 
to trade with Canton. 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 153 

A fresh disability was introduced twenty years later, 
making it imperative for ships to obtain the security of 
two members of the Co-Hong. The powers of the 
combination were extended, all dealings of foreigners 
with small traders and purveyors of provisions being 
prohibited, especially with native junks before entering 
the river, as had been the practice. And this restriction 
was further emphasized by an Imperial edict entirely 
prohibiting trade anywhere outside the Bogue. An 
attempt was made by the chief supercargo to avert the 
ruin of the Amoy agency thus threatened, which, 
however, completely failed. The interpreter, Mr. 
Flint, who had been charged with the Amoy negotia- 
tions, proceeded to Tientsin and laid the whole case, 
involving serious reflections on the local authorities at 
Canton, before the Throne. The appeal was nomin- 
ally successful, and an Imperial Commissioner, accom- 
panied by Mr. Flint, was despatched to Canton to 
remove the Hoppo from office, to abolish illegal 
extortion, and to hold a full investigation, with the 
inevitable result that the Commissioner was " squared," 
and grave charges were formulated against Mr. Flint 
of having set at defiance the Imperial edict. He and 
the supercargoes who had been summoned to the 
Yamen were attacked and maltreated and compelled 
to perform the kotow. Mr. Flint was detained in 
prison, and a special mission to Canton to obtain his 
release having proved unsuccessful, a heavy bribe being 
refused, he was actually kept in confinement till the 
year 1762, when he returned to England. 

The system of bribery and corruption, coupled with 
submission to gross indignities, continued until, in 



154 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

1771, permission was accorded to foreigners to reside 
at Canton during the winter, the business season. At 
this time the supercargoes gained a decisive victory 
over the Co-Hong, obtaining its dissolution by means 
of a cumshaw of 100,000 taels, the contributions due to 
the authorities having fallen into arrears. Some ten 
years later the old institution was revived in another 
form by the creation of " Hong merchants " — native 
brokers who bore the title of " mandarin." The sole 
difference between the old system and the new was that, 
in lieu of the earlier common financial responsibility, 
there was now a Consoo, an association or guild fund, 
established in order to supply, by means of a special 
tax on foreign trade, the guarantee provided for. 

A fresh impost to meet the requirements of coast 
defence was imposed in 1805. In the year 1818 there 
arose a serious difficulty over the " exportation of 
bullion " question. The balance of trade had been 
yearly diminishing as foreign commerce grew, and the 
Chinese authorities retricted the exportation of silver 
by any vessel to three-tenths of the excess of imports 
over exports. In view of the alarming export of silver, 
the authorities, in 1831, imposed such crushing restric- 
tions that the supercargoes threatened to suspend 
operations altogether, later, however, submitting to the 
Chinese officials. 

The foreign trading community in Canton were now 
chafing more and more at what they considered the 
weakness of the East India Company, and showing 
signs of resentment at their monopoly, while they 
evinced an increasing disinclination to submit tamely 
to the exactions of the Chinese authorities. The 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 155 

restrictions were evaded by the vessels outside the 
Bogue, where stationary ships were anchored to serve 
as warehouses. Smuggling grew apace, and the 
emoluments of the local authorities seriously suffered. 
It became apparent to the Chinese that there was a 
growing determination no longer to play the earlier 
submissive role, and that, with the cessation of the 
East India Company's monopoly, then imminent, 
foreign trade would be placed on an entirely new 
basis. Both the Imperial and the local authorities 
took a serious view of the position, and in 1832 
appeared an edict directing the maritime provinces to 
place their coast defences and ships of war in repair, 
" in order to scour the seas and drive away any 
European vessels (of war) that might make their 
appearance on the coast." Collision with the foreigners 
was, in fact, felt by the Chinese to be inevitable. 

For over two centuries the general relations of the 
East India Company towards the Chinese Government 
were those of the suppliant trader humbly acknowledging 
the supreme sovereignty of the " Son of Heaven." 
Commerce was beneath the contempt not merely of 
the court, but of the literati and officials, trade being 
fit only for the lower, or rather the lowest, classes. 
Even to the " outer barbarians," however, the Emperor 
of China was pleased to be clement. They were permitted 
to trade, under certain disabilities, being only allowed to 
reside for brief periods at intervals in the suburbs of 
Canton ; they were neither to enter the city gates nor 
travel inland ; they could only entertain in their service 
the lowest class of Chinese, the boat population, who 
are forbidden to live on shore or to compete at literary 



156 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

examinations. Under such humiliating conditions 
were trade and intercourse maintained. 

In fairness it must be admitted that the Chinese 
certainly saw little of the better side of the strangers 
from the West, whether hailing from Europe or 
America. To them the foreigner was a man thinking 
of nothing but gain by trade, gain at any price ; a man 
of gross material pleasures, a coarse and vicious being, 
with no appreciation of Chinese philosophy, litera- 
ture, or history, and not even the most elementary 
acquaintance with Chinese etiquette. To the Chinese, 
therefore, the foreigner appeared densely ignorant — a 
mere savage ; he was the " outer barbarian," the 
" foreign devil." The Chinese had their eyes rudely, 
opened, in 1741, to the fact that, whatever their 
deficiences might be, foreigners were possessed of some 
advantages. In that year the first British man-of-war, 
the Centaur, made its appearance. Under circumstances 
of considerable danger Captain Anson passed the 
Bogue, pushed on to Whampoa, and still further 
astonished the Chinese by calling, as an officer of 
King George II., upon the Viceroy of Canton, 
audaciously reminding the Chinese officials that 
etiquette must not be overlooked. To the discomfiture 
of the Chinese officials, the Viceroy received him. 
Fifty years later the situation had not improved, and 
when two British ships arrived at Canton, the officials 
absolutely refused to allow them to enter the Bogue. 
Some time later, in 1816, Captain Maxwell, of the 
Alceste, made his way to Whampoa, after returning the 
fire of the forts which had opened on his vessel — an 
incident discreetly ignored by the Chinese. 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 157 

The embassies sent with costly gifts by King 
George III., and carried out with much pomp, accom- 
plished nothing. Both the embassy of Lord Macartney, 
in 1792, and that of Lord Amherst, in 1815, were 
treated as mere " tribute-bearing " deputations. As a 
concession Britain was admitted by the court chroniclers 
to an official position in the roll of " tributary nations," 
a fiction which was actually maintained till recent 
years. Even the reception of ministers by the Emperor 
at Peking, secured after protracted struggles, was held 
till recently in a building associated with the reception 
of subject nations. 

The more frequent visits of British men-of-war, the 
protection of Macao against French attack, and the 
gradual increase of naval forces impressed the Chinese 
and enabled the British to take a firmer stand against 
the Chinese assumption of political and judicial 
supremacy. Never officially acknowledged (though in 
fact admitted), this was now formally contested, and 
the Chinese were informed that foreigners on principle 
declined longer to submit to it. From that time no 
foreigner was surrendered to the Chinese authorities 
to be dealt with. 

In view of the impending non-renewal of the charter 
held by the East India Company, which had been 
notified to the Viceroy of Canton in 1831, that official 
asked that a British officer should be sent to Canton 
to control trade. An Act of Parliament was passed 
two years later to regulate trade with China and India, 
declaring it expedient "for the objects of trade and 
amicable intercourse with the dominions of the Emperor 
of China " to establish " a British authority in the 



158 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

said dominions." Three Superintendents of Trade — 
Lord Napier, Mr. Plowden, and Mr. (afterwards Sir) 
J. F. Davis — were appointed, one of them to preside 
over " a court of justice with criminal and Admiralty 
jurisdiction for the trial of offences committed by Her 
Majesty's subjects in the said dominions, or on the 
high sea within a hundred miles from the coast of 
China." The superintendents were forbidden to 
engage in trade, a tonnage duty being sanctioned to 
defray the cost of their establishment. Extra-territorial 
jurisdiction was thus established, and the China war 
of 1841 became inevitable. Lord Palmerston instructed 
Lord Napier " to foster and protect the trade of His 
Majesty's subjects in China ; to extend trade, if 
possible, to other ports of China ; to induce the 
Chinese Government to enter into commercial relations 
with the English Government ; and to seek, with 
peculiar caution and circumspection, to establish 
eventually direct diplomatic communication with the 
Imperial court at Peking ; also to have the coast of 
China surveyed, to prevent disasters;" and "to in- 
quire for places where British ships might find requisite 
protection in the event of hostilities in the China Sea" — 
an injunction which led to much controversy later on. 

A serious mistake was made in associating with 
Lord Napier, as joint superintendents, two gentlemen 
who had been in the East India Company's service, 
and who, therefore, were most unlikely to receive con- 
sideration at the hands of the Chinese. The policy 
adopted was temporizing, vacillating, and ended in 
Lord Napier finding himself in a false position and 
being abandoned by his Government. The Cabinet, 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 159 

with all their opportunities, had learnt nothing from 
the history of the East India Company, and committed 
the additional blunder of acting under the advice of 
the directors of that Company, who had already so 
gravely mismanaged affairs. The sad story of Lord 
Napier's mission need not be recapitulated here ; 
enough that, after suffering all sorts of indignities at 
the hands of the Chinese authorities, he was at last 
permitted to leave Canton and proceed to Macao, 
where he died — of a broken heart, it is said. 

Sir J. F. Davis succeeded Lord Napier, and in 1834 
recommended that a despatch should be sent to the 
Emperor of China by a small fleet, and, in the event of 
failure, that measures of coercion should be employed. 
The British community, supporting this view, pro- 
posed that a plenipotentiary should proceed, with an 
armed force, to demand reparation of the Emperor 
and to arrange trade questions. Then followed the 
" quiescent policy " of Davis and his successor. 
Gradually, however, the idea grew that an island must 
be acquired on the coast as a colony, Chusan being 
first in favour, later Ningpo, then Formosa. The 
relations between English and Chinese, however, 
became more and more strained, the importation of 
opium being one of the grounds of dispute, and open 
hostilities took place in 1839. ^ n January, 1841, the 
island of Hong-Kong was ceded by the Chinese Com- 
missioner Keshen, and, though repudiated by the 
Chinese Government, the cession was confirmed by 
the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, whereby five ports — 
Canton, Amoy, Fuchau, Ningpo, and Shanghai — were 
opened to British trade. Possession of Hong-Kong was 



160 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

taken in 1841, the next year it was proclaimed a free 
port, which it has since remained, and in 1843 it was 
constituted a Crown colony. 

The so-called " opium war " was really waged to put 
a stop to grievances which had been accumulating for 
a hundred and fifty years. No protest against the 
drug being treated as contraband by Imperial decrees 
was made ; but when commands were issued to the 
Queen as a vassal of China, and her subjects treated 
with violence, the question entered upon another 
phase. 

In 1856 war again broke out between Great Britain 
and China, in consequence of the capture by the 
Chinese of a " lorcha," the Arrow, flying the British 
flag. Lord Elgin was sent to China as Minister 
Extraordinary, and after a series of warlike operations, 
including the taking of Canton, the Treaty of Tientsin 
was signed in 1858. Peace was only temporary, how- 
ever. In 1859 the British Ambassador was obstructed 
when on his way to Peking to obtain a ratification of 
the treaty, and it was only after the Anglo-French 
expedition had forced the passage of the Pei ho, cap- 
tured the Taku forts, and camped at Peking, that the 
Convention of Peking, ratifying the Tientsin Treaty, 
was signed in i860. The Treaty and Convention form 
the basis of the relations between Great Britain and 
China. Additional ports in China were opened to 
British trade, provision was made for the permanent 
residence at Peking of a British representative, and 
Kaulun, opposite Hong-Kong, was ceded to Britain. 
In 1867 China despatched her first embassy to foreign 
countries, consisting of two Chinese and the American 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 161 

Anson Burlingame, who died at St. Petersburg. The 
object of the mission was to obtain more favourable 
treatment from the Occidental nations, and to foster 
the impression that the Chinese were anxious to 
embark upon a policy of reform. In 1876 negotiations, 
arising out of the Margary murder, resulted in the 
Chifu Convention. This secured, inter alia, compensa- 
tion, an expression of regret for the murder of Margary, 
a promise of improved regulations of the opium 
traffic and trade, and the opening of four new treaty 
ports, with six new ports on the Yangtse. In 
1890 was executed the Tibet - Sikkim Convention, 
recognizing the British protectorate over the Sikkim 
State, and laying down that official relations must be 
carried on with permission of the British Government. 
By the Burma Convention of 1897 the Chinese Govern 
ment agreed to the connection of Chinese railways 
in Yunnan, if made, with the Burmese lines, to the 
appointment of a Consul in Yunnan, with right of 
British subjects to residence and trade. By a special 
article, Wuchau (in Kwangsi) and Samshui (in Kwang- 
tung) were opened as treaty ports and consular stations, 
with freedom of steamer navigation. 

Among the more important instruments which have 
affected the relations of China and Britain are a series 
of conventions regarding opium, the last, in 191 1, being 
the culminating point in the attempt to prohibit the 
import of opium into China. This involved a self- 
denying ordinance on the part of India, which has 
derived a large revenue from the export of opium. 
Accordingly, after a period in which the amount sent 
from India was reduced each year, a commission sat to 

11 



i6 2 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

examine whether China herself was reducing her pro- 
duction. Despite the enormous difficulties entailed, it 
is proved that she is not only in earnest on this subject, 
but that her officials, even those formerly addicted to 
the habit, have, for the most part, carried out the 
regulations, and accordingly it was agreed, in ign, 
that in seven years the export of opium from India 
shall entirely cease to those districts of China which 
have given up the cultivation of the poppy. 

Another phase of British-Chinese relations is con- 
nected with the " sphere of interest " policy which at 
one time dominated the international situation in the 
Far East. The " break-up of China " was believed 
to be imminent, and in the melee of claims by the 
Powers, which China was too weak to resist, three 
concessions were represented to the British public as 
remaining to our credit in the settling-up. They were 
the territorial extension of the island of Hong-Kong 
to the limits necessary for its effective fortification ; the 
lease of Wei-hai-wei (whose raison-d'etre, save as a health 
resort, has never been made clear), and the establish- 
ment of a " sphere of influence " in the Yangtse 
Valley. As for the last, which was a shibboleth of our 
Far Eastern diplomatists for many years, it appeared 
that it rested on no concession or agreement with 
China, for no such document ever existed ; but upon 
an off-hand reply to a query of the British Minister to 
the Tsungli Yamen as to whether China was prepared 
to alienate her great central zone. The reply was, 
" Of course not !" and this diplomatic correspondence 
had to be carefully prepared and edited for publication 
in order to "save face," not for the Oriental but for 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 163 

the Occidental statesmen. At the same time Great 
Britain had, at that period, a position in the Yangtse 
which, if properly utilized, might have secured those 
British interests which lie in the improvement of trade 
relations and facilities, and not in territorial aggression. 
The writer passed through the Yangtse region in 1899, 
and his observations of the conditions there, as expressed 
in " The Overland to China," reveal the weakness of 
the policy which, practically from the time of the death 
of Palmerston onwards, has handicapped us in China. 
In the whole province of Szechuan, with a population 
of some sixty millions, and one of the best markets for 
British goods, there was, early in 1899, not a single 
British Consul or Vice-Consul. Experienced officers 
had been despatched elsewhere, and the Vice-Consul 
at Chungking had been sent off to investigate the 
murder of a missionary in a remote district of another 
province. The trader is never the spoilt darling of 
British diplomacy, despite our tradition as " a nation 
of shopkeepers," and the British merchant in the Far 
East has had to watch while the trade which might 
have been his has been gradually absorbed by others 
with more sympathetic and watchful Governments. 
British diplomacy at this period, and since, has been 
exclusively occupied with Peking, the Manchu dynasty, 
Li Hung Chang or Yuan Shih-kai. 

The relations of Japan with China is a subject too 
vast to be summarized with any real perspective. The 
briefest references must suffice. Japan was the pupil 
of China in arts and letters, and the relations of the 
two people have retained, on the Chinese side, that 
attitude of superiority, despite the defeat of 1894-5, 



164 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

and subsequent proofs of Japan's efficiency as a modern 
State. Korea was the casus belli in 1894, and the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) recognized the complete 
independence of Korea, and ceded to Japan the 
southern portion of Fengtien (adjoining Korea) and 
the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores. China, 
moreover, in 1896, by a Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation, agreed to the reception of a Japanese 
diplomatic agent at the court of Peking, and to the 
residence of Japanese consular officials and subjects 
throughout China wherever opened to foreign residence 
and trade. Japanese subjects were to have the same 
privileges and immunities enjoyed by other nations 
under the most favoured nation. Japanese vessels 
were to have the right of landing and shipping at all 
ports of call already opened or to be opened later. 
Japanese subjects were to have the right of travel in 
the interior under passports issued by their own consuls. 
The tariffs and tariff rates with Western Powers were 
extended to Japan. Some seven years later (in 1903) 
a Supplementary Treaty for the purpose of promoting 
the commercial relations between China and Japan 
was executed, following on the supposed advantages 
obtained by the Mackay Treaty of that year. This 
dealt chiefly with likin, trade-marks, and cognate 
questions, and the right of navigation on inland water- 
ways — a most important concession — and the opening 
of Changsha in the province of Hunan, a region 
hitherto closed against the foreigner. After the defeat 
of 1895, China began to realize the necessity of reform, 
and naturally turned to her nearest neighbour for 
examples of how to accomplish it ; but it was only 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 165 

after the Boxer rising, when the disciplined action of 
the Japanese roused Chinese admiration and gratitude 
that the " boom " in Japanese models set in. Yuan 
Shih-kai and other provincial authorities engaged 
Japanese instructors for their schools and for their 
troops. The rush to Japanese universities, and the 
development of the Press under Japanese tutelage are 
described elsewhere. The defeat of Russia by Japan 
(1904-5) accentuated the successful reorganization of 
the latter, and the vulnerability of the Great Power 
which had hung so long over China like a cloud. But 
although China humbled herself to take instruction 
from her former pupil, it must not be supposed that 
she has departed from her old standpoint, nor will she 
adopt Japanese methods en bloc. A Chinese student 
has expressed very well a prevalent view of Japan. It 
was easier for her to imitate, he said, than for China, 
which had always originated, whereas Japan had 
borrowed practically all her ideas from others. Chinese 
renascence will be possible only on strong national 
lines. The situation in Manchuria does not conduce 
altogether to harmony between the two Governments, 
and a whole group of questions, including the Yalu 
river timber concession, and the Sin-ming-tun railway, 
have led to strained relations, ending in what was 
practically an ultimatum from Japan. 

The status of Manchuria was settled by the Treaty 
of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia, and China 
had no choice save to confirm this in the additional 
agreement of 1905 between her and Japan ; but 
whereas in her previous agreements with other foreign 
Powers it is she who has striven to " interpret " the 



166 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

clauses in a manner favourable to herself, or to find 
loopholes for evasion, in this case she has to deal with 
another Oriental Power strong enough to adhere to its 
own view of what the situation should be. 

The most important event in the history of foreign 
relations was, of course, the Boxer rising of 1900, and 
its sequel in the expedition of the allied armies and 
the capture and sack of Peking. For ten years anti- 
foreign feeling had been on the increase, and in 189 1 
anti-foreign riots took place in many parts, largely 
instigated by a scholar named Chow-Han. The 
Chinese Government usually had to pay money com- 
pensation for these attacks, but the method of punish- 
ment generally allowed the real culprits to escape. 
The acts of foreign aggression which followed the war 
of 1894-5 were fuel to the fire of popular resentment, 
and the Boxer movement was certainly, in its inception, 
what it was represented to be by the Central Govern- 
ment — a popular rising against foreigners in the guise 
(so familiar to the Chinese) of a secret society. They 
began to attack Christian churches and missions in 
Shantung, but very quickly the flames spread to Chihli ; 
and, when it became apparent that foreigners in the 
capital itself were threatened, neither the Empress- 
Dowager nor her principal advisers saw fit to offer any 
opposition. Indeed, it is clear that they alternated 
between a desire to use the Boxers as their instruments 
and fear of the possible consequences. 

The foreigners in Peking took refuge in the British, 
American, and adjoining legations, where they were 
besieged under most trying circumstances, and de- 
fended themselves with courage and skill. Neverthe- 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 167 

less, it is doubtful if they could have held out if the 
Chinese had been united in desiring their downfall. 
The behaviour of Chinese Christians, thousands of 
whom suffered martyrdom at this time, was often 
exemplary. The relief of Peking was first attempted 
by a force from the British and American war-vessels, 
which were stationed off Taku, but this force was com- 
pelled to retreat and narrowly escaped annihilation. 
So far the Boxer movement had had ostensibly no 
connection with the Chinese Government, but after 
the despatch of the expeditionary force the commanders 
of the foreign 'fleets off Taku summoned the Chinese to 
surrender the forts, and on their refusal bombarded and 
took them. The Peking Government then declared 
war, and more openly took sides with the Boxers. 
The Powers thereupon despatched strong forces to 
China, and a relief expedition entered Peking on 
August 14. Next day the city was occupied. 

The motives which prompted the Empress- Dowager 
and her advisers in their fatal policy were as complex 
as their action was weak and disastrous. The spolia- 
tion of China after 1895, as has been said, roused 
indignation all over China, which was not abated by 
the rush for railway and mining concessions by 
foreigners. Peking at this period was filled with 
a horde of concession hunters and mongerers, and 
more than one Legation appeared to exist for the 
purpose of feeding these gentry. Chinese indignation 
with the foreigner certainly had much justification. 
But the Empress and her advisers must have had 
some inkling of the avalanche they were bringing down 
on their heads, and cannot have been altogether 



168 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

deceived into the belief that with one great effort 
they could rid themselves of foreigners for ever. It is 
far more likely, and in accordance with the tactics 
they pursued (sending fruit and complimentary letters 
to the besieged embassies one day, and orders for their 
extermination another), that they designed to divert 
from themselves the growing dissatisfaction in which 
their impending doom was already foreshadowed. The 
entry of the allied armies into Peking, their progress 
through the Forbidden City, and the subsequent spolia- 
tion of Peking, are a chapter in Chinese history which 
no nation can recall with entire satisfaction. But it 
was not the Chinese people who were defeated and 
humbled, but their Manchu rulers. Peking is their 
city, her fall tore the last vestige of prestige from the 
dynasty, and only the personality and real ability of 
Tse-hsi kept the Throne intact in the following years. 
The price China had to pay for the Boxer outrage was 
the erection of a statue in Peking to the German 
Ambassador, Baron von Kettler, who was killed in the 
streets ; the despatch of an Imperial clansman to 
apologize for this to Berlin ; and the payment of an 
enormous indemnity, part of which the United States 
agreed to cancel on condition that the money should 
be spent on education — a step which may bring very 
great influence as its result. 

This action on the part of the United States illus- 
trates the difference which she has always striven to 
maintain between her attitude and that of other Powers 
in China. Her position in the Philippines actually 
brings her into close proximity, but her main objective 
has always been trade across the Pacific, and not 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 169 

territorial acquisition. She has executed four com- 
mercial treaties with China, and has established a very 
considerable position in that Empire. During the 
tenure of office, as Foreign Secretary, of the late John 
Hay the United States began to play a leading part in 
diplomatic negotiations with China. There is, how- 
ever, one crucial feature in Chino-American relations — 
the question of Chinese immigration. As early as 1880 
the United States became alarmed at the influx of 
Chinese into her Pacific region, and sent a commission 
to China to secure the regulation of cheap labour. 
As a result the United States secured in a conven- 
tion the power to regulate, limit, or even suspend, if 
necessary, the incoming of Chinese labourers. In 
1894 she had become more determined, and China had 
to consent to the prohibition of her nationals for ten 
years. In 1904, when the arrangement had to be 
renewed, China attempted in vain to secure better 
terms, and the result was a boycott of American goods. 
This did not last long, but it was the occasion of a 
display of national feeling and even of national soli- 
darity which was a sign of the times. 

The review of the relations of foreign Powers with 
China, while it reveals the evils and dangers of the 
policy pursued by the Government at Peking, does not 
leave any nation with grounds for special self-congratu- 
lation. As the period of attempted exclusion is now at 
an end, and as we shall probably see the whole of 
China opened to foreign trade as soon as there is 
a central government strong enough to enforce the 
necessary regulations, we need not dwell too much on 
the struggles which were necessary to overcome the 



170 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

policy of exclusion. But it is clear from history that 
this policy was not indigenous to China, where in 
earlier times foreigners were welcomed, but was due to 
the Manchu rulers, who imposed it for their own 
purposes. Unfortunately, in the course of the relations 
which grew out of that mistaken policy, foreign nations 
had to take action which involved them in hostilities 
with the Chinese. Then, as it became obvious that 
the Manchu Government was as weak as it was bigoted, 
foreign nations took by force more than they would 
have demanded had they been met differently. The 
result was that anti-foreign feeling which, though under 
better control, still constitutes an element of bitterness 
and suspicion in the relations of China to the outside 
world. 



CHAPTER VIII 

DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 

Although a Minister Plenipotentiary was appointed 
by Great Britain after the signature of the Treaty of 
Nanking in 1842, the office was merged in that of 
Governor of Hong-Kong, and the diplomatic function 
remained practically dormant until after the Conven- 
tion of Peking in i860, following the Treaty of Tientsin 
in 1858. In fact, the war of 1856-60 might be said to 
have been undertaken for the purpose of establishing 
diplomatic relations with the central government. Up 
to that time there had been no intercourse except at 
the five ports opened to trade by the Treaty of Nanking. 
At four of these ports, where the influence of one or 
two strong men in the newly-established Consular 
Service had been stamped on the new relations between 
the Chinese and British authorities, and where a natural 
development of commerce had taken place, everything 
was peaceable and prosperous. But at the principal 
port, Canton, where, most of all, firmness and con- 
sistency were needed, these qualities were unfortunately 
lacking, and the result was that an intolerable state of 
things was allowed to grow up. Taking full advantage 
of the weakness of the British attitude, the Chinese 

171 



172 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

authorities became more and more insolent and aggres- 
sive, until at length, in 1856, the cup of their iniquity 
overflowed, and reprisals had to be undertaken. The 
right to enter the city, which is the seat of a Governor 
and Governor-General, had been waived for a term of 
seven years, in deference to what was represented as 
the uncontrollable turbulence of the people. At the 
end of that period the reasons for still further post- 
poning the privilege had, of course, grown stronger, 
and entry into the city and intercourse with the autho- 
rities were still denied to the representatives of Great 
Britain. Serious troubles had ensued consequent on 
this anomalous situation. There had been assassina- 
tions of Englishmen for which no redress was obtained, 
insults of every kind accumulated, and the more sub- 
missive the foreigners showed themselves the more were 
they treated as savages and slaves. The whole mer- 
cantile community were kept in what was virtually a 
prison, their peregrinations being confined within the 
area of what was somewhat euphemistically called a 
" garden." It was only a question of time as to when 
this unbearable tyranny must lead to a catastrophe. 
The spark that ignited the gunpowder was the seizure 
of the crew of a " lorcha " or schooner belonging to 
Hong-Kong and flying the British ensign. 

The consul for Canton, Mr. (afterwards Sir Harry) 
Parkes, happened to be a man possessed of two great 
qualities — clear insight and iron resolution. He de- 
manded prompt redress, and received insolent replies. 
The Chinese authorities did not comprehend the change 
that was involved in the succession of a strong man, 
and were for " continuing the treatment," as the doctors 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 173 

say in chronic cases. When the matter was put into 
the hands of the British Admiral, he limited himself to 
a single demand — i.e., the treaty right of entering the 
city and of conferring with the authorities. This being 
refused with scorn, Sir Michael Seymour made his own 
way to the yamen of the Viceroy Yeh, but did not find 
his Excellency at home. Thus began the " war "-like 
operations which dragged on, with intervals of false 
peace, until they culminated in the occupation of the 
Chinese capital. The primary object throughout, or, 
to use the military phrase, the objective, of the hostili- 
ties, which extended over a space of four years (from 
October, 1856, till October, i860) was nothing more 
or less than to obtain by direct intercourse with the 
Peking court a remedy for the grievances which British 
subjects and officials had so long and so patiently — 
pusillanimously would not be too strong a word — 
endured in the provincial capital, Canton. Further 
extension of trade as an ulterior object was, of course, 
never lost sight of by the British statesmen of that 
time. 

The future of British interests in China being thus 
closely bound up in this sovereign remedy, the inau- 
guration of diplomatic relations acquired a character of 
crucial importance. It was by no means a thing " to 
be taken in hand unadvisedly, lightly, or wantonly." 
It was an incursion into an unsurveyed territory, where 
the greatest circumspection was called for. The suc- 
cess of the new experiment depended on the skill with 
which it was carried out, and more especially on the 
first step, which would give tone and direction to the 
whole course of future international relations. The 



174 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

conditions under which intercourse was to be conducted 
were of course unknown ; had, in fact, to be evolved by 
actual experience. The Chinese court was called upon 
to break with all its traditions, and to discover a plat- 
form on which it could treat foreign nations on terms 
of equality. This was no light matter ; it was a revolu- 
tion in the most conservative body in the known world. 
The importance of the demand was felt equally by both 
negotiants. To the British envoy access to the Imperial 
court was the sine qua non of his mission ; to the Chinese 
it was the last ditch, the point on which they could 
make no surrender. Both sides understood this ; and 
when the Chinese gave way in order to get rid of the 
British envoy and the naval squadron supporting him 
at Tientsin, it was only to draw him into an ambush. 
The Treaty of Tientsin was, from the Chinese point of 
view, simply a device to gain time in order to bar the 
way of access against the minister whom they had 
covenanted to receive. The temporary success of this 
expedient was signalized in the British repulse before 
the Taku forts in 1859. The resistance to the advent 
of a British representative was finally overcome, so far 
as mere force could overcome it, by the Anglo-French 
campaign of i860, which resulted in the capture of 
Peking, causing the flight, followed soon after by the 
death, of the Emperor Hienfung. 

Although, therefore, nothing was known of the 
machinery or the forms under which the new diplo- 
matic intercourse was to proceed, there was no room 
for doubt as to the spirit in which the foreign Ministers 
would be received. As they could not be excluded by 
material force, they would be neutralized as far as 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 175 

possible by moral expedients. The series of deceptions 
which the Chinese-— not without justification, being the 
weaker party — had practised on the intruders during 
successive negotiations, afforded ample proof that the 
high officers of the court differed in no way from the 
high officers in the provinces, of whose manners and 
customs British officials had had ample experience. 
The lesson which twenty years had taught was that the 
Chinese were friendly and reasonable under a firm hand, 
but insolent and aggressive when met with deference and 
weakness. It was no new lesson, but simply the teach- 
ing of all human experience since history began. 

It might have been expected that there would be no 
repetition, on the new stage of Peking, of the mistaken 
policy which had been followed for so many years, with 
such unhappy results, at Canton : that the ministers 
who filled the new posts would never forego the advan- 
tage which they had derived from following in the suite 
of an irresistible military force. The plain fact is, how- 
ever, that they actually did these very things, and in 
establishing themselves in the Chinese capital they 
ignored not only the results of all the experience gained 
at Canton and the other open ports, and of their own 
personal experience in the negotiations at which they 
had assisted, but also that knowledge of the laws of 
human action which every man of the world possesses. 
They assumed, and acted as if they believed, that a 
miracle had suddenly reversed the Chinese character, 
turning negative to positive, and positive to negative ; 
and to this initial error may be traced thirty-eight years 
of a policy of hallucination, which has been one of the 
efficient factors in bringing the Chinese Empire near 



176 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

disruption and British interests there into a parlous 
state. It is not always easy to isolate the acts of 
British diplomacy from that of the other Powers ; but 
it is fair to hold British policy responsible, because 
Britain possessed and maintained the lead until some 
thirty-four years ago. Beyond doubt the false move 
made, the false direction taken at the beginning, was 
chiefly due to the British line of action at Peking. 

Whether it was a kind of remorse for the act of 
vandalism committed in the destruction of the Chinese 
art treasures in the Summer Palace, or a peculiar and 
misdirected sentiment on the part of individuals, the 
attitude of the British Minister in Peking was more that 
of the representative of a defeated Power than of a 
victorious one. For a long time Peking was treated by 
him as a sacred place which would be profaned by the 
intrusion of travellers or visitors, and severe regulations 
were promulgated for the restraint, under penalty, of 
inquisitive British subjects. The motive, of course, was 
unimpeachable, but the idea of obliterating the memory 
of the burning and pillage of the Summer Palace, the 
whole justification and utility of which depended on the 
memory of it being kept fresh, by punishing an inoffen- 
sive tourist for looking at the ruins, was not very 
practical. Nor were the obsequious efforts to conciliate 
the Chinese, of which this was but a type, calculated to 
have any other effect than to inflate them with an 
already too confident conceit, and to render all rational 
business with them impracticable. This is the result 
which was naturally to be expected, and it is precisely 
what happened, the circle of evil consequences having 
gone on widening during all the subsequent years. The 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 177 

metropolitan ministers never, indeed, resorted to the 
offensive language to which the provincials had become 
addicted, but the evasiveness of the Foreign Board has, 
if possible, exceeded that of the provincial yamens, 
while their superior manner of intimating a nonpossumus 
has been no less exasperating. The urbanity of the 
Peking Yamen, indeed, was carried to almost comical 
excess at times, as when sitting placidly and listening 
to the objurgations of a foreign minister driven to 
despair by their impassiveness, they would help him out 
with the opprobrious expressions which came with 
difficulty to his tongue. It is not desirable to concen- 
trate on any one name the blame which should be 
shared by many, but as the first accredited minister to 
China after the war of 1856-60 was one whose prestige 
was quite exceptional, he had a free hand to shape his 
course in Peking without the guidance of the Home 
Government. It is Sir Frederick Bruce, therefore, who 
is mainly responsible for the truckling policy, and he 
was the first to feel and deplore its disastrous results. 
No doubt a minister, placed as he was, and as any 
minister to China is to-day, is largely dependent on his 
secretaries and sinologues, just as the Home Govern- 
ment is dependent on him ; but if he is to elude 
responsibility by sheltering himself behind a sub- 
ordinate, it were better to make the secretary minister, 
so that the public might have the satisfaction of know- 
ing who is responsible for its affairs. 

The lesson of our many years' experience was as 
clear as the day. It was simply that the Chinese 
Government should be compelled to fulfil its engage- 
ments, not only in the interest of foreigners but in its 

12 



178 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

own. This policy had never failed of success in the 
hands of British consuls of the stamp of Alcock, Parkes, 
Medhurst, Alabaster, and one or two others. The 
yielding policy had always failed, both in the object 
aimed at and in retaining the friendship of the Chinese 
officials to whom we yielded. No more favourable 
conditions could be conceived for impressing and in- 
fluencing the Government of China than those which 
existed at the close of the campaign of i860. They 
had been routed, the Emperor had fled to Jehol, those 
who were left to carry on the government were trembling 
for their heads. They were in the condition of a horse 
that has been strapped up and thrown by a horsebreaker. 
Anything could have been done with them. This is 
testified to by Mr. H. N. Lay, who was present, and 
in a better position to know than anyone else who 
has yet chosen to utter his opinion. This is what he 
says : 

" When I left China the Emperor's Government, 
under the pressure of necessity, and with the beneficial 
terror established by the allied foray to Peking in i860 
fresh in their recollection, was in the best of moods, 
willing to be guided, thankful for counsel, grateful for 
help, and in return for that help prepared to do what 
was right by the foreigner." 

And within two years this was the state of things : 

" What did I find on my return ? The face of things 
was entirely changed. There was the old insolent 
demeanour, the nonsensical language of exclusion, the 
open mockery of all treaties. ... In short, all the 
ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered 
away, and we were thrust back into the position we 
occupied before the war — one of helpless remonstrance 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 179 

and impotent menace . . . the labour of years lost 
through egregious mismanagement. The Foreign 
Board looked upon our European representatives as 
so many wis faineants. . . . Prince Kung was no longer 
accessible ... he professed to be engaged with more 
important matters." 

We have dwelt on the opening of foreign diplomatic 
intercourse at some length because it constitutes the 
substratum of subsequent history, including all crises 
in Chinese affairs; and what follows in this chapter 
will require constant mental reference to the foregoing 
remarks, in order to make it intelligible. 

The omission to implement the Treaty of Tientsin of 

1858 by at once placing a representative in Peking, an 
omission which caused the naval disaster at Taku in 

1859 and necessitated the campaign of i860, was not 
repeated in that year. The minister himself did not 
remain during the winter, there being no suitable 
quarters for his accommodation ; but a junior official 
in the Consular Service, Mr. Atkins, was left in charge. 
The Legations were formally opened in the spring of 
1861, Sir Frederick Bruce, younger brother of the 
Lord Elgin who had negotiated both the treaties, re- 
presenting Great Britain. In the Chinese Government 
departments no provision existed for the totally unfore- 
seen contingency of receiving foreign representatives 
otherwise than as tribute-bearers ; but the necessity for 
doing so having been at last recognized by the Imperial 
Government, the board or office known as the Tsungli 
Yamen was established in January, 1861, and was 
ready to transact business on the arrival of the foreign 
ministers. It did not take rank with the Six Boards, 



180 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

and bore at first a tentative character. It has been 
aptly called a species of Cabinet, composed of members 
of certain State departments. The head of the institu- 
tion then, as until the day of his decease, was Prince 
Kung, the sixth son of the Emperor Taukwang, who 
was brother of the Emperor Hienfung — then in retire- 
ment at Jehol, where he died in October, 1861 — and 
uncle of the late " reforming " Emperor. The Prince 
was from the first a reasonable and sober man of affairs, 
courteous in manner, whose character inspired hopes 
of the regeneration of the Chinese State. But probably 
the member of the Tsungli Yamen who approached 
nearer to the ideal of a patriot, was serious and intel- 
ligent, and had almost more than an ordinary statesman's 
grasp of affairs and their possibilities, was Wensiang, 
between whom and the foreign Legations a greater 
intimacy sprung up than has ever been possible with 
any Chinese or Manchu statesman since his death, 
which occurred in 1875. 

The intercourse between this enlightened and 
patriotic man and the foreign representatives, more 
especially the British, who in this connection may be 
held to include the head of the Imperial Maritime or 
Foreign Customs, was fruitful in an exchange of views 
of a highly interesting character, both oral and written, 
which, if collected, might form the basis of a new 
political philosophy. Whoever studies the works of 
Buckle, Spencer, or other writers who endeavour to 
generalize from worldwide data, is constantly reminded 
of a great gap in their chain of reasoning, because a 
fourth of the human race is virtually excluded. Dr. 
Pearson is an exception to this, but he also fails to 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 181 

master his Chinese data. For the first time a genuine 
representative of the ethnic consciousness of China, 
with four thousand years of continuous accumulated 
history and tradition behind him and a practical pro- 
blem of extreme exigency in front of him, was brought 
into sympathetic communion with wise men from the 
West, bringing in their persons the mellow fruit of 
their two thousand years of strife and progress ; and 
the result of the contact, if given to the world, could 
not fail to be highly instructive. But this was unfor- 
tunately a mere episode, which led to nothing but 
disappointment, felt the more deeply on account of the 
high hopes which had been not unreasonably raised. 
There was no successor to Wensiang. The Tsungli 
Yamen fell into the condition of an ordinary Govern- 
ment department, with special vices of its own — an 
institution for the prevention of business. The 
numbers of its members, originally three, increased, 
and varied from seven to nine, but its fatal incapacity 
lay in the fact that it was a body without a head ; for, 
though there was always a nominal president, he 
absented himself when he chose from the daily atten- 
dance. The principle of responsibility being carried to 
such lengths in China as cannot be understood by the 
mere use of the same word in the West, the vice which 
detracts so much from efficiency among Western 
officials, the habit of evading responsibility, is so fully 
developed there that it seemed as if the new Foreign 
Board in Peking had no other reason for its existence. 
The Yamen, until forced into greater activity by the 
pressure of events resulting from the Chino-Japanese 
war, served merely as the cold water which extin- 



182 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

guished the hot irons thrust into it by the ardour of 
the foreign agents. To transact business with the 
Board was declared by Sir Harry Parkes to be a 
physical tour de force. Sir R. Alcock more minutely 
described it in the Fortnightly Review, May, 1876 : 

" It is beating the air to talk to them of treaty rights 
and obligations, the claims of justice, or the benefits 
that would accrue to them, as to us, by a more pro- 
gressive and liberal policy. The tyro in such work is 
at first charmed with the courtesy and patience shown 
in listening to what he hopes may prove convincing 
arguments. They are even met, in reply, with a cer- 
tain show of appreciative intelligence and willingness 
to be convinced or better informed. When, however, 
many such interviews and interminable correspondence 
in further elucidation have exhausted the subject, and 
the time has arrived for action or definite result, the 
disillusion quickly follows. Perhaps at a final meeting 
for the purpose of settlement, when there is nothing 
more apparently to be said on either side, his proposal 
to settle the terms of agreement is met by a request in 
the blandest accents, and with a perfectly unmoved 
countenance, to explain what it is that is wanted, as 
he is ready to hear ! — all that passed in weeks of dis- 
cussion is as though it had never been. It is simply 
ignored, and the whole argument, in which days or 
weeks have been consumed, has to be begun de novo, or 
abandoned as hopeless, What diplomacy can avail 
against such adversaries ?" 

And the modus operandi was still more minutely de- 
picted by a correspondent of the Times in 1884, cited 
in the " Life of Sir Harry Parkes," hy Stanley Lane 
Poole : 

" They commence by the delicate plaisanterie of 
offering refreshments which they know their visitor 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 183 

will not touch, and the attendants know the art of 
killing time by bringing in the repast, dish by dish, with 
infinite fuss and ceremony. The visitor sits meanwhile, 
more or less patiently, on a hard seat in a cheerless 
room, grimy with venerable dirt, the north wind moan- 
ing through the crevices. Fortunately the etiquette of 
the country permits the hat to be kept on, and necessity 
compels the visitor to wear a thick ulster with the fur- 
lined collar turned up to cover the ears, if it be winter. 
At last, when the melon-seeds and sugar-plums have 
been distributed in saucers all over the only table on 
which the foreigner would have liked to spread his 
papers, business is supposed to commence, half an hour 
having been happily consumed in arranging sweetmeats. 
' And now,' observes the visitor, * what is your answer 
about the robbery of merchandise belonging to Mr. 
Smith at Nam-kwei, and the beating of his servants for 
refusing to pay the illegal extortions of the officials ?' 
One of their rules is that no one shall speak first. So 
they take sidelong glances at each other and keep 
silence until one, bolder than the rest, opens his mouth, 
as much to the surprise as relief of his comrades, who 
watch the reckless man in the hope that he will drop 
something which may serve hereafter to put a sting into 
some surreptitious charge against him. What he does 
say is, ' Take some of these walnuts, they come from 
the prefecture of Long-way, which was celebrated for 
the excellence of its fruit !' Then follows a discussion 
on the merits of walnuts, which is, however, not nearly 
such excellent fooling as Lord Granville's discourse on 
tea-roses to the gentleman who sought an interview on 
some important question connected with China, but it 
fulfils the same purpose. When they do speak, they 
all speak at once, and, like Mr. Puff's friends, their 
unanimity is something wonderful, and their courage 
rises to heroism. What they do say, can, of course, 
be neither understood nor answered ; so much the 
better, since time has been killed, with the arrow of 



184 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

controversy still in the quiver. The Foreign Minister's 
lips begin to grow pale, and other signs of exhaustion 
warn the courageous ones that it is time to shout 
louder if haply they may stun their auditor with their 
noise." 

Obviously, then, the so-called Foreign Office of China 
was a negative quantity, having neither the faculty of 
initiation nor appreciation. Its attitude towards foreign 
ideas was that of a deaf person in regard to sounds or 
of a blind man in regard to colours. The phenomenon 
is not so very uncommon even among men of Western 
race and education, when strange subjects are for the 
first time expounded. A delusive grammatical compre- 
hension of the phraseology is constantly mistaken for a 
real intelligence of the matter, which, however often 
explained, still leaves the auditor, who lacks the neces- 
sary faculty, puzzled to know what it is all about. The 
impossibility of imparting to even highly trained and 
eagerly receptive minds in the West a conception of 
the life of the Chinese and of their cogitations on 
matters of national policy or sociology, might have 
suggested to foreign ministers possible mitigating cir- 
cumstances in judging of Chinese obstructiveness. It 
was not a simple quantity, but a mixture of mulishness, 
blankness, and dread of personal responsibility. The 
fact, however, remains that a stone wall would have 
been about as effective an instrument of policy as this 
coterie of Chinese statesmen ; and an early recogni- 
tion of the true state of the case might have saved 
much gratuitous heart-burning in the first, and more 
fatalistic callousness in the later incumbents of diplo- 
matic posts. Moreover, a more general recognition of 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 185 

the facts would have saved foreign Governments, the 
British in particular, from profound misguidance in 
their Far Eastern policy. These have all, except one, 
lived on delusions which events of the most drastic 
character have failed altogether to dispel. In the 
incompetence and impracticability of the officially 
appointed medium is to be found the reason, though 
not the excuse, for trusting to unorthodox substitute 
channels of communication which have led to no satis- 
factory results, and in the nature of things could never 
do so. 

Diplomatic intercourse in China opened under a 
cloud, which exercised a most adverse influence over 
its early, and by consequence over its whole, develop- 
ment. That was the absence of the Emperor, who had 
fled before the invading host in i860 and had not been 
induced to return to his capital when he died in the 
autumn of 1861. The Government was in commis- 
sion, and consequently weak. In one way this fact 
rendered it pliable, while in another it disposed the 
foreign representatives to a forbearance which proved 
fatal to good working relations. There was no sovereign 
to whom ministers could deliver their credentials ; hence 
the question of audience was postponed. Matters were 
not improved when the Throne became occupied by a 
child, and the Regents were two women. Neither did 
the " audience question " improve by keeping ; in fact, 
international relations were stamped with a provisional 
character during the whole time of the minority. The 
first audience granted by the Emperor Tungchih was 
in 1873 ; it was purely formal, everything being done 
on the Chinese side to minimize its importance, and 



186 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

its practical effect on business was absolutely nil. All 
the hopes of improved relations which had been based 
on it proved illusory; there was only the Tsungli Yamen, 
with the imbecility of age grafted on to the ignorance 
of youth, as at this day. 

There was another cloud which cast a depressing 
shadow on Chinese affairs, the Taiping rebellion, which 
from trivial beginnings in 1849 or 1850 had spread 
havoc over the richest and most populous provinces 
of the Empire. How near the dynasty came to be 
shaken by this movement is only a matter of specula- 
tion, but the paralysis of order in the provinces, added 
to the humiliation of the Emperor by foreigners, formed 
a combination which was anything but speculative. It 
was not only the Chinese Government that was paralyzed 
by these calamitous circumstances ; the foreign represen- 
tatives in Peking and their Governments at home found 
themselves in what may be well called an impossible 
situation. While they ought to have been pressing 
and moulding the central government into the forms 
which were calculated to ensure good relations in the 
future, they were as much concerned as the Chinese 
themselves in checking the ravages of the rebellion, 
and both directly and indirectly the French and British 
Governments assisted in the final suppression of the 
movement. The patient had first to be cured of his 
disease before being corrected in his manners, but the 
convalescence was so protracted that the opportunity 
for correction never came. 

An incident in connection with the rebellion, and 
one which brought into sudden prominence certain 
features in the new international relationship, deserves 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 187 

a passing notice. That was the commissioning of a 
steam flotilla manned by British seamen and officered 
and commanded by British naval officers, known as 
the " Lay-Osborne fleet." The ships were ordered by 
Prince Kung through Sir Robert (then Mr.) Hart, the 
locum tenens of Mr. Lay, the first Inspector- General of 
Customs, who was in England on leave from 1861 to 
1863. The immediate purpose of the fleet was the sup- 
pression of the Taiping rebellion by the capture of 
Nanking and other cities on the banks of the Great 
River. The ships arrived in command of Captain 
Sherard Osborne, R.N., but the contracts which Mr. 
Lay had made with Captain Osborne and the officers 
under the direct sanction and supervision of the British 
Government of the day were not ratified by the Chinese, 
and the force was disbanded and the ships sold, while 
Mr. Lay decided to resign the Chinese service. It is 
not necessary to enter into the merits of this abortive 
transaction, but it is interesting to note what was the 
cause of the difference between Prince Kung and Mr. 
Lay which led to the break-up of the scheme. It was 
precisely the same kind of misunderstanding which 
twenty-seven years later, with all our added experience, 
led to the resignation of Captain Lang from the Chinese 
service. Mr. Lay had acted on the belief that, as his 
authority came from Peking, he was organizing an 
Imperial fleet for China ; he refused, therefore, to have 
it placed under the orders of provincial mandarins, and 
he testified to the sincerity of his convictions by throw- 
ing up a promising career rather than sanction the 
employment of such a military weapon at the pleasure 
of local officials. Had Mr. Lay not been affected as 



188 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

others also were by the glamour of a central govern- 
ment, he would perhaps have suspected from the first 
that Prince Kung could not really intend what he said 
in the sense in which he (Mr. Lay) received the com- 
munication. It was a case of words being understood 
in different senses, not, perhaps, without a secret inten- 
tion of misleading. But Mr. Lay's misjudgment was 
venial compared with that of the British officials re- 
sponsible for the engagement of Captain Lang, whose 
services were lent, some twenty years later, by the 
British to the Chinese Government for the special pur- 
pose of organizing the Chinese fleet. He was not only 
placed under the orders of Li Hung Chang, but was 
made subordinate to the Chinese Admiral, with whom 
he had been induced to believe he was associated 
on equal terms. The whole Lay-Osborne incident was 
promptly disposed of in the summer of 1863, and ceased 
to disturb the even flow of diplomacy ; and Captain 
Lang, having found his position untenable, sent in his 
resignation. That these two separate incidents, in- 
volving such important issues connected with naval 
supremacy in the Far East, should have ended so dis- 
astrously, illustrates the strange fatality which has 
attended our dealings with China. 

It is important to observe that the sapping of Occi- 
dental influence in Peking, through the deferential 
tactics of the diplomatists there, ran for a number of 
years parallel with the remarkably clear and strong 
policy of the British Government at home. From the 
time when its assertion was rendered necessary by the 
insults at Canton in 1856 until several years after the 
final suppression of the rebellion by Gordon, our Govern- 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 189 

ment followed a course both in China and Japan which 
was at once bold and prudent, eminently conducive to 
the best interests of Great Britain and the civilized 
world, and to the peace and welfare of the Chinese 
Empire. The rebellion in China was really put down 
by Lord Palmerston, for it was in full faith of his loyal 
support that the British officers on the spot were em- 
boldened to take the decided course which led to such 
great results as the practical opening of the river 
Yangtse to the commerce of the world, the suppression 
of piracy, and all other forms of disorder, and the 
covering with myriads of white sails of that vast ex- 
panse of water which, in 1861, was as desolate as the 
Arctic Ocean. This resolute and compact policy was 
most exhilarating to all foreigners engaged in commer- 
cial pursuits or mission work in China ; not to those of 
British nationality alone, nor even to foreigners exclu- 
sively, but to all Chinese — and there are vast numbers 
of them — who came within the influence of the British 
system. It was a wholesome, manly, and inspiring 
influence, and to the men of that generation it seemed 
as permanently established as if it were part of the 
order of nature. They even ceased to be thankful for 
it, taking it all as a matter of course, like light and air 
and water. The policy, indeed, was attacked on party 
grounds, and on grounds which, narrow as they were, 
went beyond mere party controversy, by Bright and 
Cobden, who advocated our retirement from the Chinese 
ports to some peaceful island whence we could conduct 
our trade, represented by them as of a very petty nature. 
But the straightforward and business-like expositions of 
Lord Palmerston, his perfect mastery of the whole 



igo CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

question, and his lusty large-heartedness, easily swept 
away opposition, and the country settled down com- 
fortably in the feeling that, however little it understood 
of these far-distant affairs, their management was in 
competent hands. This happy state of things came to 
an end, and it is sad to have to look back upon so recent 
a period as a golden age little understood by the genera- 
tion then living. It is now easy to see how the mere 
progress of the world must in any case have brought 
about changes in the balance of power in the Far East, 
but it is also not difficult to assign a date when British 
supremacy there received its death-blow : it was on 
October 23, 1865, when Lord Palmerston expired. 
It is true he left behind him that most experienced 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, who was able to 
indite despatches which cannot even to this day be 
surpassed for literary finish and absolute correctness ot 
doctrine. But the soul had departed from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, as was seen within three short years ; 
as soon, in fact, as Lord Clarendon was confronted with 
a test ; and, with the exception of a very short interval, 
it has remained absent. 

This brings us to another singular phenomenon 
which appeared in Peking towards the end of 1867. 
The representative of the United States, Mr. Anson 
Burlingame, accepted an appointment from the Chinese 
Government as special envoy to Western countries, 
having resigned by telegraph his post as American 
Minister. He was accompanied by two Chinese 
officials, who were no doubt really the envoys, 
Mr. Burlingame being the attendant. His mission 
was to persuade the Governments of the West that 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 191 

China was not in a condition to be pressed, that if left 
entirely to her own devices she would do everything 
that was proper. In particular, he inveighed, with the 
turgid eloquence of which he was a master, against any 
coercion being resorted to for the redress of injuries in 
the provinces, " the throat policy," as he termed this pro- 
cess. He also made extensive promises on behalf of 
China, with one eye directed towards the mercantile 
and the other towards the missionary sentiment of the 
English-speaking nations. "The Shining Cross," in 
his glowing phraseology, was to be planted on every 
hill and valley throughout China. It so happened, 
however, that while Mr. Burlingame was on tour, out- 
rages on missionaries and on merchants in widely 
separated portions of China had been adequately and 
effectively redressed after a very slight display of force, 
following, but by a long interval, the vigorous action 
which had proved so salutary in Shanghai two decades 
earlier. Lord Clarendon, apparently without consulting 
his own paid and responsible agents in China, seemed 
to accept Mr. Burlingame's inspiration without a grain 
of salt, and addressed severe reprimands to certain 
consuls, who, in the opinion of all foreign residents in 
China, had rendered valuable services to humanity 
while defending the immunities of British subjects. It 
was the first public pronouncement of the death of the 
Palmerstonian tradition, and of the relapse of Great 
Britain into an effeminate, invertebrate, inconsequent 
policy, swayed by every wind from without or within, 
and opposed to the judgment of her own experienced 
representatives — the policy which has beyond doubt 
led to the decline of British prestige in Asia. The 



ig2 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

genesis of the Burlingame mission is somewhat obscure, 
its precise object scarcely less so; but its putative 
parents and actual sponsors are believed to have 
deprecated its consequences as having gone far beyond 
what was hoped or intended when it was despatched. 

The new departure of the British Government in 
1869 was received with consternation by the foreign 
communities in China. Instructions were sent out 
forbidding Her Majesty's ships to land their men 
under any circumstances, except to take the British 
residents on shipboard when they were threatened 
with danger. The dismay of the residents was tempered 
with mirth provoked by the impracticable nature of the 
new order, which was scarcely less absurd than would 
be one to embark the population of Brighton on board 
a couple of Channel steamers. The alarming feature 
in the case — for there was no officer in the British 
Navy who would have carried out the instructions — 
was the ignorance displayed by the British Govern- 
ment of the actual conditions of life in China, ignorance 
which would have been impossible in the lifetime of 
Lord Palmerston, who was never at fault in his appre- 
ciation of the common facts of the Chinese question. 
That the same inacquaintance with facts has prevailed 
till now there is reason to believe, notwithstanding a 
succession of highly-paid representatives in China, with 
an extensive and capable staff of consuls, all possessing 
a knowledge of the language. Once our Government 
entered on the course of taking its information from 
every source but the legitimate one, it necessarily 
landed itself in a perpetual fog, in which it became 
more and more dependent on such information as 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 193 

might be volunteered from extraneous and not always 
disinterested sources. 

From what has been said it may be inferred that 
diplomatic intercourse in Peking has always been of a 
hidebound character. There was never any give-and- 
take in it, because such a thing as equality of standing 
could not enter into the conception of the Chinese 
Ministers, and they could not in their hearts either 
extend fair treatment to foreigners or expect such at 
their hands. Hence the attitude of the Chinese has 
been mere resistance tempered by fear. For some 
years indeed, with a few exceptions, until the Audience 
deliberations of 1891, the diplomatic body acted to- 
gether ; and had they always done so, their will would 
have been irresistible. But their unity could never 
carry them very far : in the nature of things their in- 
terests began to differ, and their policy still more. 
Then the Chinese saw their opportunity of pitting one 
Power against the other, and of profiting, in their 
shortsighted manner, by the mutual jealousies, not 
always of the Powers themselves, but of their local 
representatives. These divisions in the aims and policy 
of the foreign Powers, which began to show themselves 
as cracks and fissures not very perceptible from a 
distance, have now widened into yawning chasms. For 
many years, too, the Chinese Ministers were naturally 
accustomed to rely, especially in their controversies 
with Great Britain, on the advice and mediation of 
their own paid servant, the Inspector -General of 
Customs, who often succeeded in blunting, if not 
breaking, the weapon levelled against his principals. 
The touchstone of all discussion has been force; and 

13 



ig 4 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

the Chinese long remained true to the character which 
the late Lord Elgin gave them, of " yielding nothing to 
reason but everything to fear." The same testimony 
has been borne by his successors in the representation 
of Great Britain in Peking. Accordingly, whenever a 
question reached the point of urgency, they would 
simply ask their referee, " Does it mean war ?" If the 
answer was Yes, they would instantly yield, and if 
No, they refused to give way. Had foreign Powers 
understood the true state of the case— and it was 
often enough explained to them by their agents— their 
diplomacy might have been greatly simplified. The 
nearest approach to a threat of war was when, failing 
to obtain redress for the murder of Margary on the 
Burmo-Chinese frontier, Sir Thomas Wade left Peking. 
He was promptly followed to Chifu by Li Hung Chang, 
and a settlement was come to. It was a settlement 
injurious to the interests of Great Britain, the state of 
affairs in Europe in 1876 operating greatly in favour of 
the Chinese negotiator, for, though the British Minister 
was supported by a naval demonstration, his antagonist 
had private information that no coercive action would 
be taken. It was purely a question of force, never- 
theless, and but for the natural reluctance of Li Hung 
Chang to return empty-handed to Peking, and the 
desire on both sides to put an end to a troublesome 
controversy, no treaty at all might have been concluded 
at Chifu. 

The unreasoning resistance of the Chinese was never, 
of course, so absolute but that some impression could 
be made upon it by foreign ministers who combined 
ability with perseverance. There have been one or two 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 195 

such personalities among the various Legations, and 
some who inspired the Chinese Government with con- 
fidence. General Vlangali, who represented Russia in 
the seventies, was more than once appealed to in after 
years, when he was in office in St. Petersburg, by Li 
Hung Chang, as man to man, and he never uttered an 
uncertain sound. Herr von Brandt, who represented 
Germany for an unusually lengthy period, gained great 
influence with the members of the Tsungli Yamen, and 
was one of the few who was able to cultivate personal 
relations with some of those highest in rank, who 
visited him privately at his residence. It has always 
been one of the obstacles in the way of a good under- 
standing that private intercourse was barred by custom 
and etiquette, and that all conversations and negotia- 
tions had to be carried on with a group, each member 
more concerned to make the approved pose before his 
own jealous colleagues than to clear up the business in 
hand. Even in returning official calls, the Chinese 
Ministers Were accustomed to hunt in couples, like 
sisters of charity collecting subscriptions ; hence it was 
an important step to get in touch with a single indi- 
vidual, a thing not unknown in the provinces, but 
virtually proscribed in the metropolis. 

It was only by, so to say, capturing a single respon- 
sible minister, and withdrawing him entirely from his 
colleagues, that anything like secrecy could be secured 
for any negotiation. Business transacted at the Tsungli 
Yamen might almost as well have been conducted in 
the market-place, and the foreign ministers who took 
the trouble were able to inform themselves accurately 
and promptly of all that passed between Chinese and 



rg6 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

foreign diplomatists. They were not all equally well 
served in this matter, mainly because they were not 
equally liberal in the use of means. 

After the Japanese war, which ceased in 1895, there 
was less and less diplomacy, and more and more force, 
applied to the Government of China. As was said by 
a Russian official, " It is not a question what China 
will grant, but what foreigners will take " — a question 
of force, and that alone. The progress of the Audience 
question is only another illustration of the same thing. 
Most reluctantly, and by the slowest steps, were the 
doors of the Imperial Palace opened to the foreign 
representatives ; points of ceremony were yielded with 
rigid parsimony, beginning with the function of 1873 ; 
suspended, during the long minority of the present 
Emperor, until 1891 ; and only after the harshest pos- 
sible treatment by the " mailed fist " of Germany were 
full honours for the first time accorded to Prince 
Henry of Prussia. The various treaties, agreements, 
and conventions of the last twenty years are dealt with 
in other parts of this book. After the Boxer rising 
and the subsequent entrance of the allied troops into 
Peking, the last shadow of a pretence that China 
occupied a different position to other Powers was 
abandoned, and the late Empress-Dowager and puppet 
Emperor gave audiences, and received foreigners far 
more freely. The former, indeed, developed a taste for 
being " interviewed." 

But, although the pliability and amiability of the 
Manchu Government filled diplomatists with joy, there 
was no real sign of what is known, in some religious 
circles, as a " change of heart." The Mackay Treaty is 



DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE 197 

an instance of this. Negotiated in 1903 by Sir James 
Mackay, it provided for a whole range of reforms, in- 
cluding the abolition of likin and the reform of the 
currency muddle. No single article was ever put into 
operation, or got beyond the provisional stage. Con- 
cessions of various kinds, some already begun, in which 
large amounts of British capital were engaged for works 
really needed in China, were, and still are, hung up 
on various pretexts — blocked by official prevarication. 
The weakest side of British diplomacy in China, and 
one for which the Chinese people have no reason to 
thank us, is the readiness to secure " concessions " and 
the unreadiness to enforce them. Such a diplomacy 
has helped to demoralize the Manchu Government, 
while at the same time enabling them, by shifts and 
evasions, to conceal part of their own weakness, and so 
prolong an enfeebled and mischievous existence. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 

Victor Cousin has said, " Tell me the geography of a 
country and I will tell you its future." For either 
theoretical or practical purposes a knowledge of the 
topography of a country is a necessity, and its practical 
value is at once apparent whenever an attempt is made 
at laying down a system of communications, either by 
road or rail, or when some serious political question is 
under examination. The physical characteristics are 
as yet but imperfectly understood, both in Europe and 
the United States, though the Jesuit surveys, the 
narratives of many recent travellers, and especially the 
masterly studies of Richthofen, have done much to 
make the Western geographer, if not the general public, 
acquainted with the subject. Yet maps of China are to 
this day to be found on which are projected systems 
of railways carried across quite impracticable ground, 
in ludicrous defiance of mountain systems and other 
obstacles. Our political geography, too, seems to be 
quite as much at fault. 

The Chinese Empire comprised till lately: China 
Proper — composed of eighteen provinces — Manchuria,* 
Mongolia, Tibet, Eastern Turkestan, and Korea. 
* A viceroyalty with three provinces since 1907. 
198 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 199 

It extended over 60 degrees of longitude, and 35 degrees 
of latitude. The total area was some 4,400,000 square 
miles, and the eighteen provinces of China Proper, 
including the islands of Hainan and Formosa, con- 
stituted about one-third of the whole Empire, contain- 
ing, however, eleven-twelfths of the total population, 
and most of the wealth of the country, the Central 
Asian dominions forming a very serious burden on the 
Chinese exchequer. Not very long ago the country as 
far north as the Yablonoi Mountains belonged to China. 
In 1858 a large slice of territory — namely, the Amur 
Province, situated between the Yablonoi Mountains 
on the north and the Amur River on the south — passed 
into Russian hands, followed, in i860, by a large and 
most valuable region, the Maritime or Coast Province. 
Since the Chino-Japanese war (1895) China has lost 
Formosa, Korea, and (practically) Manchuria, regarding 
which a good deal has to be said later. 

The enormous tracts lying outside China Proper, 
still almost terra incognita, are, excepting Manchuria, 
beyond the radius of profitable commercial intercourse 
for Britain. Tibet, if opened up, must be approached 
through India. If not done from that quarter, Tibet 
will be occupied by the Russians, crossing the Kirghis 
highlands, the necessary steps having been taken for 
the purpose. The hill districts of Kokonor, the Gobi 
Desert, and great portions of Mongolia are all unsuited 
for advantageous trade relations. These table and 
high lands are in great part hill and desert, poor and 
sparsely peopled ; where fertile, and moderately in- 
habited, they are too distant. But they have a great 
strategical importance. Manchuria is now for all 



200 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

practical purposes Russian or Japanese ; Mongolia 
and Turkestan are the Tsar's whenever he chooses to 
stretch out his hand for them. Korea will never again 
be ruled by the " Son of Heaven." 

But we are dealing with the China of to-day, and 
therefore the region which interests us is comprised by 
the eighteen provinces of China Proper. These are 
Chihli, Shansi, and Shensi on the north ; Yunnan and 
Kweichau on the south-west ; Kwangtung and Kwangsi 
in the south ; Kansu and Szechuan on the west ; Shan- 
tung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien on the east ; and 
Honan, Anhwei, Hupei, Hunan, and Kiangsi in the 
centre. China Proper, speaking roughly, is bounded 
on the east by the Yellow and China Seas, reaching 
from Korea to the Tongking Gulf; on the west by 
Kokonor and Tibet ; on the south by Tongking and 
the Shan States; and on the north by Mongolia, 
Russia, and Japan. The principal islands still remain- 
ing to China, of the hundreds which fringe the coast, 
are Chusan and Hainan. 

The area of China Proper measures about 1,500,000 
square miles, being about half the size of Europe, seven 
times that of France, and seventeen times that of Great 
Britain. Each of the eighteen provinces, therefore, is, 
on an average, almost as large as England. This once 
realized, the reader will have gone far towards under- 
standing the Chinese problem. Though not so densely 
peopled as at one time supposed, it is thickly populated. 

In China Proper itself, dismissing the more or less 
savage tracts forming a fringe to the west and north, 
there still remains a vast Empire of most varied 
character. The chief physical characteristic of China 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 201 

is that, in the region north of the Yangtse, it is 
divided (eastward and westward) into two almost equal 
sections, near the 110th degree of longitude, represent- 
ing, roughly, the level and mountainous country. South 
of the Yangtse the interior is shut off from the sea, as 
regards trade purposes, by what may be termed a 
palisade of very broken hills running generally parallel 
to the seaboard. The main features of China include 
high tablelands, broken mountainous country, rivers 
breaking through stupendous ranges, and the deltas of 
the Pei ho, the Yellow, the Yangtse, and the Si kiang 
(West) Rivers. Looking at the map, it will be seen 
that the whole country, with the exception of the Great 
Plain and the deltas, is divided into a number of com- 
partments, each of these being cased in by impounding 
hills. The gorges, by means of which the drainage is 
carried through these enclosing ranges, especially those 
on the Yangtse, form a marked and imposing feature 
in the character of the hill-country. 

A few words are necessary regarding the general 
mountain system of China. Knowing, however, that 
though " geography is good, brevity is better," one must 
be brief. The ranges that penetrate the region south 
of latitude 45 N. may be said to have their nucleus in 
the Pamir plateau, the " Roof of the World." From 
this plateau extend the Tien Shan, or Celestial Moun- 
tains, separating Mongolia from Chinese Turkestan and 
the Gobi Desert. To the south of the Tien Shan the 
Kuenlun range takes its exit, and, proceeding due east, 
separates Chinese Turkestan, the desert of Gobi and 
Kokonor from Tibet, ultimately striking the Yungling 
Mountains near 104 E. At the south-east corner of 



202 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

the Pamirs a huge range leaves the plateau, and, joining 
the Kuenlun with a cross-spur, forms the western 
border of the central Tibetan tableland; thence, making 
a great curve, it continues as a barrier round the 
southern and eastern sides of the high plateau, until 
it joins the Kuenlun about 95° E. Under the name of 
the Himalaya it separates that portion of Tibet drained 
by the Sanpo or Bramaputra from India, some of its 
peaks being 30,000 feet in height. East of Assam it is 
broken through by the Bramaputra. Continuing in an 
easterly direction, it .hrows out a huge arm southwards, 
which forms, with its plateau and mountain ranges, the 
primary base of Indo-China. This arm is cleft length- 
wise by the Salween and Mekong rivers, and partly in 
its length and in part transversely by the Yangtse and 
its branches. The Irrawaddy rises in its western arm- 
pit ; the Si kiang (West River) and the Song koi (Red 
River) in its eastern one. The main range then con- 
tinues in a noith-north-east direction, and, under the 
name of the Yungling, impinges on the Bayan Kara, 
which springs in 95 E., 35 N. from the eastern flank 
of the hill barrier that encloses the central Tibetan 
tableland. Running nearly due east, and known on 
most European maps (but only there, as Richthofen 
has shown, for "ling" is applied in China only to a 
mountain pass) as the Pehling and Tsingling ranges, it 
forms the water parting between the Yangtse and 
Yellow River systems. The mountainous belt of the 
south-eastern provinces forms the northern watershed 
of the Canton River, and is the divide between it and 
the Yangtse system. All the ranges which penetrate 
China Proper, with the exception of the mountains of 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 203 

Shantung, which jutt out south of the Gulf of Pechili, 
are connected with the western Tibetan system. The 
heights of the western China highlands vary from 
3,000 feet to 15,000 feet.* 

The chief rivers of China, from south to north, are : 
The Si kiang (or West River) and its tributaries; the 
Ta kiang (Yangtse) f and its affluents ; the Hoang ho, 
or Yellow River, called " China's sorrow "; and the 
Pei ho. The Min River in Fukien and theTsien Tang 
in Chekiang may also be mentioned, but they are of 
quite minor importance. 

Regarding the rivers of Western China draining 
southwards, such as the Salween and the Mekong or 
Cambodia, little need be said here. They are mighty 
in dimension, but quite unnavigable, and therefore do 
not come within the present discussion. Of the Chinese 
rivers the Yangtse, one of the great rivers of the 
world, is indisputably the most important, being the 
main artery, indeed the only real channel for trade, 
between Eastern and Western China. It has a 
navigable length of perhaps 1,400 miles, of which the 
600 miles between Shanghai and Hankau are now 
traversed by large sea-going and river steamers, while 
Ichang, some 360 miles beyond, is regularly reached by 

* These may be roughly given as follows : the Pamir plateau, 
15,000 feet; Tibet, 15,000 feet; Kokonor, 10,500 feet; the 
Mongolian plain, 4,000 feet ; the Shansi tableland, 3,000 feet to 
6,000 feet ; Yunnan, 5,000 feet to 7,000 feet. 

t The Yangtse kiang, usually called by the Chinese the Ta kiang 
(great river) or Kiang (river), is the " Quian " of Marco Polo. Like 
other rivers in China, it bears different names in different parts of 
its course, the name Yangtse be properly applied only to its 
lower reaches. 



204 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

light- draught vessels, and Chungking, another 450 miles 
farther on, has been proved to come within the naviga- 
tion limit. Indeed, the chief obstacles lie between 
Ichang and the Szechuan frontier, a distance of about 
one hundred miles; beyond that being plane sailing, not 
only as far as Chungking, but even to near Sui fu, 
some 200 miles farther west. Of the Yangtse some- 
thing more will be said hereafter. 

The Hoang ho, the river of Northern China, which 
has so often, and with such terrible results, shifted its 
mouth (since 600 B.C., nine times), may be said to be 
nearly unnavigable. The amount of silt brought down 
by it is encroaching on the sea at the rate of 100 feet 
annually. The basin of the Pei ho is formed by a 
number of streams, flowing mostly in independent 
channels to within a short distance of the coast, where 
they converge towards the treaty port of Tientsin. 
For purposes of navigation it is only practicable for 
light-draught boats. Surveys and travels have enabled 
us to estimate the value of the Si kiang (explored 
and mapped by the author in 1882), which traverses 
the entire provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung and 
part of Yunnan. Information regarding this water- 
way may be found elsewhere, but, briefly, the river 
can be ascended some 350 miles by light-draught 
steamers, more than half the distance from Canton to 
the navigation limit. On the upper portion junks can 
travel 250 miles to the borders of Yunnan. The 
importance of this river to China and the advisability 
of opening it effectively are self-evident. 

The peculiarities of Chinese nomenclature are re- 
markable. No river or chain of mountains has the 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 205 

same denomination throughout its length ; no town 
even keeps its primitive name from one dynasty to 
another. " There is no national term to designate 
China itself, or its inhabitants," says Reclus; "every 
one of the names in common use at different periods 
has kept its former meaning and can be replaced by 
synonyms ; not one has yet been transformed by use 
into a purely geographical appellation. It is the same 
with the names of mountains, rivers, provinces, and 
towns; these names are only epithets — descriptive, 
historical, military, or poetical — changing with each 
regime and replaced at will by other epithets." 

The population of China has long been a subject of 
controversy, and seems no nearer solution to-day than 
it ever was. In recent times the earlier assumed 
figure of about 400,000,000 (in 1906 the Imperial 
Maritime Customs estimate was 407,000,000) was 
reduced by Mr. Rockhill, American Minister at Peking 
and a Chinese sinalogue, to as low as 270,000,000, and 
the latest Chinese estimate gives 331,000,000.* On the 
other hand, however, the Chinese Imperial Customs 
gives the total population (1909) as 439,000,000. 

The amount of population at first sight seems a 
large one, but the extent of population is not exces- 
sive, and, it must be noted, its distribution is most 
remarkable. The pressure upon the eastern sea- 
board and on the great waterways, where they open 
out into valleys and deltas, is marked. Away from 
these the population diminishes rapidly. The most 
densely peopled province — namely, Shantung — has as 

* The Minchang fiu (Ministry of Interior) census, 19 10, is taken, 
but the figures are quite unreliable. 



206 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

much, it is believed, as 528 per square mile, trie average 
being 216. The most thinly populated provinces are 
those of Manchuria, Kwangsi, Kansu, and Yunnan. The 
latter, which before the Mohammedan rebellion counted 
some 16,000,000 inhabitants, has now only some 
8,500,000, although the province has had a revival of its 
former prosperity. The eastern part of Szechuan is very 
populous ; but the west, abutting on Tibet, is moun- 
tainous and poorly peopled. The density of the 
population will be found to be in some degree an index 
— but by no means an unfailing one, owing to the 
defective communications — to the agricultural capabili- 
ties of the country. No estimate of the area available for 
cultivation can be made, even approximately, at present. 

The metropolitan province of Chihli, with an area of 
about 115,000 square miles, and an estimated popu- 
lation of 32,000,000, is the most northern portion of 
the Great (delta) Plain, with the exception of the 
ranges defining its northern and western frontiers. 
On the east it is bordered by the Gulf of Pechili and 
Shantung, on the south by Shantung and Honan, on 
the west by Shansi, and on the north by Inner 
Mongolia and Liaotung. This province contains the 
present capital, Peking, and the chief northern treaty 
port, Tientsin, situated on the Pei ho. 

The province of Shansi — the original seat of the 
Chinese people — is bounded on the north by Mongolia, 
on the east by Chihli, on the south by Honan, and on 
the west by Shensi. It occupies an area of 81,000 
square miles, and contains besides its capital, Taiyuen 
fu, eight prefectural cities. The population is returned 
as being 11,000,000. The configuration of Shansi is 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 207 

noteworthy, its southern portion, including the region 
down to the Yellow River — in all an area roughly 
estimated at about 30,000 square miles — forming a 
plateau elevated several thousand feet above the 
level of the sea, the whole being one vast coal-field. 
In agricultural products the province is poor, and the 
means of transport being so inefficient is liable to 
famine. 

The province of Shensi is bounded on the north by 
the Great Wall, on the west by the province of Kansu, 
on the south by the province of Szechuan, and on the 
east by Shansi, from which it is separated by the 
Yellow River. It contains an area of some 75,000 
square miles, and its population, said to number 
upwards of 10,000,000 before the outbreak of the 
Mohammedan rebellion of 1860-1875, is said to 
be 8,800,000. Its capital, Sian, is next to Peking 
in importance, and enjoys the distinction of having 
been the capital of the Empire for a longer period than 
any other city. The Wei basin,* in Shensi, is the 

* The cause of the vitality of the Wei basin, remarks Richthofen, is 
that " Singan-fu (Sian) occupies a dominant position, such as few 
inland cities enjoy that are not built at the places of confluence of 
navigable rivers. It is situated at the confluence of those few roads 
of traffic which are the only possible connections for mediating the 
intercourse between the Wei basin and the eastern and northern 
provinces, and occupy, therefore, in some measure, the place of 
rivers." The antiquarian finds nowhere in China, says the same 
authority, such opportunity for collecting objects of interest as on 
the classical soil of the Wei basin. At a comparatively recent 
epoch of Chinese history, during the Tang dynasty, arts and 
sciences flourished at the court of Chang-ngan the present Sian fu. 
Of this celebrated line of princes Dr. Wells Williams says : 



208 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

greatest agricultural region of the north-west, and on 
this account, as well as its geographical position, has 
played a prominent part in the history of China, 
especially in its early epochs. It is well termed by 
Colonel Mark Bell the centre of gravity and resistance 
of Mid-China. Cut off from the rest of China by the 
Yellow River and its bordering mountainous region 
to the eastward, and the Tsingling shan range to the 
southward, the Taiping rebellion never was able to 
cross from the south into northern Shensi, nor did the 
Mohammedan rebellion of Kansu and Shensi ever 
spread southward. As regards products and com- 
mercial intercourse, the two districts have also been 
widely divided. The political importance of the region 
to China is evident, and railway connection with the 
eastern provinces is a necessity, for it requires no 
special insight to see that China is especially open to 
attack by the very road from Central Asia which she 
herself in the past always followed in her invasions. 

The province of Yunnan lies in the extreme south- 
west of the Empire, its southern and western borders 
forming the northern frontiers of Tongking and Burma 
respectively. On the north it is bordered by Szechuan, 
and on the east by Kweichau and Kwangsi. It is the 
third largest province of the Empire, its area measuring 
146,000 square miles, but, as already remarked, owing 
to the devastations of the Mohammedan rebellion and 
ensuing plague, its population was greatly reduced. 



" During the 287 years they held the throne, China was probably 
the most civilized country on earth, and the darkest days of the 
West formed the brightest era of the East." 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 209 

Yet its mineral wealth is greater and more varied than 
that of most of the provinces. Its capital is Yunnan, 
between which town and Burma, Tongking, Canton, 
and the Upper Yangtse a considerable trade was once 
carried on. 

The other south-west province, Kweichau, is the 
poorest of the eighteen in agricultural products, but in 
minerals it is nearly as rich as Yunnan. The popula- 
tion is given as 11,300,000, and the area some 67,000 
square miles. The means of communication, however, 
are so defective that its resources have hitherto been 
almost undeveloped. 

The province of Kwangtung lies between Kiangsi 
and Hunan on the north, Fukien on the north-east, 
Kwangsi on the west, and the ocean on the south. 
Its area is over 100,000 square miles, with a popula- 
tion estimated at over 27,700,000. The capital is 
Canton, on the Pearl River, the largest town in China 
and the one best known to Westerners, as it was long 
the only place to which foreigners were allowed access, 
and is easily visited by the itinerant traveller from 
Hong-Kong. The natural facilities of the province for 
internal navigation and an extensive coasting trade are 
considerable, its long littoral affording many harbours, 
and its waterways, radiating into the districts west and 
north, even beyond the provincial frontiers. 

The province of Kwangsi extends westwards of 
Kwangtung to the border of Tongking, and has an 
area of over 77,000 square miles and a population of 
6,500,000. Both Kwangsi and Kwangtung are fairly 
well watered by the West River and its tributaries, and 
intercourse is easy. Wuchau and Nanning, on the 

14 



210 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

main river, are the largest trading towns in the pro- 
vince. 

The province of Kansu projects like a wedge into the 
Tibetan plateau, and is second in area of the eighteen 
provinces, measuring 125,000 square miles, with a re- 
ported population of 5,000,000. Its importance politi- 
cally is considerable, commanding as it does the high- 
way between Central Asia and China Proper. 

The largest of the eighteen provinces, Szechuan 
(referred to elsewhere), is one of the richest and in parts 
most populous. It is bounded on the north by Kansu and 
Shensi, on the east by Hupei and Hunan, on the south 
by Kweichau and Yunnan, and on the west by 
Tibet and Kokonor. Its area is estimated at 218,000 
square miles, and its population at 23,000,000.* 

The province of Shantung, concerning which some- 
thing is said elsewhere, is bounded on the east by the 
Yellow Sea, on the south by Kiangsu and the Yellow 
Sea, on the west by the province of Chihli, and on the 
north by Chihli and its gulf. A population variously 
estimated, but officially numbering as many as 
29,600,000, is found within its area of 55,000 square 
miles. Possessed of enormous mineral wealth, Shan- 
tung is also a great agricultural province, as is proved 
by the revenue from the land-tax, the largest derived 
from any of the eighteen provinces. 

South of Shantung lies the province of Kiangsu, 
between the ocean on the east and Anhwei on the 
west, with Chekiang to the south. Its area comprises 
38,000 square miles, with a reported population of 

* Estimated in 1904 by Sir A. Hosie at 45,000, and by the Cus- 
toms Department in 1910 at over 78,000,000 ! 



THE GEOGRAPHIC PROBLEM 211 

17,000,000. A great portion of the province is covered 
with lakes and marshes, but it is generally very fertile. 
Amongst its many fine cities are Shanghai, Nanking 
(twice the capital*), and Suchau. Suchau is situated 
close to the Tahu Lake, whence streams and canals place 
the city in communication with various parts of the pro- 
vince, especially with Shanghai, and the road between 
the two cities is a continuous line of towns and villages. 
In 1859 Suchau was a city which for industry and 
wealth was not to be matched in China, and had then 
a population estimated at over 1,000,000. Suchau and 
Hangchau (in Chekiang) represented to the Chinese the 
terrestrial Paradise. " To be happy on earth," said 
they, "one must be born in Suchau, live in Canton, 
and die in Hangchau." 

Following the coast-line southwards, the next pro- 
vince is Chekiang, bordered by Anhwei and Kiangsi on 
the west and Fukien on the south. It is the smallest of 
the eighteen provinces, being only 36,000 square miles 
in extent, but its population is given as 17,000,000. 
Chekiang is renowned for its fertility, its forest and 
fruit-trees, its populous towns, and its salubrious 
climate. Hangchau, the capital, one of the finest towns 
in the Empire, is described by Marco Polo, who visited 
it in 1286, as " beyond dispute the noblest in the world." 

The next province bordering on the ocean is Fukien, 
with Kiangsi on the west and Kiangtung on the south. 
Formosa lies opposite Fukien, and formed part of that 
province until it passed into the hands of Japan. In 
many parts highly cultivated, the country is generally 

* From a.d. 317 to 582 Nanking was the metropolis of China, 
and once again during the Ming dynasty, from 1368 to 1403. 



212 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

densely peopled, having a population of 13,000,000 in 
an area of 46,000 square miles. Amongst its numerous 
large cities are the treaty ports of Fuchau and Amoy. 

The province of Honan, with its fertile sections of 
the Great Plain, supports a population of 25,000,000 on 
an area of 68,000 square miles. On its north lie Shansi 
and Chihli, on the east Anhwei, on the south Hupeh, 
and Shensi on the west. The northern part of Honan, 
next the Yellow River, is level, fertile, and well peopled. 
Kaifung, the capital, lying close to the southern bank 
of that river, was the metropolis from a.d. 780 to 
1129. 

The province of Anhwei is situated in the central and 
southern parts of the Great Plain, between Honan and 
Hupeh on the west, and Kiangsi and Chekiang on the 
east and north, with Kiangsi in the south. The area 
is 54,000 square miles, and its estimated population 
over 17,000,000. The country is generally similar to 
Kiangsu, but has fewer cities. 

The central provinces of Hupeh and Hunan were 
formerly one province. Hupeh is the more populous 
and fertile, but the smaller of the two, its area being 
some 71,000 square miles against 83,000 for Hunan, the 
estimated populations being 25,000,000 and 23,000,000. 
The Yangtse flows through Hupeh, carrying an im- 
mense amount of silt into the side valleys. The south- 
eastern portion of the province is considered the most 
fertile portion of China. The provincial capital, Wu- 
chang, lies on the southern side of the Yangtse, 
Hankau and Hangyang being on the opposite bank, 
and divided by its tributary, the Han. The admirable 
position of Hankau, situated as it is on the central 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 213 

portion of the Yangtse, has been dwelt on by all 
travellers in China ; the city seems destined by nature 
to become the port of eastern Central Asia. The rich 
province of Hunan, the population of which was terribly 
reduced by the Taiping rebellion, is drained by four 
rivers, the Siang and Yuan being both navigable for 
some 200 miles, except at low season, whose basins 
occupy almost the entire province. The people have a 
reputation for roughness and turbulence. 

The province of Kiangsi, south of Anhwei and 
Hupeh, is bounded by Hunan on the west, Kwang- 
tung on the south, and Fukien on the east. Its area 
is 69,000 square miles, the population reported 
14,500,000. The country is hilly and well watered, 
much of it being marshland. Its soil is generally pro- 
ductive, and the inhabitants, like those of the coast 
provinces, engage to a considerable extent in manu- 
factures. 

Of the islands belonging to China two may be briefly 
mentioned. Hainan (situated on the Gulf of Tongking) 
is about 150 miles long by 100 broad. The interior of 
the island is mountainous and well wooded. The 
inhabitants, said to be racially the same as the moun- 
taineers of Kweichau, have only partially submitted to 
the Chinese. Kiungchau fu, the prefectural town, lies 
at the mouth of the Himu River ; but the port is 
Hoihau, where the entrance is so shallow that trade 
actually centres at Pakhoi, the nearest treaty port on 
the mainland. 

Chusan is of particular interest to England, having 
been occupied several times by a British force. It was 
captured first in 1840 and again in 1842, being held till 



214 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

1846 as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty with 
China until the full payment of the indemnity had been 
made by the Chinese Government according to the pro- 
visions of the Treaty of Nanking. It was again occupied 
in the war of i860. The length of the island, which 
was incorporated with China in the seventh century, is 
twenty miles and its greatest breadth six miles. Ting- 
hai, the capital, is situated half a mile from the shore ; 
the harbour is well land-locked, the water varying from 
4 to 8 fathoms. 

Of the two chief features of Northern China — the 
mountainous region and the Great Plain — the latter is 
economically far the more important, and is the richest 
part of China. Politically it is of great consequence, 
affording an easy means of advance from the north. 
The plain extends some 700 miles from the Great Wall 
and mountain ranges north of Peking to the junction of 
the Poyang Lake with the Yangtse River. Of varying 
breadth, it has an average of 200 miles in its northern 
part (next Shantung and Shansi) ; farther south it is 
about 300 miles broad ; and next to the Yangtse basin 
it is as much as 400 miles in width, stretching from the 
seaboard inland. The northern section of the plain is 
partly a deposit of loess, being alluvial elsewhere, and 
the region of Kiangsu is low and liable to inundation, 
with frequent lakes, the whole covered with a network 
of water-courses. The population supported on this 
plain is very great, amongst the most densely populated 
sections of the whole world's surface. 

Before leaving the subject of the physical aspect, the 
loess formation peculiar to the northern provinces must 
be mentioned. Loess is a solid but friable earth of 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 215 

brownish-yellow colour, differing from loam by its 
highly porous and tubular structure. It is found in 
most of the northern provinces, disappearing gradually 
towards the lower Yangtse, though remnants are found 
in the lakes south of that river. No trace of it is found 
in Szechuan. How far it extends into Central Asia is 
as yet unknown. With the loess (called hwang-tu by the 
Chinese) are bound up the distinguishing features of 
interior China, not merely in regard to scenery, but 
agricultural products, dwellings, and means of trans- 
port. The loess spreads over high and low ground alike, 
smoothing the irregularities, and having often a thick- 
ness of as much as 1,000 feet. Its peculiar feature is its 
vertical cleavage and sudden crevices, which are narrow, 
of vast depth, and greatly ramified. No scenery 
presents smoother, gentler, and more monotonous out- 
lines than a loess basin if overlooked from some high 
point of view. Should the traced roads be left, how- 
ever, it is impassable even on foot, and the strayed 
traveller finds himself in a labyrinth of vertical walls, 
irretrievably lost. It is probably one of the most 
difficult countries in the world for either military or 
engineering purposes. In the loess region the people 
dwell mainly in caves. Agriculture in modern China is, 
in fact, confined to the alluvial plains and the loess, in 
Southern China to the alluvial plains and the terraced 
hillsides. Richthofen has given to the north and south 
the names of Loess and Non-Lo^ss China — no mere 
pedantic terms, for they accurately describe the two 
regions. It is a noteworthy fact that, excepting in the 
loess regions, the Chinese are able to cultivate only a 
certain portion of the soil, bearing a direct ratio to the 



216 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

quantity of human manure they are able to supply and 
therefore to the density of population. 

As might be expected from the varied character of 
the country, comprising wild mountainous tracts, table- 
lands, the loess and non-loess regions, and alluvial plains, 
the products vary greatly, as do the people and their 
language. From north to south and from east to west 
the races, now for the most part welded into one people, 
are distinguishable. To this day, although there is one 
language common to the Empire (with three varieties), 
spoken by perhaps two-thirds of the people, still the 
number of patois is great, and in the south the aboriginal 
tribes retain their languages. 

The ancient Chinese, who introduced civilization and 
subdued the aboriginal tribes, entered China from the 
north-west, following the course of the Hoang ho. The 
valley of the Yangtse and the whole region to the south 
continued up to the Christian era to be the abode of 
savage tribes, which were gradually — and, indeed, only 
partially — absorbed and assimilated. The aborigines, 
who were driven south as the Chinese moved forward, 
are still found on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, 
and on the mainland in Kweichau, Szechuan, Yunnan, 
Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, some millions in number. 
They are divided by the Chinese into a multitude of 
tribes, but the chief races are the Lolo, the Miao, 
the Pai (Shan), the Ikias, the Hakkas, and the 
Hoklos. The Shans are not met north - east of 
Yunnan fu, but are found at the lower levels all along 
the south Yunnan border, and from Kwangnan fu to 
the border of Kweichau they form almost the whole 
population. They must have been masters of Kwangsi 



THE GEOGRAPHIC QUESTION 217 

before the Chinese. It appears likely that the Shans 
mainly reached Kwangsi across the Yunnan plateau ; 
those in southern Kweichau, however, are undoubt- 
edly immigrants from Kwangsi, and did not cross 
Yunnan. 

The climate presents many varieties of the temperate, 
and even of the frigid and torrid zones. The northern 
provinces have winters like those of Siberia, while the 
heat of Canton is equal to that of Hindostan. Between 
these two extremes is found every variation of tempera- 
ture and climate. During the months of December, 
January, and February, the rivers debouching in the 
Gulf of Pechili are frozen, and even the Gulf itself is 
fringed with a broad border of ice. The plain-dwellers 
of China consider the highland provinces — especially 
the three south-western ones — to be extremely un- 
healthy, a reputation partly due to prejudice, which 
probably arose from these provinces being remote 
regions, whither criminals and political offenders were 
transported. The highlanders, on their part, look upon 
the plains as far from healthy. The central regions 
are, perhaps, the healthiest — not so subject to cold as 
the northern and western districts, nor so liable to 
changes as along the seaboard. 

It will be apparent, then, that some knowledge of the 
physical features of China is of importance. The chief 
points to be noted are the extent of the Great Plain, its 
fertility, its extent of population ; the richness of the 
Yangtse basin, with its far-reaching system of water- 
ways, and its value as the great artery of China ; and, 
finally, the mountainous region, Tibet, and its but- 
tresses, forming Western and South-Western China, 



218 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

which form the natural barrier, the line of defence, for 
the north-eastern frontier of India, much as Afghanistan 
does for its north-western frontier. Variety and con- 
trast are the salient features of the physical charac- 
teristics of China. 



CHAPTER X 

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 

The slumbering factors of an immense industrial 
production all exist in China, says Richthofen. The 
chief elements of an industrial country — coal and iron 
— exist to an extent unparalleled elsewhere in the 
world, while the vast supply of labour, whether 
regarded from the point of view of numbers, personal 
efficiency, or power of endurance, is unsurpassed. 
Amongst the various races of mankind the Chinese 
is the only one which in all climates, the hottest and 
the coldest, is capable of great and lasting activity. 
The Chinaman fulfils in the highest degree the ideal of 
an intelligent human machine. It is evident that in 
many important industries use will be increasingly 
made of this latent activity, and that the seat of many 
industries will be established by the Chinese them- 
selves or transplanted from abroad to Chinese soil. 
It is very doubtful whether the people themselves lack 
intuition, as is so commonly maintained, but if that be 
the case foreign capital will utilize the opportunity for 
flooding the markets of the world with the products of 
cheap Chinese labour.* 

* " It is not difficult to guess what they will do when foreign 
importations cause them serious anxiety," says M. Simon. " They 

219 



220 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

China may be divided into three zones, of which the 
temperature and products are very different. The 
northern zone comprises the country lying to the north 
of the Yellow River. The climate here is much too 
severe for tea or rice, and the land is mostly sown with 
millet and barley. The central zone (stretching from 
the Yellow River southwards to the 26th degree of 
latitude) has much milder winters than the northern, 
and rice and wheat thrive well there. It possesses, 
too, the better kinds of tea, the mulberry, the cotton- 
tree, the jujube, the orange-tree, the sugar-cane, and 
the bamboo, which has been applied by the Chinese to 
a great variety of purposes. The eastern part of this 
favoured zone is celebrated for its manufactures of 
silk and cotton ; the middle is the granary of China, 
and might feed the whole country from its enormous 
harvests of rice ; the west alone abounds in valuable 
timber, the rest of the country having been denuded of 
its forests. The southern zone, bordered by the sea, 
has much the same natural productions, though not 
generally of as good a quality, as the temperature is 
much higher. 

Numerous mineral and metalliferous deposits are 
distributed throughout all zones : coal and iron in the 
north, south, and centre; gold and silver in the 



will erect looms, mills, and steam machinery of all kinds ... if 
needful obtain European assistance, and dispense with European 
products. It is to be hoped they will stop there, because the day 
that they take a fancy to engage in Western industry will mark a 
disastrous day for Europe. Free from taxes, with cheap and 
abundant labour, it will be impossible to compete with them." 



THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 221 

provinces of the north, south, and west ; and copper, 
tin, mercury, and lead in many parts. Coal, iron, 
copper, and tin are the chief minerals. The vast 
mineral wealth of the country is still for the most part 
locked up, and cannot be developed until communica- 
tions have been more fully developed. 

The population of China, pre-eminently agricultural 
— the vast majority of its people being cultivators of 
the soil — is only dense along and close to the seaboard 
and the main waterways of the interior. Away from 
these it becomes sparser, and trade does not penetrate 
because communications have been, as noted already, 
almost entirely wanting, thus taking away all incentive 
from the people to produce beyond their immediate 
wants. It should be borne in mind, in dealing with 
China, that paucity of population is a very imperfect 
index to the potentialities of any district which is not 
in communication with the main trade arteries. 
Scantiness of population does not imply absence of 
mineral and other latent wealth, and affords a poor 
test of the character of the soil. 

The use of coal in the household and the arts has 
been carried to some perfection.* Anthracite is pow- 
dered and mixed with wet clay, earth, sawdust, or 
dung, according to the exigencies of the case, in the 
proportion of about seven to one, the balls thus made 

* Marco Polo notices its use : " It is a fact," says the Venetian, 
" that all over the country of Cathay there is a kind of black stone 
existing in beds in the mountains, which they dig out and burn 
like firewood. It is true that they have plenty of wood also, but 
they do not burn it, because those stones burn better and cost less " 
(Yule's " Marco Polo," vol. i., p. 395). 



222 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

being dried in the sun. The brick-beds (kang) are 
effective means of warming the house, and the hand 
furnaces, aided by a little charcoal, enable the poor to 
cook with these balls at a trifling expense. Owing to 
the extremely defective means of communication, how- 
ever, only those who live in close vicinity to coal-mines 
can derive benefit from them; while to others who 
live at a day's walk from the mine coal is a luxury for 
which a poor people like the Chinese could not afford 
to pay. The manner in which defective means of 
transport operates may be illustrated by an example. 
Coal, which cost in Shansi 13 cents per ton at the 
mine, not many years ago, rose to 4 taels at a 
distance of thirty miles, and to 7 taels at sixty miles. 
Thus the price increased 1 tael per ton in every 
ten miles. 

Coal is destined to play an important part in the 
future of China, and indeed in that of the whole Far 
East. The largest coal measures are found in Shansi 
and Honan, while there are coalfields of great value in 
Manchuria, Chihli, Shantung, Hupeh, and Szechuan. 
Other provinces throughout the country have deposits 
of varying value. The deplorable condition into which 
communications and transport facilities had fallen has, 
until the recent development of railways (with branches 
to the mines in certain sections of the country) by foreign 
capital and enterprise, greatly retarded the development 
of mining which is even now in its infancy in China. 
Mines have long been worked by the natives in a primi- 
tive way in Hunan province, where there are two fields — 
one in the basin of the Lei River, yielding anthracite, 
and the other next the Siang with bituminous coal. 



THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 223 

Communication with Hankau by water is thus secured. 
Lines to serve the local coal-mines have been con- 
structed here as in other provinces. 

Shansi is one of the most remarkable coal and iron 
regions in the world. At the present rate of consump- 
tion the world could be supplied with coal for thousands 
of years from Shansi alone, according to Richthofen. 
And speaking of Professor Dana's comparison of the 
proportions in various countries of coal land to the 
total area (the State of Pennsylvania being given as 
leading the world with its 43,960 square miles embra- 
cing 20,000 of coal land), the distinguished geologist 
says the province of Shansi will take the palm from 
Pennsylvania. Nor is its extent the only advantage 
possessed by the Chinese coalfield, the ease and cheap- 
ness with which coal can be extracted being a remark- 
able feature. This region, however, has laboured under 
the disadvantage of being situated at a distance from 
the coast and navigable rivers, while the coal forma- 
tion lies a few thousand feet above the adjoining plain, 
difficulties which have been partly overcome by the 
construction of the Taiyuan fu railway. 

Shansi has the greatest coalfield of China, the seams 
(from 20 feet to 36 feet in thickness) resting on a sub- 
structure of limestone, and the stratification being hori- 
zontal. The limestone bed being some 2,000 feet above 
the plain the coal crops out, and mining is carried on 
by means of adits without any difficulty. A curious 
circumstance in connection with the Shansi coalfield 
is that it is divided into two — anthracite and bituminous 
— by a mountain range of granite formation, of an 
earlier date to the limestone and coal formations. The 



224 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

Peking Syndicate retroceded its mining rights in 
Shansi to the Chinese Government four years ago, and 
is now working coal only in Honan, permission to 
work iron not having been obtained. The first coalfield 
opened in China was in the east of the Chihli province, 
at Kaiping, which is connected by rail with the seaport 
of Taku, at the mouth of the Pei ho, and with Chin- 
wang tao further north. The coal obtained there is a 
soft bituminous variety with a considerable admixture 
of dust. 

Iron ore of varying quality is found in many parts, 
the principal region as yet worked being at Ta-yeh (in 
Hupeh), and at Tsze-chau and Ping-ting (in Shansi), 
which supply nearly the whole of North China with 
the iron required for agricultural and domestic purposes. 
Iron ores, worked by the natives for local consumption, 
on a very small scale, are found in Szechuan, and also 
in Hunan, Fukien, Chekiang, and Shantung. Finally, 
iron (in conjunction with the great coal supplies found 
there) is worked in Manchuria, but this can hardly now 
be counted an asset of China. 

Regarding the basin of Taiyuan fu, Richthofen says 
that coal is abundant everywhere, and in most places 
worth little more than the cost of transportation. 
All the coal in the vicinity is of extremely good 
quality. The beds are numerous, those worked being 
generally from 3 to 5 feet thick, but in some instances 
8 and even 10 feet. Owing to their horizontal position, 
the outcroppings being exposed to view on the hillside, 
mining is extraordinarily easy. Most of the coal-seams, 
too, are overlain by hard sandstone, forming a solid 
roof in the mines, which only needs to be supported by 



THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 225 

coal-pillars, thus reducing the expense for timbering to 
a minimum. 

At another coalfield, Pingting chau, according to the 
same authority, the mines constitute a narrow and 
crooked belt, following the line along which the coal 
measures crop out. Here the coal-bearing strata 
extend to the west, south-west, and north, practically 
through almost the whole of southern Shansi. Adits, 
miles in length, could be driven within the body of the 
coal, underneath great thicknesses of superincumbent 
strata. It is probable that all, or nearly all, the 
anthracite beds here would be worth development. 
Mining, therefore, seems capable of an almost unlimited 
extension. With railroads built from the plain to 
this district, and branches carried through the body of 
these beds of anthracite (among the thickest and most 
valuable in the world), the output of the coal-beds can 
be loaded direct on railroad cars and railed to distant 
places. In northern Shensi, also rich in coal, the 
difficulties of transportation place it beyond the reach 
of any but the adjacent places. The coal formation in 
the bottom of ravines cut through the cover of loess is 
so similar to that of Shansi as, in Richthofen's opinion, 
to make it probable that the tablelands of coal extend 
over the greater portion of northern Shensi. 

The same methods witnessed by Richthofen for 
extracting the metals at Tszechau (in Shansi) were 
probably applied several thousand years ago. They 
bear the character of nearly all Chinese industry, being 
primitive and imperfect and yet producing good results. 
The trains of mules and men encountered on the road, 
laden with ironware of the most varied description, 

15 



226 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

prepare the traveller to see the metal manufactured on 
a large scale. It is surprising, on arrival at the spot, 
to see hundreds of small establishments, between which 
the labour is divided, each manufacturing a certain set 
of articles for which a reputation has been gained. It 
is evident that the success which the local manufacturers 
attain, by application of the rudest methods, must be 
due in great measure tb the superiority of the material 
they employ. They have, in fact, an abundance of 
every kind of material they require — iron ore of great 
purity (rich in metal and easily fusible), all sorts of 
clay and sand (such as are required for crucibles and 
moulds), and anthracite of a superior quality. 

In Shantung coalfields have been developed on a 
considerable scale by Germany, which are well served 
by the railways she is building into the interior. There 
are several fields of considerable but unequal value, the 
chief being those at Wei-hsien and Poshan. The 
importance of these coalfields to Germany, for the 
working of the network of railways she has in hand 
and for naval supplies, is self-evident. 

Copper is found chiefly in Kweichau and Yunnan, 
across which there is a valuable hill of copper bearing 
ore, extending into the south of Szechuan. The output 
of the mines is known to be considerable, but they are 
a Government monopoly and no information is avail- 
able. Copper is also worked near Kiukiang, on the 
Yangtse. Tin is mined in Yunnan, in the Mengtze 
district, connected since 1909 with Hanoi (the capital of 
Tongking), and also in Hainan. Antimony ore is found 
in Hunan, and quicksilver in Kweichau. Notwith- 
standing her vast mineral wealth China has as yet a 



THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 227 

small surplus of minerals for export. A few years 
ago her export of coal was only one per cent, of the 
amount imported and of iron ore less than one-sixth. 

Salt, which forms so important an item in the 
revenue, is obtained chiefly by coast evaporation and 
then from brine wells in Szechuan. The salt industry 
evidences Chinese ingenuity in a striking way. The 
sale of salt is a Government monopoly, the revenue 
raised by the central government until recently being 
about 13,000,000 tads."* The U.S. Consul-General at 
Shanghai, in 1897, gave an interesting account, 
which embodied the information collected by Baber, 
Richthofen, and other travellers. 

"The ingenuity which, 1,700 years ago, bored 
through solid rock to the depth of from 2,000 to 5,000 
feet attests scientific skill that may still interest. The 
salt wells of China are found in Szechuan, Yunnan, and 
Shansi ; but the more important are in the province of 
Szechuan, about 175 miles west of Chungking and an 
equal distance south-east of Chengtu. The salt belt is 
a triangular tract, having the Min River (from Ching- 
ting fu to its junction with the Yangtze at Sui-fu) for 
its base, and its apex near Tzeliutsing, an area of some 
1,500 miles. The number of wells in this region, 
officially reported, is 1,200, but the number is by 
some estimated as high as 5,000." 

Tea, which was once the chief item in the trade 
of China, is still an important element in the foreign 
trade, although relatively diminishing on account of 
the competition from India and Ceylon. Fifty years 
ago the United Kingdom received all its tea from China ; 

* This item, like all other sources of revenue, is largely 
increased in the Imperial Budget for the year 191 1 (see 
Appendix III.). 



228 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

now it gets little over one-twentieth. Its use in China 
is not so universal as imagined ; in the north and west 
the people use preparations in which tea forms a small 
proportion, or else drink hot water. The " brick tea " 
for the Siberian, Mongolian, and Tibetan markets — 
where it is used, not as a beverage, but as a soup — is 
principally prepared at Hankau. For the better 
qualities the Russians invariably outbid the English, 
and the finest kinds are consumed either in China or 
in Russia, where alone, it would seem, the upper 
classes are prepared to pay heavily for a fine tea. Tea 
was used as a beverage, in the earlier centuries of our 
era, in China, whence a knowledge of the plant was 
carried to Japan, where the cultivation was established 
in the thirteenth century. 

The wool industry in Mongolia and North Chihli is 
important, but the principal development of trade in 
recent years is the soya bean from Manchuria, of 
which in 1909 no less than 518,000 tons were shipped 
to Europe, of which four-fifths went to Britain, chiefly 
for soap manufacture, the residue being suitable for 
feeding cattle. 

Insect wax is exported to some extent from Szechuan, 
and the supply from that province, Yunnan, and Kwei- 
chau, is believed to be capable of great expansion. 
Unlike those of their kind in Szechuan, the wax insects 
of Shantung breed and become productive in the same 
districts. They are placed upon the trees in the spring, 
and at the close of the summer they void a peculiar 
substance which, when melted, forms wax. In the 
autumn they are taken off the trees, and are preserved 
within doors until the following spring. 



THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 229 

The history of tobacco in China is very curious, 
showing how rapidly a narcotic can spread. Some 
three hundred years ago it came from Japan (doubt- 
less introduced there by the Portuguese or Dutch) 
to Korea. Thence it was introduced into Manchuria, 
and, when the Manchu dynasty ascended the throne 
(a.d, 1664), made its way into China. Its use is now 
universal, the Manchurian tobacco being famous 
throughout China. 

Apart from the preparation of tea and other produce, 
the chief manufactures before the Western trader 
entered into competition were porcelain and silk, the 
silks and gauzes of Suchau, Nanking, and Hangchau 
being highly esteemed. Silk is still the most valuable 
export from China, although pressed hard by Japan. 
Silk weaving is still carried on with native looms, the 
greater portion of the output being used in China, but 
27 per cent, of the world's supply of raw silk still comes 
from China. Reeling of silk cocoons by machinery, 
and filatures for winding silk have come into use. The 
world-famous porcelain came from the province of 
Kiangsi, and at one time as many as 1,000,000 people 
were, according to report, employed on the works 
there, but the industry has fallen upon evil days and 
the colour and finish of earlier days are no longer to be 
found. 

Cotton-spinning and weaving mills, established by 
foreigners at Shanghai, are doing an increasing business, 
and are gradually displacing the native hand looms, 
though a large proportion of the clothing of the lower 
classes is still produced by the older methods. It was 
the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-95 which secured to 



230 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

the Japanese, and thus to other foreigners, the right 
to establish these mills at Shanghai and elsewhere for 
the manufacture of yarn for the Chinese market. 
Flour and rice mills and sugar refineries are superseding 
native methods. It appears, then, from this very rough 
survey, that China is becoming industrialized after the 
Western fashion, a fact which is bound to modify her 
relations with the other Powers. 

The production of opium, which was a considerable 
industry fourteen years ago, when the first edition of 
this book was published, is an ancient industry. As a 
medicine it has been used for nine centuries, and the 
smoking of opium mixed with tobacco was introduced 
by the Dutch in the middle of the seventeenth century. 
It was in 1800 that the importation of foreign opium 
was forbidden, and it was not till 1858 that it was 
regularized by being placed on a regular tariff footing. 
The abuses of the period during which it was contra- 
band made this necessary, but with the growth of 
Chinese feeling against the injurious use of the drug 
came a demand for the limitation of its import, particu- 
larly from India. The present arrangement is that 
India shall send no opium in future to provinces which 
have abandoned its cultivation, and there is evidence 
that the home production is decreasing, and that a firm 
stand is being made against the opium habit. 

In the development of her resources China has an 
invaluable asset in her great reserve of human labour. 
A Chinese coolie can be employed at from six to eight 
dollars (Mexican) a month, and, considering his greater 
strength and endurance, he is cheaper at these rates, 
either in or out of his own country, than the ordinary 



THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 231 

native of India. The people are sturdy and well built, 
those of North China being stronger than those of the 
South, and more civil to foreigners. The poorer 
classes live almost entirely on rice and vegetables, to 
which they sometimes add small pieces of fish and 
meat. An artisan's wages vary, according to his skill, 
from 5d. to iod. per diem. As a rule they are diligent 
workmen, being generally good carpenters, slow brick- 
layers, excellent stone-cutters, very fair navvies, indif- 
ferent blacksmiths, and bad at forge work and iron work. 
They are said not to appreciate the necessity of exact- 
ness, but to have considerable powers of imitation. 
They are considered indifferent miners, but experience 
in South Africa seems to prove that they learn rapidly. 
When working by contract, piecework being usual, 
meals are provided on the premises. They work 
generally nine hours a day, lunching about noon, and 
dining after the day's work is done, usually on rice, 
fish, and vegetables. The amount of work done by a 
Chinaman in a given time does not equal that of white 
men working under similar conditions — a fact which is 
even more true of Japanese and, indeed, of all non- 
meat-eating races. In skill and industry, however, the 
Chinaman is unrivalled. 

Of the population not engaged in agriculture, a large 
number are tradesmen or engaged in commerce. The 
extremely over-populated condition of certain sections 
of the country has had a powerful influence in moulding 
the national character. Under the conditions which 
have prevailed till lately — especially want of com- 
munications — large numbers of the inhabitants have 
been compelled to emigrate. The Chinese immigra- 



232 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

tion into Mongol territory, which commenced some 
centuries ago, was at first a purely political measure, 
the Emperor Kanghi fostering it by deporting criminals 
and building fortified cities. But the most rapid 
progress in the way of spontaneous colonization 
appears to have been made in the last two decades. 
While in Manchuria the Chinese have succeeded in 
becoming the dominant race, they gain upon the 
Mongols chiefly by pushing them back, for no inter- 
marriage takes place, and the Mongols, unlike the 
Manchus, do not assume the Chinese language and 
literature. Chinese are found abroad throughout the 
Far East as traders, labourers, farmers, and miners, 
and in places like Singapore, Bangkok, and Rangoon 
they are among the leading merchants; while in the 
United States, Australia, and Canada they would be 
much more numerous but for the anti-Asiatic immigra- 
tion policy adopted by these countries. There are 
probably at least 10,000,000 Chinese resident beyond 
the Empire. In Japan and Korea there are com- 
paratively few — a significant fact. 

The general opinion among foreigners seems to be 
that the Chinese will be unable to manufacture any 
but low-grade articles, which may enable them to com- 
pete with Japan, but that the finer qualities of goods, 
for which as the country is opened there is an increasing 
demand, will still be supplied from abroad. So far, 
as might be expected, the general use of foreign goods 
is confined chiefly to the towns and districts, either on 
the coast or near the great rivers, and this condition 
cannot change until railways penetrate those regions 
hitherto closed to foreign trade, and indeed to any but 



THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 233 

local manufactures. In their industrial enterprises the 
Chinese are averse to the employment of foreigners as 
managers or engineers, and if utilized their services are 
dispensed with as soon as possible, often before the 
native engineers have learnt how to manage the 
intricate and delicate machinery which has to be dealt 
with. In the field of commerce, again, the Chinese are 
said to be incapable of conducting the greater enter- 
prises, such as steamship services, ironworks, and so 
forth, while owing to defective management the majority 
of Chinese companies are, if not in actual financial diffi- 
culties, not doing well. Some of the more enlightened 
Chinese begin to realize that capital, machinery, and 
labour, however, alone are not sufficient to make indus- 
trial and commercial undertakings a success.* It must 
be borne in mind that Rome was not built in one day, 
and that we heard very much the same story in the 
early days of Japanese railways, steamships, and 
factories. The period of superficial training will pass, 
and China may yet astonish the industrial and com- 
mercial world. There is one serious drawback to 
progress — the absence of any code of company law, 
and no legal obligation on Chinese companies to 
furnish properly audited accounts, and the only 
security for a loan is a mortgage on the property, 
involving expert valuation, investigation of title, and 
Government sanction. 

The foreign trade of China is carried on through 
" treaty ports " — sea and river ports and some inland 
cities which by treaties have been thrown open to 

* Report by British acting Commercial Attache at Peking on 
Trade of China in 1910. 



234 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

trade. The total foreign trade in igio amounted 
to £113,605,126 (imports £62,331,472 and exports 
£51,273,654), showing an increase of over £15,000,000 
over the previous year. Of this British trade (Great 
Britain, Hong-Kong, India, British dominions) accounted 
for 52 per cent, and foreign countries for 48 per cent. 
Of the foreign share, Japan had 17 per cent. ; Europe 
(excluding Russia), 13 per cent. ; U.S.A., 7 per cent.; 
Russia, 7 per cent. ; and other countries, 4 per cent. 

Of our competitors for China's import trade Japan 
is the most serious. In 1910 for the first time imports 
from Japan were higher than those direct from the 
British Isles, though still far below the gross British 
total from all sources. Japan's share in Chinese 
imports has been rising very rapidly of late years, but 
it is satisfactory to note that, with the exception of 
textile goods and one or two other items, the increases 
are due to lines in which Great Britain does not com- 
pete with her, though they affect some of our Asiatic 
possessions. 

The Western world got many things from China, 
and many others were in use in the Chinese Empire 
before they were known to us. The mariner's compass, 
gunpowder, the use of the umbrella, belong to the first 
category, and possibly some of the following also : 
The system of Civil Service examinations, the early 
telegraph (signal towers), bull-fights, theatres, novels, 
the census, the rotation of crops, printing, incubators, 
banknotes, newspapers, and inoculation for small-pox. 

In reviewing the general economic condition of the 
Chinese Empire, we cannot fail to be struck by the 
fact that, though progress has been at a standstill for 



THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 235 

centuries, some of the products of China not only hold 
their own in the markets of the world, but are in some 
cases unrivalled. Again, though the tools used by the 
Chinese in their manufactures and arts are as a rule 
most primitive, the results are remarkable, and some- 
times beyond the reach of the European, with his 
improved methods and up-to-date machinery and 
mechanism. The mineral wealth of China, perhaps 
the greatest of any country on the world's surface, is 
as yet hardly touched, while there is a vast store of 
human energy in the people of China to develop that 
wealth. A great force at present runs to waste in the 
shape of the waterpower, at present unutilized. If the 
Chinese have been able to accomplish so much with so 
little adventitious aid, it requires no great foresight to 
be able to foretell that when the spirit of progress is 
really abroad in the land, and when modern improve- 
ments and methods are studied and adopted by the 
people, the Chinaman will occupy a leading position 
among his contemporaries in the world of commerce 
and manufacture. 



CHAPTER XI 

COMMUNICATIONS 

The first organic need of all civilized States, and pre- 
eminently so in a country so vast and so various in its 
terrestrial conditions as China, is arterial communica- 
tion. This need, now long neglected, has been fully 
recognized by its rulers in the past, who have from 
time to time made serious efforts to connect the most 
distant parts of the Empire by both land and water 
routes. But in these degenerate days little has been 
attempted to maintain, nothing has been done to im- 
prove, either by land or water, the great arterial com- 
munications, so urgent a necessity for China. 

The " Grand Canal," or Yun ho, so often spoken of 
and so highly extolled by travellers in past times, is in 
its way as great a monument of human industry as the 
Great Wall, although perhaps at first sight it may seem 
less wonderful. Not a canal in the Western sense of 
the word, it is " a series of abandoned river-beds, lakes, 
and marshes, connected one with another by cuttings 
of no importance, fed by the Wan ho in Shantung 
and by other streams and rivers along its course. A part 
of the water of the Wan ho descends towards the Hoang 

236 



COMMUNICATIONS 237 

ho and Gulf of Pechili ; the larger part runs south in 
the direction of the Yangtse."* 

It has generally the aspect of a winding river, of 
varying width. As related by Marco Polo, the Emperor 
Kublai Khan, towards the end of the thirteenth century, 
created the Yun-ho, the " River of Transports," chiefly 
by connecting river with river, lake with lake. Even 
before that epoch goods were conveyed partly by water 
and partly by land from the Yangtse to the Pei ho 
basin. The Grand Canal connects Hangchau (in 
Chekiang), with Tientsin (in Chihli), and may be said 
to extend to Tungchau, in the neighbourhood of Peking. 
After leaving Hangchau, it skirts the eastern border of 
the Great Lake, surrounding in its course the beautiful 
city of Suchau, and then runs in a north-westerly direc- 
tion through the fertile districts of Kiangsu as far as 
Chinkiang, on the Yangtse. Thence it passes through 
Kiangsu, Anhwei, Shantung, and Chihli, to Tientsin. 
In the halcyon days when the canal was in order there 
was, it is said, uninterrupted water communication from 
Peking to Canton, the waterways between the Yangtse 
and the West (Canton) Rivers being connected. Many 
other canals of a minor importance also existed in 
the past. 

For many years past, but especially since the carriage 
of tribute-rice by steamers along the coast began, repairs 
to the Grand Canal have been practically abandoned. 
Numberless instances of the manner in which the water- 
ways and the river embankments are neglected could 
be given. The repairs furnish a source of income for 
the local officials. Nothing is attempted till too late, 
* Richthofen. 



238 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

when several hundred coolies, sometimes thousands, 
are requisitioned and hurried off to undertake what 
could be done by a few men and a little application 
of mechanical skill, if taken in time. 

The higher waters of the streams and rivers are 
difficult to navigate. But the absence of cataracts, 
the cheapness of wages, and the small value of time, 
and even of life, make it possible for the Chinese to 
employ boat navigation advantageously where the diffi- 
culty, expense, and risk would make it an impossibility 
in Europe. The Chinaman drags his boat over rapids 
that in most countries would form an absolute barrier 
to navigation. He takes them across shallows only 
a couple of inches deep and flowing with great velocity 
over a pebbly or shingly bottom. The amount of freight 
carried in this manner in the face of almost superhuman 
difficulties is astounding. 

The roads in China, confined generally to the 
northern and western sections of the country, are 
proverbially the very worst in the world. Roads are 
worn, not made. The typical Western China road is a 
thing to be experienced ; it cannot be described. 

"The paving is of the usual Chinese pattern," says 
Baber, " rough boulders and blocks of stone laid some- 
what loosely together on the surface of the ground ; 
'good for ten years and bad for ten thousand,' as the 
Chinese proverb admits. On the level plains of China, 
in places where the population is sufficiently affluent to 
subscribe for occasional repairs, this system has much 
practical value. But in the Yunnan Mountains the 
roads are never repaired; so far from it, the indigent 
natives extract the most convenient blocks to stop the 
holes in their hovel walls, or to build a fence on the 






COMMUNICATIONS 239 

windward side of their poppy patches. The rain soon 
undermines the pavement, especially where it is laid on 
a steep incline; whole sections of it topple down the 
slope, leaving chasms a yard or more in depth; and 
isolated fragments balance themselves here and there, 
with the notorious purpose of breaking a leg or 
spraining an ankle." 

But they were not always so. China has had her 
roads and bridges at a time when many parts of Europe 
had none, for instance in Szechuan, Yunnan, and 
Western China generally. 

Where travelling by water is impossible, carts, mule- 
litters, and sedan-chairs are used to carry passengers, 
and coolies with poles and slings, or animals, transport 
the luggage and goods. The distances covered by the 
sedan-chair porters across these highland roads are 
remarkable, sometimes as much as thirty-five miles 
daily, even on a journey extending over a month, and 
with only a few days' halt altogether. 

" No traveller in Western China who possesses any 
sense of self-respect," says Baber, " should journey 
without a sedan-chair, not necessarily as a conveyance, 
but for the honour and glory of the thing. Unfurnished 
with this indispensable token of respectability, he is 
liable to be thrust aside on the highway, to be kept 
waiting at ferries, to be relegated to the worst inn's 
worst room, and generally to be treated with indignity 
or, what is sometimes worse, with familiarity, as a 
peddling footpad who, unable to gain a living in his 
own country, has come to subsist on China. A chair is 
far more effective than a passport." 

The transport animals — ponies, mules, oxen, and 
donkeys — are very strong and hardy, and manage to 



240 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

drag the carts along the most execrable roads, six or 
eight animals being harnessed (often as a mixed team) 
in a cart drawing about a ton. Many descriptions of 
travel in a springless Chinese cart have been attempted, 
but no pen can possibly reproduce the sensation. The 
ponies of Northern and Western China are admirable, a 
rougher edition of the Shan or Burma pony, hardier 
and more enduring. The mules are unequalled in any 
other country. The distances that ponies and mules 
will cover are surprising, and this on the very poorest 
of fodder; their endurance and patience being 
unequalled only by that of the coolies. 

From Peking four high-roads branch in various 
directions. One leads to Urga, and traverses the Great 
Wall at Kalgan ; another enters Mongolia through the 
Ku-pei-kou in the north-east, and after reaching 
Fungning proceeds with a north-westerly bearing to 
Dolonor; a third goes due east by way of Tungchau 
and Yungping fu to Shanhaikwan (the point on the 
Gulf where the Great Wall terminates), and fourthly, 
one leads in a south-westerly direction to Paoting fu 
and on to Taiyuen fu in Shansi. 

The Central Asian trade route from Sian fu, which 
turns north-west, leaving the fertile loess Wei Valley 
and traversing the once rich but now devastated and 
depopulated hills and valleys of Shensi and Kansu as 
far as the confines of the Gobi Desert, passes through a 
country of great agricultural wealth, possessed of a 
magnificent coal and probably also iron supply. It is 
a point of great importance to note that the most 
practicable line of approach for a railway from central 
Asia to central China is the present cart road via 



COMMUNICATIONS 241 

Sian, south of the Yellow River. From its favourable 
position Kaifeng-fu, the capital of Honan province, 
seems destined to be a great railway centre. 

In turning one's steps southwards, one is struck by 
the backward and decaying condition of the northern 
as compared with the central and southern provinces. 
The chief causes are : (1) The deterioration of the 
climate, due to the persistent destruction of the forests, 
and failure to take any steps to renew them. In the 
north for example, on the route from Hankau to Peking, 
mountains and hills are destitute of trees and shrubs, 
and present a most forbidding appearance. (2) The 
neglected state of the means of inter-communication. 
When the Empire was flourishing, some of the -roads 
were in a fairly good condition ; now they are almost 
impassable, and hence the congested state of certain 
districts in the north, especially Honan. 

The three great enemies of the supreme Government 
in China have been famine, provincial autonomy, and 
rebellion. Famines are caused in China by various 
calamities. Locusts and rats may devour the growing 
crop of a whole province ; deficient rainfall may prevent 
the crops (particularly on the loess) from coming to 
maturity ; unseasonable snow on the highlands or heavy 
and continuous rainfall may breach the dykes and cause 
inundation, thus bringing starvation and its accom- 
panying horrors home to millions. China, however, is 
a land of such variety and contrast that, though there 
may be famine in one or more provinces, at the same 
time there may be abundance in neighbouring ones. 
But here, as elsewhere, without communications, a 
failure of the local crops means famine, while a bumper 

16 



242 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

harvest actually depreciates the value of the produce, 
so as scarcely to repay the labour of reaping, for it 
cannot be removed. It is mainly the difficulty en- 
countered by the Government in transporting the food 
supply that, in famine times, leads to the terrible loss 
of life. To carry for long distances the enormous 
amount of grain required, over terribly defective roads 
—especially in the north, where for practical purposes 
no waterway exists — is an impossible task. 

The story of the 1878 famine illustrates what such a 
calamity means in China. In that year Shansi and 
large portions of Chihli, Shensi, Shantung, and Honan 
— that is, a population of some millions — were suffering 
at the same time from famine. In Shansi it was at its 
worst. The people were hemmed in by a belt of famine- 
stricken country which it took weeks to cross. The 
peasantry clung to their homes until their last cash was 
spent, praying each day for rain that never came, and 
vainly awaiting the Government relief. At last, penni- 
less and weakened by starvation, they started — some 
with wives and children, but generally abandoning these 
— on their march to reach the food districts. Few 
succeeded. A consular officer, despatched on a merciful 
mission, says that of the thousands who thus attempted 
to escape, only those on the outer confines of the famine 
district succeeded in doing so. The Chinese Govern- 
ment has been the subject of considerable opprobrium 
in connection with famines, but its character for apathy 
and incapacity is not altogether deserved. The history 
of Indian famines should make us reflect before we too 
severely blame the Chinese Government for its want of 
success in famine relief. Means of communication did 



COMMUNICATIONS 243 

not exist and the system and organization were faulty. 
The Government, rinding itself powerless to deal with 
the transport, was compelled to attempt relief by dis- 
tributing money. The cost of cart transport from the 
Chihli plain to Shansi was officially stated to be £12 per 
ton ! In addition to want of communications, official 
corruption, as usual, found its opportunity. Thus came 
about the strange anomaly that, while people were 
suffering from starvation, relief was sparingly given in 
money rather than in grain. When money began to 
fail, and general starvation set in, the Government 
seriously bestirred itself and imported silver as fast as it 
could, impressing into the service all available carts and 
animals. But the official rate of hire is considerably 
below the ordinary one, and there are other obvious 
reasons why Government work is unpopular in China. 
The transport owners, therefore, avoided all parts 
where " requisition " was liable to be enforced, and 
the Government scheme of transport was brought to a 
standstill. The rates were then raised to the market 
standard, but much time had been lost, and in the 
meantime thousands upon thousands died from want. 
The wolves attacked not only children but adults in 
broad daylight and in the village streets. There is no 
need to dwell further upon the horrible scene; it is 
sufficient to state that the consumption of human flesh 
became a practice. 

So long as China was absolutely cut off from the rest 
of the world, so long, even, as she was not impinged 
upon, hemmed in, or carved into, by Western Powers, 
it was quite possible for the Empire to at least hold 
together, loose as the system was throughout. Two 



244 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

disintegrating processes, however, have been at work. 
While, on the one hand, foreign nations have closed 
in upon China both by sea and by land, internal com- 
munications have been gradually falling into greater 
and greater neglect. The growing weakness of the 
Manchu Government has, for a long time past, been 
becoming more and more evident to the people and the 
officials, whose confidence had been gravely shaken, 
even before the shock of events since 1895 had com- 
pletely done so. The enfeebled control exercised over 
most of the eighteen provinces, especially those remote 
from the capital, has been largely due to Peking being 
at the extremity of the country and to the defective 
condition of the communications. " Chinese " Gordon 
laid great stress on the importance of having the capital 
central, and he was right. The influence of the Peking 
Government is exhausted long before it can reach the 
central region, and still more the southern and western 
provinces. The same cause that kills trade on its way 
inland paralyzes the authority of Peking a few hundred 
miles from the capital. Absence of communication 
means failure of control and lack of power ; causes 
which chiefly contribute to the frequent occurrence 
of rebellions. 

If communications are a necessity to the Govern- 
ment in checking famine, crushing the secret societies 
which sow the seeds of rebellion, and generally in 
effecting good government, their value for purposes 
of defence and in time of war can hardly be over- 
estimated. The importance of railways in war-time 
has been fully illustrated, notably in the Russo-Japanese 
campaign. The lesson should have been taken to heart 






COMMUNICATIONS 245 

by China. To have had the power at the beginning of 
the Chino-Japanese war of concentrating on the border, 
suddenly and without fear of interruption, a drilled 
army, however small, might have prevented things 
drifting into war ; Russia might have thought twice 
before executing the coup de main on the Liaotung 
Peninsula and Port Arthur; Manchuria and Korea 
might still be hers. 

Much remains to be accomplished by steam naviga- 
tion, though the rapid adoption of steamers along the 
coast and on the Yangtse has paved the way. Shallow 
steamers now traverse the Poyang and Tungting lakes, 
which lie next the Yangtse, and the Pei ho and Canton 
Rivers, as well as many minor streams. But railways 
are the supreme necessity. Except along the Yangtse, 
for the thousand-odd miles now covered by steamers 
and other navigable rivers, there is no single trade route 
of importance in China where a railway would not pay. 
Such lines as those from Peking and Tientsin, carried 
through the heart of China to the extreme south, along 
existing trade highways, cannot fail to be advantageous 
and remunerative. The plain -lands, with defective 
waterways where small craft only are now available, 
and even the tablelands (less peopled than the river 
valleys, yet often rich), could profitably be covered with 
railways. The enormous traffic carried on throughout 
the Empire, in the face of appalling difficulties — on 
men's backs, by caravans of mules or ponies, by the 
rudest of carts and wheelbarrows — must some day be 
undertaken by the railway. 

It is matter for regret that the Chinese apostles of 
progress should have laid such importance on the intro- 



246 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

duction of the railway for strategic purposes. In the 
interests of foreigners, and of China herself, such steps 
were less to be desired than inter-provincial trunk-lines, 
designed primarily for administration and commerce. 
In such free transit throughout the Empire, China 
would have found the wisest and safest means of 
defence. It was only by opening the Empire and 
peacefully developing its resources, thereby giving to 
all foreign nations a commercial interest in the country, 
enabling her to carry out the necessary reforms, that 
safety was to be found. 

The basis of railway construction should be the 
development of the internal or inter-provincial trade of 
China on some settled plan, the interchange of the 
varied products of a country boasting so many climates 
and soils. This would bring prosperity to the people, 
render administrative reform possible, and open " China 
for the Chinese," more than for the European mer- 
chant or manufacturer. Thus would be avoided the 
enormous waste of capital which has occurred in 
England for instance, where double the requisite 
amount has been expended owing to want of system. 
Consider the advantages to be gained. Here is a 
country of marvellous resources, with a population 
intelligent, peaceful, industrious, and well-disposed to 
migration, and yet the existing means of transport, 
whether by road or canal, are failing or disused. 

Of all the factors which are working a profound 
change in China one of the most powerful is the con- 
struction of railways within the past quarter of a century. 
With the exception of the small ' Kaiping railway built 
by Mr. Claude Kinder, the tiny Shanghai-Woosung 



COMMUN ICATIONS 247 

line, torn up after a brief existence and dumped down 
in Formosa some years later, and the line in that island 
which was allowed to fall into disuse, there was not 
until twenty-five years ago a single mile of railway in 
China. If China was dilatory in embarking on railway 
construction she has, judging from the conditions to-day, 
been trying to make up for lost time since then. In 
the year 1912 there is a mileage of railways open or 
under construction of over 8,000 miles (of which over 
5, goo miles are in operation or nearly so), while there 
are also some 3,000 miles of projected railways."* Want 
of funds, dissensions among the promoters, differences 
of opinion between the central and provincial govern- 
ments, apart from the intrinsic merits of the schemes, 
render the failure of some of these projected lines cer- 
tain. When comparison is made with Japan, the extent 
of the revolution effected in China in the matter of 
communications will be made evident. In the country 
which holds the record for magic evolution from 
feudalism to modern methods thirty years were occu- 
pied in building the first 3,000 miles. The Chinese, as 
was anticipated by all who knew the character of the 
people and the success of railways in India and other 
Oriental countries, have taken to railways with alacrity 
and travel freely not merely for business, but often 
actually for the fun of the thing. The question now is 
not " shall railways be built," but who shall build 
them ? The anti-foreign capital movement and the 
revolution have for the time being suspended railway 
construction but, order once restored, the work will be 
renewed with increased vigour. 

So far as can be ascertained, the position at present is given 
in Appendix I. 



CHAPTER XII 

CHINA AND THE POWERS 

Since the first edition of this book was published two 
fresh factors in the Far East have been added to our 
calculations — Japan and Germany. It is true that, in 
1898, the former had already shown, by her victory over 
China, that she was rapidly becoming the first of 
Oriental Powers, but it was not until the Treaty of 
Portsmouth, in 1905, that she took her place among 
world-powers, and executed a treaty with Great Britain, 
which is the first of its kind between an Oriental and an 
Occidental nation. The German Navy dates from 1898, 
but the modest Naval Bill passed through the Reichstag 
in that year was a finger-post hardly noticed by Germans 
themselves, among whom the propaganda of the Navy 
League (founded in the same year) had not yet 
spread the doctrine that their future " lies on the sea." 
The modification wrought in world- politics by the 
emergence of two new and great naval Powers, in the 
East and in the West, was moreover stimulated in a 
manner little foreseen by the adoption of a new type of 
battleship, and the consequent necessity for " scrapping" 
a large number of vessels which, under earlier condi- 
tions, would have survived to augment the naval 

248 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 249 

superiority of Great Britain. The writer on foreign 
politics of fourteen years ago was still reckoning with a 
world situation, in which Great Britain's naval 
supremacy was unassailable. Although he may perhaps 
still derive comfort from a calculation of tons and guns, 
and a meticulous comparison of dates when certain 
vessels will be completed, yet, broadly speaking, no one 
can deny that British naval supremacy is no longer 
a fixed and immutable quantity, but must be regarded 
in the light of hypotheses and contingencies which could 
not enter into the calculations of fourteen years ago. 

But, while making every allowance for the changes 
wrought by the developments referred to, there are 
certain broad lines, laid down by the writer in 1898, to 
which he is prepared to adhere. He saw then, and 
sees now, the greatest menace to China from the steady 
advance of the great Russian Empire towards her 
historic goal. After 1905 the Russian Empire passed 
through a period of internal convulsions so severe that 
it became usual to speak of her as almost a negligible 
quantity in world-politics. To-day we find her pursuing, 
by identical methods, the foreign policy which led her 
across Asia. The weakness of Persia or of China are 
her opportunities. " The policy of the Russian Govern- 
ment," said Lord Palmerston, in 1851, "has always 
been to proceed with its conquests as rapidly as the 
apathy or want of firmness of other Governments 
permitted, but to retire if it encountered determined 
opposition, and then to await the next favorable oppor- 
tunity to renew the onslaught on its intended victim." 
The collision with Japan does not disprove this. 
Russia did not realize that she had at last come up 



250 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

against a hard, instead of a soft, organism. She dis- 
believed the reports of Japan's readiness for war, and 
the latter took care not to give her time to be better 
informed. The events of 1904 checked her advance in 
one direction, but not in another. The recent announce- 
ment of the " declaration of independence " by the 
Mongolian tribes, under the protection of Russia, was 
not unexpected, for in the last twenty years she has 
been steadily spreading a net work of " diplomatic 
influence" throughout Mongolia, and the allegiance 
of the tribes to Peking was always more a matter of 
compulsion than of love. Of late years the Chinese 
Government has been stiffening up its administration of 
these outlying provinces, and, whether through Govern- 
ment encouragement or not, the Chinese colonist has 
been making his way not only to the belt of fertile land 
just beyond the Great Wall (which, indeed, is practically 
indistinguishable from the Inner provinces), but to the 
country north and east of the Gobi desert, and therefore 
contiguous to Russian territory. Indeed, the Chinese 
colonist has become a serious feature in Siberia itself, 
where the Russian agriculturist or trader is at a dis- 
advantage with a rival so skilful, thrifty, and industrious. 
The Manchurian war revealed the fact, only half 
suspected by most observers, that Russian coloniza- 
tion, even in that favoured country, had not bitten deep, 
and that the territorial advances of Russia were being 
met by the economic advances of China. These con- 
siderations, however, only serve to whet the blade of 
Russia's determination, and they are mentioned here 
chiefly because of the light they throw on the Russian 
official explanation of the Mongol attitude — China's 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 251 

aggressive policy, her people pushing the Mongols off the 
fertile land, and so forth. 

Russia will now be in a position to construct the 
Trans- Mongolian extension from the Siberian line (via 
Kiachta and Urga) to Kalgan, which lies close to the 
Chinese boundary, being only 124 miles from Peking, 
with which it is already linked by rail. That this short 
cut from the West will largely supersede the Manchurian 
railway cannot be doubted. It will also bring Russia 
within striking distance of the Chinese capital and the 
gulf of Pechili. 

The fate of Tibet is obscure. In 1898 the writer 
was inclined to take it for granted that it must fall into 
the hands which hold Mongolia and Turkestan. He 
was aware of the immense pains taken by Russia to 
become acquainted with the internal affairs and con- 
ditions of a country at that time jealously preserved 
from foreign contact. The Tibet expedition, with its 
extremely negative results, and the Conventions of 1904 
with Tibet and with China, followed by an Arrange- 
ment between Great Britain and Russia concerning 
Tibet, have to a certain extent modified this view. The 
position of Tibet, not as an independent power but as 
subject to China, was recognized and affirmed by these 
instruments. That the Tibetans do not like their 
position is well known. Whether or no they are 
strong enough to throw off the yoke is another thing. 
Certainly the Chinese administration of Tibet is in 
an unenviable position, some six weeks' journey from 
the capital of the Empire. Lord Curzon, to judge 
from a speech made in January, 191 2, regrets that the 
British Government lost in 1904 the chance of creating 



252 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

in Tibet an independent buffer state. The outbreak 
of any serious revolt against China would probably 
render some such action imperative now, but the 
difficulty and danger of such an experiment at this 
stage is certainly aggravated by the fact that we have 
now a convention with China recognizing her suzerainty 
in Tibet. It would be deplorable if, in the interests of 
our Indian frontier, we were obliged to appear as em- 
barrassing, and even betraying, the new Chinese Govern- 
ment. But if we have tied our own hands as regards 
Tibet we have also, surely, tied those of Russia. India 
and China, be it noted, have at present 3,000 miles of 
common frontier. 

An outline of French relations with China will be 
found elsewhere, in the chapter on foreign intercourse. 
Probably the most cynical thing in all history is France's 
use, in foreign relations, of the Church and religion 
which she has handled so severely at home. The 
position of a French bishop in China, where he ranks 
with the highest grade of local officials, and possesses 
extra-territorial rights, may be contrasted with that of 
a similar dignitary of the dispossessed Church at home. 
The part played by France in Southern China cannot 
be considered altogether apart from the Franco-Russian 
alliance, although the moderating power of Germany 
has altered the perspective of the British view of that 
alliance. The writer saw a good deal of the " Franco- 
Chinese Empire" at the period when it was being 
energetically pushed into public notice in France, and 
he wrote with considerable disapprobation of the 
French colonial method of administration, which 
consists chiefly in providing armies of fonctionnaires. 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 253 

But in one respect he is bound, as an honourable 
antagonist, to acknowledge a French victory. From 
the period of his earliest acquaintance with China 
he has been the advocate of the connection of that 
country, in its rich and populous province of Yunnan 
and the Upper Yangtse, with Burma by a railway. The 
project has been again and again revived, more than 
one route has been surveyed, but nothing has been 
done. Meanwhile, France (whose intentions first 
spurred the writer on to his own efforts in this cause) 
has been allowed a walk over in what he originally 
described as a "race for the Yangtse." Her line from 
Hanoi (the capital of Tongking) via Lao-kai (on the 
frontier) to Yunnan-fu, the capital of the province, is 
now complete, and surveys are made for the extension 
to the Yangtse. 

The importance of promoting intercourse between 
the two most populous countries in the world, India 
and China, so widely different in their circumstances, 
yet having so many and such vital interests in common, 
should require no argument. The idea has its founda- 
tions in the actual circumstances of the two empires. 
Essentially commercial and peaceful, both are endowed, 
though in varied degree, with the complementary re- 
sources which, united, would make them not merely a 
serious antagonist, but dominant in Southern Asia. 
Such an entente should and could have been cemented 
by inter-acquaintance and inter-communication. In 
such an understanding would have been, and might 
still be found, the best guarantee for the preservation 
of the interests of the two Empires, a sure means of 
preserving the peace of Asia. China knows that the 



254 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

policy of Britain, whatever it may have been at one 
time, is one of commercial expansion and development 
only, untainted by ulterior designs, and that while 
Britain wants Chinese trade, other nations want Chinese 
provinces ; and, as China is compelled by circumstances 
to take a new departure in the direction of industrial 
and defensive enterprise, she is still disposed to look to 
Britain as an efficient guide and a safe ally. Better 
than " disinterestedness " in international relations is 
an interest which is mutual, clearly avowed and under- 
stood, and such is the bond which should cement 
British India with China. The unique opportunity so 
long enjoyed for developing our relations with our 
Imperial neighbour, bound to us by geographical and 
other ties, has been neglected. 

It was our duty to take China into tutelage, to 
strengthen her by insisting upon reforms. Instead of 
that, Britain blindly counted on China as an ally against 
Russia : China, in fact, was to play the part of buffer — 
vide, for instance, the Tibet Convention. Our diplomacy 
has been devoted to seeking her goodwill, even at the 
cost of undue deference in the questions of Sikkim, 
Tibet, and Burma ; slights and affronts were met with 
humility, claims remained unsatisfied or were shelved ; 
" treaty rights " became the synonym for " treaty 
wrongs." At the same time, China was encouraged 
against Russia, vague promises of help were held out, 
and hopes were raised which were doomed to bring 
nothing but disappointment in their train, until British 
promises came to be regarded — so a Chinese statesman 
in my presence termed them — as merely " from the 
teeth outwards." 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 2 

In the long run Japan took up the cudgels — not to 
protect China but herself from the growing menace of 
Russian expansion, and the result of a war, which 
might have been averted by a firm Far Eastern policy 
on our part at an earlier stage, has been the downfall 
of Western prestige in the eyes of all Asia, and, not 
least, in those of the natives of India. 

Another feature of France's development is singularly 
paralleled in our own experience, and has had much to 
do with her comparative quiescence in Southern China 
to-day, as compared with twenty years ago. She, like 
ourselves, was distracted from the Far East by the 
possibilities of empire-making on a nearer continent. 
Just as pre-occupation with Equatorial Africa prevented 
our statesmen from devoting any real attention to 
China in the eighties and nineties, so France found her 
true colonizing metier in the north of Africa, where her 
special qualities of method and administrative symmetry, 
and her scientific zeal for communications, are enabling 
her to build up a great Empire. There is one feature of 
this pre-occupation of both France and Great Britain 
which needs to be brought out. In Northern and 
Equatorial Africa — indeed in almost the whole of that 
continent — we have a vast reserve for the product of raw 
material. How valuable that reserve is need not be 
emphasized here. But in China we have, as every 
authority has always insisted, the greatest market, as 
yet only partially exploited, for manufactured goods. 
If, as an industrial nation, we need a supply, free from 
the manipulations of foreign markets, of the raw 
materials of our industries, do we not equally need to 
insure, both for the teeming millions of our own 



256 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

industrial population and for those of India, a fair 
chance of disposing of those industries on equal terms 
in the markets of the Far East ? Elementary as this 
proposition may seem, it has over and over again been 
lost sight of by our statesmen, and to-day we have to 
face not only the handicapping of our goods in the 
Japanese home market, but their gradual exclusion from 
Manchuria and Korea, under a system of tariffs and 
railway rates judiciously framed to favour Japanese 
goods, without openly infringing the doctrine of the 
open door. 

" How vital is its maintenance," as Lord Curzon has 
said, " not merely for the sake of our Empire, but for 
the sustenance of our people, no arguments are needed 
to prove. It is only in the East, and especially in the 
Far East, that we may still hope to keep and to create 
open markets for British manufactures. Every port, 
every town, and every village that passes into French or 
Russian hands is an outlet lost to Manchester, Bradford, 
or Bombay."* 

If we add Japan to Russia and France we shall 
bring this statement up to date/j* but we may also 
console ourselves with the reflection that it cannot now 
be long before we are able to resume, for the waging of 

* "Problems of the Far East," p. 415, by Hon. G. N. Curzon. 

t The following table, relating to cotton piece goods, is taken 
from R. P. Porter's "The Full Recognition of Japan," 191 1. It 
tells its own tale : 



Nationality. 


1906. 

Pieces. 


1910. 
Pieces. 


British 


... 10,785,227 


6,511,126 


United States 


... 8,544,165 


1,385,819 


Japanese 


733,436 


2,389,693 


Indian 


85,003 


147,952 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 257 

our economic battles, the weapons which, as Lord 
Salisbury declared, we threw down in a vain attempt to 
convert the world to Free Trade. 

Before leaving the question of the relations of Britain, 
France, and Russia in the Far East it may be useful 
to repeat what was said in 1898 on this subject, because 
the vast improvement in the relations of the three 
Powers in Europe have not, so far, been adequately 
reflected in that Pacific arena which, as a rule, repro- 
duces the European situation. " In China," it was 
said in the first edition of this book, " England has 
been completely isolated. Her efforts to achieve some- 
thing have for years past been rendered futile by a 
systematic process of thwarting, practised as a fine art, 
by Russia and France. These two countries, and, later 
on, Germany, were securing for themselves solid ad- 
vantages." 

The United States is another fresh factor in the Far 
Eastern situation, and one which cannot be dealt with 
here in any detail. The writer has elsewhere made a 
special study of the steps which have led the American 
Republic overseas, and established her firmly as a great 
Pacific Power.* Having grown up, as it were, with her 
face to the Atlantic and her back to the Pacific, it has 
taken the United States some while to realize her 
manifest destiny, but with hostages to fortune in so 
many parts of the ocean she is no longer able to main- 
tain an attitude of aloofness. The American occupation 
of the Philippines brought many of her statesmen and 
administrators into contact with the Chinese, and the 
growing industrialization of their own country also 
* " The Mastery of the Pacific," 1902. 

17 



258 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

drove them to the search for markets. A brief account 
of the diplomatic and commercial relations of the two 
countries has already been given, and it is enough here 
to say that the United States now has not only a con- 
siderable stake in the opening of China, but a great 
moral influence on the young educated class, which 
cannot fail to be reflected in future policy. 

The whole question of British and American relations 
with China and Japan must ultimately hinge upon some 
solution of the problem of Asiatic immigration. This 
question is so important that it must be dealt with at 
some length. The writer has frequently insisted that 
any attempt to differentiate between Chinese and 
Japanese in international intercourse can only be 
temporarily successful. Legislation to exclude the one 
yellow race must ultimately extend to the other. The 
arguments advanced against one are equally applicable 
to both, and the whole question tends to resolve itself 
into the problem of White and Yellow. In order to 
appreciate this it is necessary to review briefly the 
arguments usually advanced in favour of excluding the 
Chinese (and consequently also the Japanese) from 
various countries. 

As the first move of this kind took place on the 
Pacific Coast of America (as late as 1880) it is well to 
turn to the American case first. The Western States 
welcomed Chinese labour in their early days, and it 
was a valuable assistance to them in their pioneer work. 
Without it the rapid rise to fortune of the Pacific slope 
could not have been accomplished. The beginning of 
the anti-Chinese agitation on the " sand lots " of San 
Francisco, under the auspices of a notorious and dis- 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 259 

reputable tub-thumper, is now historical. Nominally a 
" trade union " movement, it soon became political, and 
having become involved in the tangled web of party 
politics in America there was little chance that Chinese 
labour would ever again be considered dispassionately. 
The conscience of the American people demanded that 
the Chinese should be vilified to justify their exclusion, 
and accordingly a vivid picture was drawn of the moral 
obliquity of the yellow man and the degrading influence 
of his presence in a white community. Although this 
libel has been largely discounted by the independent 
testimony of the white men who know most of Chinese 
psychology yet it still survives in some quarters, and 
therefore a few words on the subject may be useful. 

The average Chinese — even the average emigrant — 
is a very fair specimen of humanity. He is usually 
educated despite the very great difficulties of his language, 
accustomed to a civilized mode of life, has certain fine 
and even lofty ideals, and is industrious and thrifty. 
Removed from the influences of the communistic society 
in which he was brought up, he is liable to lose many of 
his native virtues, but his vices (with one exception) 
are emphatically those of the community in which he 
finds himself, while his virtues are his own. The exist- 
ence of such a moral canker as Chinatown in San 
Francisco is due not so much to the wickedness of 
the Chinese as to the corruption of the white men's 
government. No people are more easily governed than 
the Chinese, but none are more capable of taking 
advantage of lax or corrupt officials. The statistics 
of crime show that the Chinese compare favourably 
with the Americans among whom they dwell, but as a 



2 6o CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

matter of fact they prefer to deal with many offences 
themselves. Crimes of violence are not usual among 
Chinese in their own country, and in Western America, 
where such crimes are deplorably frequent, there are a 
few cases of a Chinese attacking a white man or woman. 
The Chinese Minister at Washington, in a speech which 
was (to the writer's knowledge) not confuted, said, in 
reference to the murder of American missionaries in 
China, that more Chinese had been killed in the United 
States within twenty-five years than all the Americans 
ever killed in China, and that in no single case had 
punishment been meted out to the white man. 

There is, of course, a strong moral argument against 
forming yellow communities within white ones. The 
number of Chinese who are likely to bring their wives 
is small, and miscegenation is as undesirable between 
white and yellow as between white and black. This 
objection does not apply to contract labour for fixed 
periods, but labour unions, especially in America, have set 
their faces against contract labour. They resent the 
fact that the Chinese refuse to enter their unions or to 
fetter themselves by restrictions on their hours of work. 
The crux of the exclusion of the yellow races is, 
therefore, found in the intensely protectionist spirit 
of the new democracies — for a similar argument is 
employed in Australasia, Canada, and even South Africa. 
This argument is assumed to be an economic one — 
" We are ruined by Chinese cheap labour !" — but, in 
reality, it must be taken out of the confused region of 
economics into the higher one of sociology. We must 
return to this point again, but, in passing, it must be 
urged that it would be wiser to abandon the " moral " 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 261 

argument altogether. Oriental travellers who have 
seen something of our own moral atmosphere comment 
bitterly on the stigma placed on their countrymen. 
We should be wiser, as well as more just, if we looked 
at the question fairly and gave the true reason for our 
attitude. 

The history of the American attitude to Chinese 
immigration follows a sharp, upward curve after 1880. 
Restriction was followed by exclusion of "coolies," 
then by the extension of the word " coolie," then by 
regulations as to the American-born Chinese and the 
re-entry of those who revisit China. The increasingly 
strict and vexatious interpretation of the Immigration 
Acts culminated in the action taken at the time of the 
Louisiana Exhibition already referred to, and President 
Roosevelt declared that his country had " fallen far 
short of its duty " towards the people of China. The 
awakening national consciousness of China, stimulated 
by Japanese success, led to a retaliation upon American 
goods, which constituted, perhaps, the first really 
national demonstration in China. The boycott had no 
official sanction, and was even actively opposed by 
Viceroy Yuan Shih-kai, but it was consistently carried 
through, not only in China but in Hong-Kong and 
Singapore, and as American trade was growing rapidly 
it caused genuine dislocation. Cotton mills in the 
United States had to be shut down, and, although 
the boycott was abandoned, American trade, which 
expected such a large expansion after the Russo-Japanese 
war opened the door of the East, received a serious 
check. 

The question of the education of Japanese in 



262 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

Californian schools is merely another sign of the in- 
creasing tension between white and yellow. Japanese 
immigration increased from 2,230 in 1898 to nearly 
20,000 in 1903, and there was a strong suspicion that the 
men, of whom 90 per cent, come in as " farmers," ful- 
filled the immigration regulations through collusion with 
certain labour immigration agencies. It was also stated 
that the Chinese evaded the law by obtaining illegal 
naturalization. A Federal judge has calculated that, if 
all the Chinese claiming naturalization were legally 
entitled to it, every Chinese woman in the country 
twenty years ago must have had about 500 children. 
The situation reflects not only on the ingenuity of the 
Chinese but on the corruptibility of the naturalization 
officials. Despite these evasions it cannot be seriously 
urged that the actual number of Asiatics constitute a 
moral or economic danger in States which contain a 
strong white population. It is different, of course, in 
a country like British Columbia, where the white 
settlers are still only a handful. The method of exclu- 
sion adopted by Canada is a penalty of $500 for land- 
ing prohibited immigrants and a tax of $50 on each 
immigrant. The prohibition by the British Columbia 
Legislature of immigrants who could not read or write 
a European language was disallowed by the Dominion 
Government in 1909, but the strong feeling against 
Asiatic immigration still exists. 

The attitude of Japan towards this question is 
significant. By 1906 trade between Canada and Japan 
had shown such signs of increase that the Dominion 
asked to be allowed to become a party to the original 
Japanese-British commercial treaty of 1894, without 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 263 

any restriction on immigration. No sooner was this 
done than a large Japanese immigration into British 
Columbia began, and anti- Asiatic riots were the result. 
A Canadian Minister was sent to Tokio, with the result 
that Japan intimated that she would not " insist upon 
the complete enjoyment of the rights and privileges " 
to which her position, by the treaty of 1894, still 
entitled her. In short, while she had been willing in 
1895 to accept treaties with the Dominions (as with the 
United States) which involved the exclusion of Japanese 
immigrants, she refused in 1907 to do more than 
voluntarily — and as a favour — restrict immigration 
from her shores to Canada. 

In 1894, when the British Government agreed to the 
abolition of its extra-territorial rights in Japan, that 
country entered into the comity of civilized nations. 
A commercial treaty between Great Britain and Japan 
gave privileges to the traders of each, and allowed 
unrestricted rights and liberties to travellers " in any 
part of the dominions or possessions of the other." An 
amending clause, however, added that these rights 
should not be granted in India or the self-governing 
dominions unless they consented. Only Natal and 
Newfoundland acceded ; the other dominions offering 
to adopt a proviso similar to that put forward in the 
commercial treaty between the United States and 
Japan of 1895, but going beyond it in excluding not 
only labourers but artizans. These terms were practi- 
cally accepted by Japan, but when the question was 
discussed at the Colonial Conference of 1897 it was 
finally decided to refuse the treaty altogether. In the 
last commercial treaty with the United States the same 



264 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

significant change is noticeable. In 1895 the United 
States asserted the right to exclude Japanese labourers. 
That paragraph has been altogether dropped in the 
new treaty, and the question is therefore suspended, as 
it were, by a single hair, the real Damocles' sword of 
the international situation. 

It is interesting to note that out of some four 
and three-quarter millions of Chinese who have left 
their country for other continents in the last thirty 
years only four millions have returned. Making full 
allowance for a considerable death-rate, this shows a 
leakage to foreign countries of some four hundred 
thousand. The possibility of such leakage is therefore 
some excuse for the American attitude, but it is hard to 
reconcile Anglo-Saxon ideas of liberty and justice with 
the attempt made in 1892 to render unlawful residence 
by a Chinese in the United States a crime punishable 
by a year's imprisonment without trial by jury. 
Although this was disallowed, it meets the views of a 
large section of the American public, and, taken in 
conjunction with the attitude of the Western nations 
in forcing their way into China, is a striking illustration 
of the adage about orthodoxy and heterodoxy. 

The main objection raised to yellow labour on 
economic grounds is that it lowers the standard and 
undercuts white labour. All over the world the same 
phenomenon is to be observed, that the Asiatic can do 
work as well and even better than the white man, and 
because of his frugal habits can accept a lower wage. 
It is frequently asserted that it is the low standard of 
an inferior civilization which enables him to do this, 
but no one who has any real acquaintance with the 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 265 

Oriental could accept this dictum without question. 
What is the essential of a high grade of civilization ? 
Certainly not a high rate of expenditure on material 
comforts. Who that knows the Chinese and still more 
the Japanese in their homes — homes where the annual 
family budget is perhaps only a few pounds — who has 
seen the grace and dignity with which they invest their 
small possessions, the etiquette and self-control, the 
philosophy and artistry with which they are imbued, 
their attitude towards the family, the Unseen World 
and the State — who that has seen all this can be 
prepared to say that the working classes of the West, 
with their frank materialism, are a superior type of 
civilization ? We may well ask ourselves if we are not 
setting up a false standard in this as in other matters, 
but even if this standard of expenditure is adopted a 
great deal of the agitation against yellow labour will be 
found to be unjustifiable. The old story that the China- 
man sends all the gold he earns out of the country is by 
no means accurate. A proportion he will always send, 
but as he earns easily he will spend generously, and 
with all his business cunning he is neither a miser nor 
curmudgeon and will surround himself with the com- 
forts and Luxuries of the country he lives in. 

If, therefore, we intend to take our stand on the 
economic argument let us not do so with hypocritical 
pretence that it is the inferiority of the yellow man that 
makes him dangerous, but let us frankly acknowledge, 
as the Australian Premier has done, that it is the many 
superior qualities of the yellow man which make it 
necessary for us to protect ourselves against his com- 
petition. In this, as in other ways, the younger demo- 



266 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

cracies are frankly Protectionist, and the recognition of 
the principle of Protection is the only logical excuse or 
explanation for the policy of Chinese exclusion. 

The Australian measures for Asiatic exclusion are 
very stringent since they include a dictation test, fifty 
words in " any prescribed language." New Zealand 
makes the test in " any European language." It must 
be said that the test is used to exclude undesirable 
aliens of all races. In the Union of South Africa, 
although the Immigrants Restriction Act of 191 1 failed 
to pass, the measures for exclusion are of the same 
drastic character, and arrest without warrant of persons 
suspected of being prohibited immigrants is allowed. 

The Australian's point of view is one that arouses 
sympathy. His is the only continent which is genuinely 
homogeneous in race, and his effort has been to keep it 
as the heritage of a white British race. Unlike the 
Western American, he has not called in foreign or 
Asiatic help to do his pioneering or to swell his popula- 
tion, and he is prepared to sacrifice much to preserve 
the ideal of race solidarity. But, with every apprecia- 
tion of the Australian attitude, one cannot but regard 
the facts of the case with apprehension. This handful 
of white men, some four and a half millions in number, 
are undertaking a serious task in proposing to hold 
three million square miles of country in the teeth of 
four hundred millions of Asiatics who are embarked on 
that course of national development which invariably 
leads to land hunger. At present there are only 
30,000 Chinese and 3,500 Japanese in Australia, and 
the Immigration Acts make it difficult for any Asiatic 
to land. The strong point in the Australian case is 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 267 

that they have always discriminated against alien im- 
migration of all kinds, and that the Chinese has not 
to complain that people of inferior calibre, mentally or 
morally, are admitted while he is refused. As Mr. 
Deakin said, it is not a moral objection which influences 
Australia, but simply the desire to protect her sons from 
competition. This is an argument which the Chinese 
perfectly understand, and, although they may regret it, 
they are too anxious to recover their own " sovereign 
rights " to protest against the exercise of those preroga- 
tives by another country. The danger for Australia is, 
therefore, not immediate, but it is none the less an 
inevitable sequitur unless the populations of the Pacific 
can be better balanced by an enormous increase in the 
white population of Australia. 

The basis of all the acts which exclude the Chinese, 
disqualify them or the Japanese, or interfere with their 
freedom of action in foreign countries is not a Phari- 
saical regard for public morality, is not even only the 
selfishness of trades unions, nor the protectionist policy 
of young democracies. It is rooted far deeper than this 
in the mysterious barrier which lies between white and 
yellow as it does between white and black. Relations 
between races which cannot successfully blend, and 
which seem to have an instinct against miscegenation, 
can never be arranged on terms of freedom and equality. 
In the past our intercourse with the two main yellow 
races has been complicated by the foolish contempt 
with which we and they mutually regarded each other. 
Now it is becoming possible to have a better mutual 
understanding, and since the Peace of Portsmouth and 
our own alliance with Japan we have made public 



268 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

acknowledgment of the status of a yellow people in the 
comity of civilized nations. It is possible that Japan 
expected (and that China also expects) this acknowledg- 
ment to be followed by the placing of the yellow man 
on the same footing internationally as the rest of the 
civilized races. Such a hope is bound to be dis- 
appointed, and it is in the highest degree important 
that we should make this clear and place our relations 
with the East on a broad and definite footing before 
one of those unforeseen " incidents " occurs which 
outrage national sentiment and make war inevitable. 
This matter of the relations between white and yellow 
is not as complicated as that between white and black. 
We are not dealing with unreason or with undeveloped 
possibilities, but with a situation and a people with 
whom we can come to terms on a basis of mutual 
concession and advantage. They will not question — 
have never questioned — our right to protection in any 
form ; they do resent the non-fulfilment of treaties, 
the vexatious application of laws, and the violation of 
obligations of courtesy between civilized peoples. If a 
satisfactory basis of relations can be established there 
seems no reason why, without any idea of settlement, 
large numbers of Chinese should not be recruited for 
certain terms to help on the great works for which the 
world is waiting. Such temporary immigration relieves 
the congestion of the country, and by enlarging the 
ideas of the coolies helps forward the progress of China. 
The conditions of Chinese society and the peculiarities 
of Chinese character mitigate all the more obvious evils 
of such coolie emigration. " Chinese cheap labour " is 
a world asset which ought not to be allowed to run to 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 269 

waste, for, be it remembered, the value of the Chinese 
worker is not measured by his " cheapness " but by the 
excellence of his work. 

To turn again to the relations of the Powers in the 
Far East. Japan, of course, in 1898, was still the hated 
conqueror, who had inflicted humiliation on China. A 
portion of the odium which would have descended on 
her head, however, was diverted to the Powers who 
intervened, and compensated themselves so liberally for 
their generosity. Also the vast majority of Chinese 
never appreciated the fact that the Japanese had de- 
feated the Imperial troops and sunk the Imperial navy- 
No such news was officially circulated, and at that time 
unofficial channels for diffusion of news were still few 
and far between. To the official mind, and especially 
to Li Hung Chang and the late Dowager- Empress, their 
defeat, and the superior efficiency of Japan, presented 
itself in the light of a revelation, but like many revela- 
tions it was only partial. Being still convinced of the 
ineffable superiority of Chinese civilization, they con- 
cluded Japan's success to be due to the use of modern 
machinery. If killing is really an essential feature of 
relations between modern States, they said, we must 
certainly buy some up-to-date killing apparatus. 
Accordingly, they began to place large orders for guns 
and armaments, but took few measures to provide the 
man behind the gun. That Japan handled the situation 
with tact cannot be denied, for she was always ready 
with instructors, teachers, and drill-masters, but it was 
only after her defeat of Russia that China really took to 
heart the lesson of the awakening of Japan, and since 
that time the diplomatic situation between the two 



270 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

Oriental neighbours has more than once been strained 
to breaking point by their relations in Manchuria. 

It is generally assumed that Japan's particular interest 
in the present crisis has been to preserve the Manchu 
dynasty, because a republican form of government will 
introduce a dangerous free-thinking element in the Far 
East, where religion and government are closely inter- 
woven. It is undoubtedly true that the theocratic 
basis of Japanese rule may suffer from contact with 
Chinese republicanism, but as Japan was the breeding- 
ground for Anti- Manchu propaganda she cannot com- 
plain too much. It used to appear as though she did 
not mind encouraging what might prove an embarras- 
ment to the Chinese Government, but probably this is 
to do her injustice. A stable and prosperous but not 
too large and not too united China would probably suit 
best those projects of economic and territorial expansion 
which are dearest to Japan. An alliance of the Oriental 
against the Occidental races might occur if sufficient 
pressure were brought to bear from outside, or if the 
Asiatic exclusion question worked up to a climax. At 
present, however, it is some way off, for China is too 
weak to afford alliances. 

This survey of the international situation began with 
the premise that Great Britain no longer holds unques- 
tioned supremacy in the sea. It must end with a brief 
account of what was the logical outcome of that state 
of affairs — the Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 
London on Angust 12, 1905. The preamble of the 
treaty states its objects as threefold : first, the con- 
solidation and maintenance of general peace in Eastern 
Asia and India ; second, the preservation of the 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 271 

independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and 
the principle of equal opportunities for all nations in 
China; and third, the maintenance of the territorial 
rights of the high contracting parties, and defence 
of their special interests, which are further defined 
as existing in Korea and on the frontiers of India. As 
this treaty was substantially renewed in 191 1, it may be 
convenient to say here that the main difference in this 
part of the instruments of 1905 and 191 1 lies in the 
omission from the latter of any mention of Korea, 
which had passed from the stage of " special interest " 
into that of incorporation with the Japanese Empire. 
The obligations incurred by the contracting parties 
vary somewhat in the two treaties. In both of them 
unprovoked attack or aggressive action, involving either 
party in war, for defence of its territorial rights or 
special interests, makes it obligatory that the second 
party shall come to the assistance of the one attacked. 
In the 1905 treaty Great Britain undertook to come to 
the assistance of Japan in the war she was still waging 
with Russia if any other Power or Powers joined 
Russia. 

A clause in the 1911 treaty, not found in the earlier 
one, provides that, in the event of either contracting 
party concluding a treaty of arbitration with another 
Power, " nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon 
such contracting Power an obligation to go to war with 
the Power with whom such arbitration treaty is in 
force." This is an echo of the now somewhat dis- 
credited policy of arbitration treaties, advanced by 
President Taft and seconded by Sir Edward Grey. It 
was suggested that the Anglo-Japanese treaty, in the 



272 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

event of a war between the United States and Japan, 
would oblige Great Britain to fight for the latter against 
the former, even though she might have agreed to 
submit all questions between herself and the American 
Republic to arbitration. The enthusiasts for a Peace 
policy had begun to dream of arbitration agreements 
covering the globe like a net-work, and as a concession 
to them Article IV. gave either party the chance of 
contracting out of the agreement. As the American 
senate appears to oppose an impenetrable barrier to 
arbitration proposals, because they decline to waive 
their right of deciding what questions are and what are 
not " arbitrable," it does not look as if Article IV. made 
any real breach in the alliance, which certainly, as 
it stands, binds Great Britain to fight with and for 
Japan against any unprovoked attack or aggressive 
action involving her in war for the preservation of 
her territorial rights or special interests. 

The enormous advantage this treaty gave to Japan at 
the moment of its conclusion can only be realized when 
we remember that her heroic efforts had brought her to 
the end of her financial resources. But it cannot be 
denied that it also relieved British statesmen of a 
serious anxiety. The situation in Europe, and the 
rapid growth of German naval policy, made it necessary 
to rearrange the distribution of the British Navy and to 
concentrate the bulk of it in home waters. There is at 
present no prospect of any change in that distribution. 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which secures the friend- 
ship of the one naval Power whose home waters are in 
the Pacific, was a covering movement, and has served 
its object. At the same time, it cannot be forgotten 



CHINA AND THE POWERS 273 

that the British Empire lies partly in the Pacific, and 
that in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Coast of 
Canada we have hostages to fortune whose immunity 
from attack we cannot permanently assure by our 
present policy. Australia is founding a small but 
efficient navy, so constituted as to be easily combined 
with the British force ; New Zealand contributes the 
flagship of the China squadron and adheres to the policy 
of contribution. Both Australia and New Zealand have 
adopted universal military training. Canada, so far, 
places her reliance entirely in the Monroe doctrine. 
All these countries enforce strict Asiatic exclusion laws, 
and could not substantially modify them without sacri- 
ficing national ideals. The writer looks upon this 
question as one which at any time may come to the 
front, and doubts very much whether it can be post- 
poned until the Dominions are strong enough to main- 
tain their attitude unaided. The awakening and reform 
of China, and the establishment of a more modern form 
of government, are bound to stimulate the national 
pride and self-respect of Orientals. That there is no 
way out of the difficulty is not suggested, but that it can 
be secured through reliance on an Oriental ally must 
be strongly questioned. 

The result of that policy, even in securing interests 
mentioned in the preamble, is by no means satisfactory, 
though it may be argued (and has been argued by the 
present Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir E. Grey) that 
when we are not prepared to pay the piper we cannot 
expect to call the tune. The British Government, 
which came into office in 1906, was pledged to retrench- 
ment in armaments, and has had a constant struggle 

18 



274 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

ever since to justify that pledge in the light of the com- 
petition that has had to be met. In many respects 
that Government has done far better in the field 
of foreign policy than could have been expected, 
but it had certainly no mandate for any bold or 
adventurous policy. If, therefore, Great Britain has 
had to stand aside, and see her trade conventions 
slighted, her railway investments in China tied up, and 
her interests generally suffering, nothing else could have 
been expected. Manchuria, at the time of signing the 
1905 treaty, was (and still is in law) part of China, but 
Japan cannot be competed with in the markets of 
Manchuria. Korea, of course, is quite lost. Incident- 
ally, the existing treaty, while nominally securing the 
integrity of China, cannot apparently be invoked in the 
teeth of a secession (under Russian protection) by Mon- 
golia, which has just declared its independence. 

The mistake lies in the comfortable supposition that 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance secured the status quo in 
the Far East. The status quo has been altering all the 
time, and will continue to alter, and both British and 
American interests can only be secured by vigilance 
and determination. As it is fairly clear to everyone in 
the Far East that neither Great Britain nor the United 
States are in a position to back diplomacy with force, 
it cannot be a matter of surprise if that diplomacy 
sometimes lacks effectiveness. 



CHAPTER XIII 

WHITHER, CHINA? 

As this chapter goes to press China is in the throes of 
a revolution, and the immediate course of it cannot, 
with any certainty, be predicted. The ultimate outcome 
will be a remodelled China, as efficient in her way as 
the New Japan, and more wealthy — perhaps more 
powerful. But how much water must flow under the 
bridge before this goal is reached no one can say. 
There are too many unknown quantities to be reckoned 
with. 

In the chapter on the New Learning can be traced 
the very characteristic course of the Chinese renascence. 
It came through literary sources. Japan's revolution 
was aristocratic, military, from above. China's has 
come from below. The gradual spread of printed 
matter has coincided with an increased intercourse 
with the West. Chinese students have gone to Japan, 
Europe, and America, and Chinese of the literary and 
official classes have travelled and seen the world. One 
of the features of the revolution has been the support 
accorded to it by Chinese living abroad, and the rally- 
ing point for reformers of all classes has been found, 
eventually, in the Anti-Manchu propaganda. It is not 

275 



276 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

the intention of the writer to elaborate in this chapter 
arguments against the dynasty, which can be found 
throughout this book. Most of the charges brought 
against them were written over fourteen years ago, and 
have not been altered, for the faults of the Manchus in 
1912 are the faults of 1898, with the additional grievance 
that, whereas in the Empress-Dowager Tze-hsi's time 
there was at least some semblance of a policy, since her 
death the Government have been mere straws on the 
current. If the current had been purely Chinese the 
straws might have floated down stream, but as it is 
they have swirled and eddied, and finally coalesced 
into what the Chinese believe to be an insuperable 
obstacle to progress. 

The late Empress-Dowager, before her death, chose 
to adopt a pro-reform attitude. Edict after edict was 
promulgated, dealing with the principal abuses found 
in the kingdom. Some of these were chiefly intended 
to impress foreign nations, others were concessions to 
pressure from below. The promise of constitutional 
government in 1906 and the despatch of an Imperial 
mission to study foreign forms of government were 
probably regarded by the court as an excellent way 
of staving off a difficulty, but the edict of 1907, 
which declared that China must, " after careful investiga- 
tion, proceed to imitate the constitutional type of 
government," was followed by surprisingly rapid results. 
Yuan Shih-kai, in the autumn of that year, introduced 
a new scheme of municipal popular government in 
Tientsin. 

The council was elected by delegates, themselves 
chosen by popular ballot. The council is not paid, and 






WHITHER, CHINA? 277 

its decrees are carried out by an executive board of 
salaried officials chosen by ballot from the councillors. 
This microcosm of a parliament met first, after much 
preliminary educative work, on August 18, 1908, and 
had the honour of being the first representative assembly 
in China. By the edict of 1906 the provincial officials 
had been directed to prepare the ground for local 
representative assemblies, and in the summer of 1908 
edicts were issued convoking these parliaments within 
a year, and fixing their functions, which were to be 
purely advisory. At the same time (August, 1908) 
constitutional government for the whole country was 
promised in nine years ; this was reaffirmed in the 
following December, after the death of the Empress- 
Dowager and the Emperor Kwang-su, and the acces- 
sion of the new infant sovereign. It was not till the 
autumn of the following year (October, 1909) that the 
provincial assemblies first met, and they conducted 
themselves with a decorum and, on the whole, a 
harmony which surprised some observers. It was 
noticed from the first, however, that they were inclined 
to assume powers beyond the very limited advisory 
ones permitted by the edict of the previous year. The 
demand for a national parliament grew apace, and the 
next year (October, 1910) saw the second meeting of 
the provincial assemblies and the first of the embryo 
national parliament at Peking. The latter was com- 
posed of 262 members : 98 nominated by the Emperor 
(comprising members of the Imperial family, Mongol 
princes, Chinese and Manchu nobles, Imperial clans- 
men, representatives of various boards, scholars, and 
landowners), 98 representatives of provincial assemblies, 



278 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

and the remainder deputies appointed by the grand 
council and boards. In the year 19 10 three largely- 
signed petitions were presented to the Government in 
favour of the immediate grant of a constitution, and the 
last was sent up by the provincial assemblies, and was 
actually supported by the senate of the national parlia- 
ment. Moreover, when in Kwangsi the provincial 
assembly had a difference with the Governor, the 
senate supported the assembly. One of the more 
important measures of the national parliament was 
the appointment of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs 
for each province — a decentralization of power, since 
hitherto all foreign relations had to be referred to 
Peking. 

But, although on the surface, the advance towards 
representative government appears to have been both 
orderly and rapid, the Chinese reformers were not 
satisfied. The changes which were made in deference 
to the pressure of public opinion did not go to the root 
of abuses which lie, very largely, in the Manchu system 
of nepotism. The Dowager- Empress Tze-hsi, not 
long before her death, issued an edict abolishing the 
special privileges of the Manchus, and recommending 
mixed marriages, thus endeavouring to mitigate the 
offensiveness, to Chinese eyes, of the presence of a 
ruling caste. But under the regime of her successors 
the reactionary Manchu nobles regained power, and 
the position of the Imperial clansmen and bannermen, 
as " eaters-up " of the people, holding a large number 
of administrative posts and enjoying a living which 
neither they nor their fathers had earned, was not to be 
altered by a stroke of the pen. Changes made in the 



WHITHER, CHINA? 279 

forms of government at Peking were illusory — a square 
table instead of a round one and the same reactionary 
gang dominating the counsels. Moreover, in the palace 
itself (although the writer believes some of the stories 
as to this to be exaggerated) the old evil Manchu 
custom of eunuch domination, and consequent intrigue 
and corruption, ran riot. Administrative reform is 
impossible when the stream is poisoned at its source, 
and true parliamentary government was believed by 
the Chinese to be impossible with a Manchu camarilla 
always at hand. 

We come, therefore, to the revolution of 191 1, and 
the sudden emergence from obscurity of Dr. Sun Yat 
Sen as the leader of a republican party. Born in 
Honolulu in 1862, Sun was educated as a Christian at 
a mission school, and later on was a medical student at 
Dr. Kerr's Hospital at Tientsin, whence he went to join 
the staff of the Alice Memorial Hospital in Hong-Kong. 
His first attempt at private practice was in Macao, but 
owing to the customary prohibition of any practitioner 
not possessing the Portuguese diploma, he had to move 
to Canton, where he became involved in the reform 
plots of 1895. The Canton plot was betrayed, many 
reformers were captured and executed, and Dr. Sun 
escaped with a price on his head. He was a political 
fugitive from that time till January, 1912, when, in 
answer to a cable from the reform leaders in Shanghai 
he landed there, and was shortly after proclaimed the 
Provisional President of the new Chinese Republic. 
In the six years of his wanderings he has never ceased 
the work of propaganda, and at the same time has 
visited and studied many countries. His adventure 



28o CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

in 1896, when he was kidnapped and kept prisoner in 
the Chinese Legation in London, is too well known for 
repetition. Had he not succeeded in communicating 
with a friend outside, he would doubtless have been 
deported to China, and would have paid forfeit with 
his life. On Europeans with whom he comes in contact 
Dr. Sun makes a most favourable impression, being 
obviously a man of genuine enthusiasm and single 
mind. While other Chinese reformers, even Kang 
Yu-Wei, have fallen into disrepute with their country- 
men, Dr. Sun, who has handled very large sums of money 
for his compatriots, has remained poor, and is of the 
utmost simplicity in his habits. 

Just before he sailed for China the writer had two 
long and intimate conversations with Dr. Sun, and was 
empowered by him to state authoritatively the plan of 
action which the reform party intended to put into 
action should it gain ascendancy. The first and un- 
shakable resolve is that the Manchu dynasty must go. 
Next, they designed to set up a provisional government, 
with Dr. Sun as its president. There will be three 
periods. First, a period of martial law, during which 
administrative abuses will be abolished. The second 
period will be " conventional " — that is, carried on by 
means of conventions between the military and local 
elected bodies. Three years later it is hoped that the 
country will be ready for a federal constitution, when the 
president will abdicate, and a new national assembly, 
with two chambers, will be elected and will promul- 
gate an organic law. Dr. Sun does not wish the Chinese 
Republic to follow closely any existing model, and pro- 
poses to retain two features already familiar to China — 



WHITHER, CHINA? 281 

the board of censors, who form an inspectorate and 
have the power of impeaching for dereliction of duty 
any offending official, and the method of selection for 
administrative posts through a literary competitive 
examination. 

So far the progress made by the republican party in 
China does not promise a smooth path to success, and 
yet the first and most vital feature in their programme 
seems to be nearly assured. At the time of writing 
the Imperial family still hovers on the edge of abdica- 
tion, but there seems to be little doubt that they must 
accept the terms offered. In their consternation they 
sent for Yuan Shih-kai, who had been sent into retire- 
ment some years before, after the death of the Empress- 
Dowager Tze-hsi. Yuan did not respond immediately 
to their appeal, and when at last he arrived at Peking 
he did not betray any very striking signs of constructive 
statesmanship. The reform party captured Wuchang, 
Hanyang (with its arsenal), Hankau, and eventually 
Nanking. Fourteen provinces seceded, Canton and 
many other cities went over bodily to the republicans, 
and disorders began to spread in the northern provinces. 
Massacres of Manchus, retaliation by Imperial troops, 
self-immolation by women fearful of falling into the 
enemy's hands — all the familiar features of revolution 
in China are there, though not comparable to rebellions 
such as that of the Taipings, but so far foreigners have 
been protected, and there is no doubt that they will 
be safe so long as the reform leaders can control their 
following. 

Any attempt to bring the history of the revolution up 
to date would be useless. It is only possible to describe 



282 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

the issues in broad outline. At present the Manchus 
demand the submission of their position to the will of a 
national assembly. The reform party, whose head- 
quarters are at Nanking, do not trust such an assembly, 
as is not unnatural. Few of them would adventure 
themselves in Peking, where a price is still on the heads 
of some. Yuan stands between the dynasty and the 
republicans, and it is still possible that he will form the 
bridge between the old and the new order by becoming 
President of the Republic. But Dr. Sun and his 
followers appear to distrust the Viceroy ; and again, they 
cannot fail to remember that he betrayed the reform 
movement in 1898, and that till quite recently he has 
thrown his weight into the balance for a limited Manchu 
monarchy. The contest for the leadership between 
Yuan Shih-kai and Sun Yat Sen is unequal in some 
respects. The first is a high official, with great ad- 
ministrative experience, who raised and organized an 
army — the first real modern army in China — and who 
commands, moreover, the attention and respect of the 
foreign legations and press. Dr. Sun is a scholar, a 
scientist, and therefore likely to be esteemed by his 
countrymen. He has obviously imagination, devotion, 
and courage. He is trusted by Young China, but he has 
neither military or administrative experience, nor the 
prestige of official rank. In compelling Yuan to acquiesce 
in the abdication of the Manchus (even although the 
Viceroy may again change his mind) he has won the 
first rubber. In justice to Dr. Sun it must be said that 
he appears to be devoid of personal ambition, and has 
expressed his willingness to yield to Yuan his place as 
leader. But he has to reckon with his followers. 



WHITHER, CHINA? 283 

Whether or no the republican form of government 
is suited to China is a question which only time can 
answer. China already possesses the essentials of 
a democratic government, but (as is explained in 
other chapters) she has also, superimposed, a highly 
centralized system, which unites her parts to a single 
head. No people on earth are, in all probability, less 
likely to trouble about the label worn by their central 
government, but if the new republic is an autocracy 
in everything but name it will come into collision with 
the newly-formed and ambitious provincial assemblies. 
The question of State rights and Federal rights will be 
the more difficult to settle because under the old regime 
the provincial treasuries were perfectly independent so 
long as they transmitted a fixed sum to Peking. More- 
over, in the very incomplete and chaotic state of the 
national army the " martial law " period would be 
impossible for a central government to enforce. 

The possibility of a split in China has to be faced. 
So far as it was developed to me by Dr. Sun there was 
nothing in the republican scheme to adequately replace 
the Throne and dynasty as the focus of Chinese social 
and political life. The Emperor does not occupy the 
semi-divine position of his neighbour in Japan, but he 
does occupy a position as the apex of the social and 
political structure— as the Son of Heaven, and therefore 
the intermediary between his people and the Great 
Unseen, to which no popularly elected President can 
be elevated. The Emperor of Japan has magnified 
and elevated his office ; the Manchu dynasty have 
brought theirs into contempt. Probably it must go, 
and as the idea of reviving a native Chinese dynasty 



284 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

— there are peasant representatives of the Mings to be 
found, or the descendants of Confucius — does not seem 
to appeal to the Chinese imagination, there seems no 
alternative save a republic. The danger is that there may 
be more than one — China has split several times before, 
and if the strong sectional spirit which has been dis- 
cerned in the recent movement continues it is likely 
that she will split again. 

One change which is almost inevitable, sooner or 
later, is a change in the capital. Peking, lying in the 
extreme north, is further exposed by the Russo-Japanese 
control of Manchuria, the complete possession of Korea 
by Japan, and the threatened Russian "protection" 
of seceding Mongolia. An administrative centre 
nearer the heart of China, and particularly its great 
artery, the Yangtse, will become imperative, and in 
the writer's opinion should help to secure any new 
Chinese Government from the pressure which the 
geographical position of Peking has hitherto enabled 
certain foreign Powers to bring to bear in emergencies. 

Long ago General Gordon gave the Chinese advice 
which they have never forgotten, " Move your Queen 
bee to Nanking," and as a historical fact Peking is a 
Mongol and not a Chinese capital. 

Whither, China ? is indeed the vital question of the 
day, for upon the answer depends the fate of nearly one- 
fourth of the world's population. What the calibre o^ 
these people is may be partially judged by readers of 
this book. What their future may be under wise and 
prudent guidance no one can estimate. For Great 
Britain and the United States, who have no territorial 
ambitions in the Far East, the awakening of China is 



WHITHER, CHINA? 285 

of supreme interest on account of its reflex action on 
themselves. Their commercial policy must be pro- 
foundly affected by the opening of so great and populous 
a country to modern influences, and their foreign policy 
cannot leave out of account the future strength and 
possible tendencies of the awakened giant. But for 
one who visited China, studied her and her people, and 
succumbed to her fascination at a time when she was 
still little known in Europe and America, the pre- 
dominant feeling at this moment is one of satisfaction 
that her people are strong enough at last to throw off 
the Manchu blight, and of hope that their sterling and 
virile qualities, and admirable powers of organization, 
will carry them through the necessary initial disorders 
towards the haven of a stable and respectable govern- 
ment. 




SKETCH-MAP OF CHINA AND MANCHURIA SHOWING TREATY PORTS 
AND RAILWAYS. 



APPENDIX I 

MEMORANDUM RE RAILWAYS 

Railways built or being built with foreign capital are — 

The Chinese Eastern Railway \ about 1,100 miles ; Russian 

control. 
The South Manchurian Railway, about 803 miles; 

Japanese control (main line, 437 ; Mukden-Antung, 

189 ; branches, 177). 
These are the Manchurian lines, and are working. 

Imperial Railways of North China (Peking-Mukden), 
601 miles (main line, 522; branches, 79); British 
and Chinese money ; running. 

Peking-Hankau Railway ', about 755 miles ; Franco- 
Belgian money; running, and redeemed by China, 
1908 ; branches 60. 

Tientsin-Pukau Railway, about 635 miles; Anglo-German 
money; in construction; nearly completed except the 
Yellow River bridge. 

Shantung Railway, 256 miles; opened 1904; branch, 28; 
German. 

Szechuan-Hankau Railway, about 800 miles. 
Hankau- Canton Railway, about 750 miles. 

These lines are provided for under the so-called 

287 



288 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

" Four Nation Contract " (England, France, Ger- 
many, and United States) negotiated in 191 1, 
which has been the subject of general protest, and 
ostensibly the pretext for the present revolution. 
(Work not begun ; under Contract.) 

Taokau-Tsinghuai Railway \ about 96 miles ; British 
capital, redeemed by issue of bonds 1905. 

Shansi Railway ', 151 miles ; Belgian. 

Kaifeng-Honan Railway \ 140 miles ; opened 1908 ; 
Belgian. 

Shanghai- Nanking Railway, 193 miles; British money. 
Canton-Kaulun Railway, about no miles ; British money. 
Both now open to traffic. 

Yunnan Railway, about 300 miles ; open ; capital and 
control French. — Total 6,818 miles. 



Railways built and building with Chinese capital and by 
Chinese engineers (though not entirely so) are roughly as 
follows : 

Peking-Kalgan Frontier Railway, about 360 miles; 
124 miles open to Kalgan; balance under construction. 

Sunning Railway, 55 miles. 

Swatau-Chaochau, about 24 miles. 

Tungkwan-Honan fu Railway, about 166 miles; under 
construction. 

Kiang-si Railway, about 80 miles; under construction, 
Japanese engineers. 

Anhui Railway, about 150 miles; under construction. 

Chekiang-Kiangsu Railway, about 220 miles; Anglo- 
Chinese capital ; work suspended. 

Fukien Railway, about 33 miles. 



APPENDIX I 289 

And a few minor lines , about 100 miles; under con- 
struction. 
—Total i, 1 88 miles. 

In addition, there are about 3,000 miles of railway, projected 
to be " China built," but, as noted already, many of the 
schemes are in abeyance. 

The statement shows a total of 8,006 miles built or building? 
but the data obtainable are in some cases conflicting, and the 
figures are only given as approximate. 

According to M. E. de Laboulaye (Les Chemins de fer de 
Chine, 191 1) the sum which China will have to disburse in 
order to repurchase existing lines is no less than 1 milliard 
467 millions of francs (say, ^56, 280,000), or more than one- 
third of her total exterior debt. In tabular form details are 
given from which the following is taken, showing the share of 
the different countries interested : 

Francs. 

France ... ... 205,000,000 

France and Belgium 41,000,000 
France, Britain, ) 
Germany, U.S.A.] 

Britain 165,000,000 

Germany 66,138,000 

Germany and Britain 200,000,000 

Japan 231,882,000 (approximate)) Manchurian 

Russia 348,000,000 „ j Railways. 

Total 1,407,020,000 (say, ^56,280,000) 

Two-thirds of the railway network, in the opinion of 
M. de Laboulaye, belong to foreigners — one-third to Russia 
and Japan, and the other third to France, Germany, Britain, 
Belgium, and the U.S.A. 

19 



150,000,000 



APPENDIX II 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Boy, a male personal attendant or general servant. 

Cangue, or "wooden collar," the Chinese form of pillory, in 

which the neck and hands are confined. 
Cash, the Chinese copper coin, with a square hole in the 

centre, used for stringing. 
Cathay, the mediaeval name for China. 
Cattie = i J lbs. 
Chifu, a prefect. 
Chihtai, Governor- General, usually superintending the affairs 

of two provinces. 
Chin Chin, commonly supposed to be a corruption of the 

Chinese sounds Ching Ching, now generally used by 

Europeans as a form of greeting. 
Chop, a mark \ term generally applied to a trade-mark and to a 

stamped official document. 
Comprador, the chief Chinese employe in a foreign firm ; the 

middle-man between the firm and the Chinese. 
Coolie, a labourer or porter. 
Fan Kwei, "foreign devil," foreigner. 
Fan tai, provincial treasurer. 

Feng shui, " wind and water," a system of geomancy. 
Fu, a prefecture. 
Futai, a governor of a province, 

290 



APPENDIX II 29I 

Ginseng, a root, greatly prized by the Chinese for medicinal 

purposes, found in Manchuria and imported from America. 
Godown, a place for storing goods. 
Haikwan, Chinese Maritime Customs. 
Hanlin, the National Academy of Peking, admission to which 

is gained by competitive examination, conferring great 

distinction on those who are successful. 
Ho, a river. 

Hong, a mercantile firm, a building used as an orifice. 
Hoppo, an official, usually a palace favourite, appointed to 

certain provinces as head of the Native Maritime Customs. 
Hsiang, a village. 
Hsien, a district. 
Hu, a lake. 

Hui, a club or association. 
Hui Hui, a Mohammedan. 
Kiang, a river.! 
Kiao, a sect. 

Kitai, the Russian name for China. 
Kotow, literally "hitting the head on the ground," an act of 

prostration formerly demanded by the Chinese from 

foreign envoys. 
Lamas, the Buddhist priests of Tibet, who live together in 

lamaseries. 
Li, a Chinese mile = J of an English mile. 
Likin, an inland tax, well known from its being imposed on 

foreign goods in transit. 
Ling, a hill, peak, a pass. 
Lingchi, the punishment of " slicing to death," inflicted on 

parricides and others. 
Loess, called by the Chinese hwang-tu, a brownish-yellow earth, 

the chief physical characteristic of northern China. 
L.oti Shui, a terminal tax, imposed on goods arriving at their 

destination. 



292 CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 

Mafu, horse-boy or groom. 

Mandarin, a Chinese official. 

Miaotzu, the aborigines of certain provinces. 

Pailau, commemorative gateway or arch. 

Peking Gazette, the official gazette published at the capital. 

Picul— 133 lbs. 

Pu, a board of government. 

Red Book, sl quarterly publication containing the names, titles, 

salaries, etc., of all officials. 
Samshu, Chinese spirits, distilled from rice or millet. 
Shan, a mountain. 
Sheng, a province. 

Shihye, a secretary — a great power in all yam ens. 
Squeeze, generic term for extortion — official and otherwise. 
Sycee, ingots of silver. 

Ta Tsing Kwo, "great pure kingdom " — the Empire of China, 
the Manchu dynasty having been known as the Ta Tsing, 
or " great pure " dynasty. 
Tael, 1 J ounces of silver in weight ; now about 3s. 4d. in 

value. 
Tao, a circuit or group of departments. 
Taotai, an intendant of circuit. 
Tientzu, "Son of Heaven," the Emperor. 
Tsung Tu, Governor- General, usually superintending the 

affairs of two provinces. 
Tsungli Yamen, the bureau at the capital which was supposed 

to deal with foreign affairs, replaced by the Wai wu-pu. 
yamin, an official residence. 



APPENDIX III 



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INDEX 



Administration and Govern- 
ment, Chap. III. 
civil, 55 

conception of, 64 
precautions against mis- 
conduct, 65 
theory and practice, 67 
Alcock, Sir Rutherford, on 

Peking Gazette, 106 
il Altruism, Absence of," Arthur 

H. Smith, 102 
Ancestor worship, 38 
Anglo - Japanese Alliance of 

1905 and 191 1, 270 
Arabs, visits to China, 138 
Army, Abbe Hue, material for, 

Assembly, Provincial, 60 
Association, powers of, 97 

Thief Guild, 100 

variety of, 98 

Baber, Colborne, Chinese roads, 
238 

Boxer Rising of 1900, 166 

Bredon, Sir R., on Imperial 
Revenue, 82 

Bretschneider on Chinese me- 
dieval travellers, 139 

Britain, intercourse, 150, etc. 
war with China, 1856, 160 

Buddhism, 40 

from China to India, 138 



Burlingame, Anson, Embassy to 
Western Countries, 
190, etc. 
Mission from China, 
161 

Burma Convention of 1897, 161 

Canada, immigration policy, 262 
Capital of China, Gordon's 

opinion, 244 
Catholics, polic}' of, 46 
Cecil, Rev. Lord W. G., scheme 

for Central University, 134 
Censorate, 66 
Central Government, character 

of, 68 
Chang Chih Tung, educational 

reformer, 128 
Chi fu Convention, 161 
China and the Powers, Chap. 
XII. 
Asiatic immigration, 258, 

etc. 
attitude of Japan, 270 

of the Dominions, 266 
Australia and Asiatic ex- 
clusion, 266 
British policy, 254 
France, policy of, 252, etc. 
French and British policy, 

255 
intercourse between India 
and China, 253 



295 



2g6 



CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 



China and the Powers, Chap. 
XII. — continued : 

Tibet, 251 

treaties since 1898, 248, etc. 

United States, 257, etc. 
China and Religion, Chap. II. 
" China for the Chinese," 21 
China, Whither ? Conclusion, 

Chap. XIII. 
Chinese People, Chap. I. 

characteristics in business, 
27 

commercial dealings, 15 

Democracy, Chap. IV. 

endurance, 33 

gratitude, 28, etc. 

luck, 17 

private and public life, 19 

soldiers, 23 

the family idea, 18 
Christianity, Christian civiliza- 
tion, 48 

claim of Christian Bishop, 

45 
dissensions among Jesuits, 
Dominicans, and Fran- 
ciscans, 41 
France, missionary propa- 
ganda, 42 
German attitude, 43 
Japan and, 50 
Lazarists, 42 
legal status of, 44 
Nestorian, 40 
policy of Catholics and 

Protestants, 46 
prospects of, 47 
Treaty of 1858, 42 
Wensiang's Circular, 44 
Civil Administration, 55 
Coal, chief coal-fields, 222, etc. 

native use of, 221 
Commercial genius, 25, etc. 
" Commercial Press," 10, 126 
Communications, Chap. XI. 
Central Asian trade route, 
240 



Communications, Chap. XI. — 
continued ; 
famine time, 242 
Grand Canal, 236, etc. 
high roads from Peking, 

240 
railways, 245, etc. 
steam navigation, 245 
Confucius, 38, 82, 90 
Courage, 22 
Currency, 84 

Curzon, Lord, on " Open Door," 
256 

Democracy, Chinese, Chap. 
IV. 
power of the people, 91 
Diplomatic Intercourse, Chap. 

VIII. 
Dominicans, Jesuits, and Fran- 
ciscans, 41 
Doolittle, Justus, 2 

" Beggars' Association," 99 

East India Company, inter- 
course with, 151 
Economic Problem, Chap. X. 

capacity for manufactures 
and commerce, 232 

Chinese labour, 230, etc. 

coal, 221, etc. 

copper, tin, antimony, 226 

cotton-spinning and weav- 
ing mills, 229 

emigration, 231, etc. 

foreign trade, 233 

German coal-fields in Shan- 
tung, 226 

iron ores, 224 

Japanese enterprise, 256 

mineral deposits, 220 

opium, 230 

salt, coast evaporation and 
brine wells, 227 

silk, 229 * 

Soya bean, 228 



INDEX 



297 



Economic Problem, Chap. X. — 
continued : 
tea, 227 
tobacco, 229 
wool industry, 228 
zones, 220 
Education : Chinese students in 
Japan, 127 ; influence, 
132 ; in U.S.A. and U.K., 

133 
" Commercial Press," 126 
Confucian works, neglect, 

129 
Edict of Emperor in 1896, 

126 
foreign - trained students, 

125, etc. 
new movement, 130, etc. 
old and new, 125, etc. 
Embassy, foreign countries, 

first to, 160 
Emigration, 231, 258 

Japanese attitude towards, 
262, etc. 
Emperor, position of, 54 
Empress- Dowager, the late, 75, 

167 
Endurance, 33 
" Englishman in China," author 

of, on missionaries, 51 
Examinations, literary, 62 
Extra-territoriality, 43 

Family, master-key to Chinese 
polity, 55 

system, 57 
Famines, 242, etc. 
Finance, budget, 293 

loans, 294 
Foreign Relations, Chap. VII. 

trade, 233 
France, Franco-Chinese War, 
148 

intercourse of, 147, etc. 

missionary propaganda, 
42 
Franciscan missions, 139 



Franciscans, Jesuits, and Do- 
minicans, 41 
Fu tai, 59 

Geographic Question, Chap. IX. 

Aborigines, 216 

climate, 217 

features, 217 

" Great Plain " of North 
China, 214 

islands, 213 

Loess formation, 214 

mountain system, 201 

river system, 202, etc. 

the eighteen provinces, 200, 
etc. 

Wei basin, Richthofen on, 
207 ; Yangtse, 203 
Germany, Catholic priests, 43 

relations with 149, etc. 

Treaty of 186 1, 43 
Giles, A. H., 2, 34 
Gordon on Chinese capital, 244 

on Chinese soldier, 23 
Government, 90, 96 
Government and Administra- 
tion, Chap. III. 
Governors, Governors-General, 

powers of, 61 
Grand Canal, 236, etc. 
Gratitude, 28, etc. 
Guilds, 97 

Hart, Sir R., 82, 83, 187 

Hoang ho, 204 

Holland, intercourse of, 147 

Honan, coal-field, 224 

Hong - Kong : Crown Colony, 

160; University, 133 
Hue, Abbe : army and navy, 
24 ; associations, 97 ; 
Central Government, 
56 
Chinese placards, 108 

trader, 26 
Manchu policy, 142 
Throne, 89 



298 



CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 



Ignatieff, Manchu - Tartary 

coast, 145 
Imperial Maritime Customs, 81 , 
84 
structure, 54 
Islam, 40 

Jamieson, G., on land-tax, 82 
on provincial contributions, 
78 

Japan, Christian civilization, 50 
policy, 270 
relations, 163, etc. 

Jesuits, Dominicans, and Fran- 
ciscans, dissensions, 41 

Jewish Colony, 140 

Johnston, R. F., 3 

Kaiping, first coal-field, 224 
Rang - hi abolishes religious 
freedom, 41 

Labour, character of, 230, etc. 

Land Tax, 80, 82 

Lao-tsz, 38, 52 

Lay, Horatio, 187 

Li Hung Chang, foible of, 26, 

64, 73, 145, 194 
Likin, 82 

Loans, foreign, 294 
Lockhart, Sir Stewart, Chinese 

quotations, 115 
Loess formation, North China, 

214, etc. 

Mackay Treaty, 164 
Manchu policy, 141, 142 
Manchuria, Russian occupation, 

146 
^arco Polo, coal, 221 

travels, 141 
Mayers, Central Government, 

69 
Meadows, right of rebellion, 92 
Michie, A., Chinese people, 88 
Military sentiment, 21 
Mills, cotton, 229 



Missionaries, 41, etc. 

legal status, 44 

Michie, A., 51 
Mohammedans, 40 
Mongolia, Russian policy, 146 
Morse, H. B., postal system, 

85 
Muravieff, Amur province, 145 

Native Press, Chap. V. 

establishment of, 109 

future, 122 

in war time, 118 
Navy Board in 1890, 70 

Hue on material, 24 
Nestorian Christians, 40, 138 
New Learning, the, Chap. VI. 
Nicolo di Conti travels, 140 

Odoric, 139 

Official : censorate check, 65 ; 

expectants, 112 
Officials, laborious life, 71 

multifarious duties, 63 

payment, 76 
Opium, 160, 230 

I Palmerston policy, 189, 249 

i Pei ho, 204 

\ Peking Gazette, 105 

; Pliny, notices of Seres, 137 

I Policy, Chinese, 193, etc. 

Population, 205, 221 

Porte, R. P., Japanese cotton 
export, 256 
i Portsmouth Treaty, 146 
I Portugal, intercourse of, 147 
, Postal Department, 84 
j Protestants, policy of, 46 
I Provinces, autonomy, 60 
j Ptolemy, notices of Seres, 137 

j Railways, 245, etc., App. I. 

Rebellions, 92, etc. 
: Reclus, Chinese nomenclature, 

I 205 

1 Religion, Chap. II. 



INDEX 



299 



Republican Government, Sun 
Yat Sen's scheme, 67 

Revenue, 78, 80, App. III. 

Revolutions, classic ground of, 
92 

Richthofen, 90, 219, etc. 

Roads, 238 

Rockhill, estimate of popula- 
tion, 205 

Russia, intercourse, 143, etc. 
policy, 145, 249 

Salt Tax, 82 

Secret Societies, 94 

Sects, 96 

Self-sacrifice, 103 

Seres, notices by Ptolemy and 
Pliny, 137 

Shansi, greatest coal-field, 223 

Shen Pao, 116 

Shen-tao, 39 

Si Kiang, 204 

Silk, 229 

Simon, M. : economic future, 
219 ; family system, 57 

Smith, Arthur H., 2, 34, 102 

Soldiers' qualities, 23 

Spain, intercourse, 147 

Squeeze, official, 77 

Stein, Dr. Aurel, 139 

Sun Yat Sen, scheme of Re- 
publican Government, 67, 
103, 133 

Tao tai, 59 
Tea, 227 



Throne, feeling for, 21 
Tibet, 161, 251 

Tientsin, Treaty of i860, 160 
Trade, superintendence of, 70 
Treaty, 1858, 42 
Tribute, 82 

Tsungli Yamen, 69, 182 
Turkestan, Chinese, Russian 
action, 146 

United States, Chinese students 

in, 133 
education, 127 
relations, 168, etc. 
scholarships by Uni- 
versities, 130 
Universities : Chinese, Peking, 
128 ; Shansi, 128 ; Central 
University, 134 

Wai-wu-pu, the old Tsungli 

Yamen, 70 
Weights and measures, 85 
Wensiang, 44, 180 
Wolseley, Lord, 23 

Yangtse, 203 
Yuan, Shih-kai, 74, 128 
Yule, Sir H., Arab travellers, 
138 
China appellations of, 

136 
European intercourse, 

140 
Marco Polo's Seres, 137 
Odoric, 139 



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Sir Oliver Lodge, F.R.S. The Ether of Space. Illus. 
Prof. W. M. Flinders Petrie 

Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity 
Leo Tolstoy. The Teaching of Jesus 
Algernon Charles Swinburne 

Three Plays of Shakespeare 



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